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  • Press Releases - American Academy of Arts & Sciences
    and Sciences An initiative of the American Academy The Lincoln Project Excellence and Access in Public Higher Education is studying the importance of public research universities analyzing economic trends affecting their operation and recommending new strategies to sustain these institutions Additional context for the state financing of higher education offered by Public Research Universities Changes in State Funding includes Between 2008 and 2014 thirty six states cut inflation adjusted spending per FTE student by more than 20 percent 19 states cut by more than 25 percent and 10 states cut by more than 30 percent While states once spent more on higher education than Medicaid the reverse is now true and the gap is widening States now spend more than twice as much on Medicaid as they do on public higher education State spending on correctional institutions has grown much faster than education spending over the past three decades In 11 states corrections has now surpassed higher education as a percentage of funding Tuition increases have abated recently in response to modest increases in state support States that have continued with deep cuts are now the outliers Public higher education is perceived as a relatively flexible budget item a rarity among mandatory spending programs elsewhere in state budgets The Lincoln Project is making a serious effort to understand all of the factors that influence state governments as they adjust their contributions to public research universities said American Academy President Jonathan F Fanton A full understanding of this context will help to guide the committee s recommendations and should be useful in the ongoing discussion of the costs and benefits of public higher education Public research universities play a critical role in the American economy and in the lives of millions of Americans said Kay Bailey Hutchison former United States Senator from Texas and Lincoln Project member Yet in state budgets higher education competes for resources in areas that are either difficult or impossible to cut We owe it to Americans who can be served by these institutions to make substantive recommendations informed by a deep understanding of the reality on the ground as described in our latest publication Public Research Universities Changes in State Funding is the second in a series of publications from the American Academy s Lincoln Project This publication was based on analysis by Donald J Boyd Director of Fiscal Studies at the Rockefeller Institute of Government The first publication of The Lincoln Project Public Research Universities Why They Matter demonstrated the vital public good that public research universities represent in the nation The co chairs of The Lincoln Project are Robert Birgeneau Chancellor Emeritus University of California Berkeley and Mary Sue Coleman President Emerita the University of Michigan Funding for The Lincoln Project is provided by generous support from The William and Flora Hewlett Foundation The Spencer Foundation Carnegie Corporation of New York Thomas and Stacey Seibel Foundation and Robert and Colleen Haas Founded in 1780 the American Academy of Arts and Sciences www amacad org

    Original URL path: http://www.amacad.org/content/news/pressReleases.aspx?pr=10241 (2016-02-13)
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  • Press Releases - American Academy of Arts & Sciences
    effective mechanism for addressing the challenges of income inequality equity and inclusion We must preserve their excellence Across the country public research universities have responded to the financial crises of the past decade with enormous resilience and creativity added cochair of The Lincoln Project Mary Sue Coleman President Emeritus of the University of Michigan But limits have been reached and we now risk losing a valuable resource for every single state in this nation In addition to Coleman and Birgeneau the Lincoln Project advisory committee comprises scholars business and industry and political leaders Public Research Universities Why They Matter begins the discussion by highlighting five specific ways in which these institutions are vital to the public good Public Research Universities Serve the national interest With the demise of many private research laboratories our nation s universities are the primary sources of U S research discovery and innovation Contribute to the innovation economy Between 2012 and 2013 research at public research universities resulted in more than 13 340 patent applications 3 281 patents awarded and 693 start ups Provide quality educational opportunities and programs at a highly efficient cost An education from a public research university typically pays for itself within five to seven years of post graduate employment Work to maintain and improve access and affordability Of first year students entering public research universities in 2012 2013 83 of students received financial aid and 31 received Pell Grants Value responsible spending Tuition increases are driven mostly by cuts in state appropriations In response universities are cutting administrative costs and developing new funding models to reduce the burden on students Subsequent publications will examine the challenges facing higher education funding at the state level current and changing financial models of public research universities and the myriad impacts of the research conducted

    Original URL path: http://www.amacad.org/content/news/pressReleases.aspx?pr=10236 (2016-02-13)
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  • Food & Health of a Full Earth - American Academy of Arts & Sciences
    had one billion or fewer people adequately guide a world that is ten times more populous Or will new ethical principles be needed to live sustainably in this new context The answers to these and related questions must also consider a second major way we fill Earth our consumption Many but by no means all of the less developed nations of the world have rapidly growing economies Based on current growth trajectories citizens in developing nations are likely to gain three to five times more buying power within the next forty years This is a continuation of a trend that began in earnest in the early 1900s from 1900 to 2000 the buying power of the typical person on Earth increased 360 percent while the global population increased 270 percent What might the totality of global consumption look like in 2050 Consider the World Bank forecasts of the global economy and the United Nations projections of the global population Per capita inflation adjusted incomes are on a trajectory to increase 140 percent from 2000 to 2050 while the global population should increase 50 percent The cumulative effect of these global increases is a 260 percent increase in consumer buying power between 2000 and 2050 Urbanization also accompanies economic growth in 1960 slightly less than one billion people lived in cities By 2013 more than 3 5 billion people were urban By the time that the great human expansion reaches its limit the vast majority of the peoples of the world will be living in large cities and have incomes associated with middle class lifestyles Because incomes determine how much an individual can consume the full environmental impact of nine billion people in 2050 or ten to eleven billion by the end of the century will be much greater than is suggested by the increase in population alone Moreover greater consumption does not necessarily lead to better lives This is especially true for food The world s two billion overweight or obese people would likely be harmed rather than benefit from increased caloric consumption Indeed increasing global incomes and urbanization are strongly associated with dietary and lifestyle shifts that degrade health However the world s eight hundred million malnourished people would greatly benefit from increased incomes and better diets The future of humanity including our ability to live on Earth in ways that would allow future generations to enjoy a quality of life at least as high as ours will depend on the decisions we make in the coming decades These decisions will impact our diets our health and the abilities of managed and natural ecosystems to supply us with vital services and will also determine how many other species will share the planet with us Some of these decisions will be pragmatic others will be ethical The world faces many unavoidable tradeoffs Actions that provide a net benefit or profit to one individual such as a farmer applying more fertilizer to cropland to increase yields may come at a cost

    Original URL path: http://www.amacad.org/content/publications/pubContent.aspx?d=21955 (2016-02-13)
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  • Press Releases - American Academy of Arts & Sciences
    retired CEO of Lockheed Martin Jeannette M Wing Corporate Vice President Microsoft Research Roger M Perlmutter Executive Vice President Merck Co Inc and President Merck Research Labs and John D Evans Vice President International Science and Technology Lockheed Martin all took up the call to action to compel the federal government to return to consistent sustainable funding for basic research and recommit to restoring the United States as a leader in innovation The speakers urged support for the goals and policies set forth in the American Academy of Arts and Sciences report Restoring the Foundation The Vital Role of Research in Preserving the American Dream That report in turn led to the creation of Innovation An American Imperative a call to action signed by ten CEOs and chairpersons plus more than 300 organizations colleges and universities businesses and nonprofits from across all 50 states Each expressed their belief in the importance of federal funding for basic research to America s future productivity prosperity and strength Senators Lamar Alexander R Tennessee Chris Coons D Delaware and Gary Peters D Michigan and Representative Randy Hultgren R Illinois 14th spoke prior to the symposium The U S is now in 10th place in in R D investment among Organisation for Economic Co operation nations as a percentage of gross domestic product said Augustine who also is co chair of the Restoring the Foundation commission At this pace China will surpass the United States in R D intensity in about eight years Do we really want to watch that play out Among the policies cited today that would help America retain its position of leadership are End sequestration s deep cuts to federal investments in R D Make permanent a strengthened federal R D tax credit Improve student achievement in science technology engineering and

    Original URL path: http://www.amacad.org/content/news/pressReleases.aspx?pr=10244 (2016-02-13)
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  • Press Releases - American Academy of Arts & Sciences
    Lane Malcolm Gillis University Professor Rice University and Senior Fellow in Science and Technology at Rice University s Baker Institute the report recommends actions to recapture American leadership in scientific and engineering research including Securing America s Leadership in Science and Engineering Research Especially Basic Research by Providing Sustainable Federal Funding and Setting Long Term Investment Goals Establish a sustainable real growth rate of at least 4 in the federal investment in basicresearch Adopt multiyear appropriations for agencies or parts of agencies that primarily support research and graduate STEM education Ensuring that the American People Receive the Maximum Benefit from Federal Investments in Research Enhance the productivity of America s researchers particularly those based at universities by adopting best practices streamlining burdensome regulations and practices governing federally funded research reducing researchers time spent writing and reviewing grant proposals and fostering an appropriately sized and sustainable biomedical research workforce Regaining America s Standing as an Innovation Leader by Establishing a More Robust National Government University Industry Research Partnership Remove lingering barriers to university industry research cooperation by helping universities reevaluate their technology transfer policies Urge corporate boards and chief executives to place a higher priority on funding research in universities and to work with university presidents and boards to develop new forms of partnership that can justify increased company investments in university research On September 16 2014 Mr Augustine and Dr Lane will brief Congress on the Restoring the Foundation report at the Senate Visitors Center at 10 30 am Dr Lane testified this past July before the Senate Committee on Commerce Science and Transportation led by Sen John D Rockefeller IV D WV and Sen John Thune R SD At the hearing titled The Federal Research Portfolio Capitalizing on Investments in R D Dr Lane stressed the importance of federal investments in research emphasizing that new knowledge and technologies which are the products of research are the lifeblood of today s accelerating high tech knowledge based economy If the U S is to remain a leader in this new economy it will have to ensure that it has a robust science and engineering research enterprise that matches the challenge Mr Augustine a strong supporter and long time champion of science and technology has also heralded scientific research as an indispensable ingredient for the future of America and the American Dream During his TedX talk at Utah State University last fall he warned that the American Dream can survive but only if we have the willpower to make the changes I have described to make America a place that continues to offer opportunity to all people Norman R Augustine is the retired Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Lockheed Martin Corporation and Chairman of the Committee on Prospering in the Global Economy of the 21st Century which produced the landmark National Academies study Rising Above the Gathering Storm He previously served as Under Secretary of the U S Army was a member of the President s Council of Advisors on

    Original URL path: http://www.amacad.org/content/news/pressReleases.aspx?pr=229 (2016-02-13)
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  • Preface - American Academy of Arts & Sciences
    Overview Visiting Scholars Program Hellman Fellowship in Science and Technology Policy Policy Fellowship in the Humanities Education and the Arts Policy Fellowship in Global Security and International Affairs The Exploratory Fund Member Login User Name Password Forgot your password Home Nuclear Collisions Discord Preface Nuclear Collisions Discord Reform the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime Preface Nearly all of the 190 signatories to the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty NPT agree that the forty two year old treaty is fragile and in need of fundamental reform But gaining consensus on how to fix the NPT will require reconciling the sharply differing views of nuclear weapon states and non nuclear weapon states Strengthening the international rules is increasingly important as dozens of countries including some with unstable political environments explore nuclear energy The result is an ever increasing distribution of this technology In this volume Steven E Miller Harvard University Codirector of the Academy s Global Nuclear Future GNF Initiative outlines the main points of contention within the NPT regime and identifies the issues that have made reform so difficult How these deep divergences can be managed minimized or overcome is a crucial question for the future and a focus of the American Academy s GNF project For more than five decades the American Academy of Arts and Sciences has played an integral role in nonproliferation studies beginning with a special issue of Dædalus on arms control published in 1960 Today the GNF Initiative is examining the safety security and nonproliferation implications of the global spread of nuclear energy Through innovative scholarship and behind thescenes interactions with international leaders and stakeholders the Initiative is developing pragmatic recommendations for managing the emerging nuclear order The GNF Initiative is supported in part by grants from Carnegie Corporation of New York The William and Flora Hewlett Foundation The

    Original URL path: https://www.amacad.org/content/publications/pubContent.aspx?d=1004 (2016-02-13)
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  • Nuclear Collisions: Discord, Reform & the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime - American Academy of Arts & Sciences
    end a compromise was found largely because the Obama administration was determined that the 2010 conference be successful and core Arab League concerns were satisfied Indeed the action plan of the 2010 final document contains an entire section devoted to the Middle East Resolution that mostly echoes the Arab League formulations on the issue It stresses the importance of drawing Israel into the NPT calls for the full implementation of the 1995 resolution and proposes that the UN Secretary General convene a conference in 2012 to consider the establishment of a WMD free zone in the Middle East At least momentary success was achieved and the 2010 NPT Review Conference managed to issue a consensus final document to considerable acclamation However trouble soon ensued guaranteeing that this issue will continue to bedevil the NPT system Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu promptly declared that Israel would not attend such a conference subsequently Israel has been more flexible but its participation remains uncertain 51 The United States displayed a singular lack of enthusiasm for the entire enterprise In the aftermath of the 2010 NPT Review Conference very little was done to move forward the preparations for the 2012 conference The Arab League found itself back in a familiar position lamenting the lack of progress in following up on the 1995 Middle East Resolution and frustrated at what it sees as the disregard of its interests and preferences It is an inescapable reality of NPT diplomacy that a significant fraction of NPT member states is perennially dissatisfied by what they see as an unfair double standard applied in their region Israel for its part is preoccupied with worries about its security and sees the nuclear issue as inextricably bound up with the so far intractable conflict with its neighbors The Israeli government has remained outside the NPT has no binding legal obligations that might constrain its choices with respect to the possession of nuclear weapons and has thus far shown no willingness to alter its nuclear position in anything like the current geopolitical circumstances Prospects would be brighter if Israel were able to resolve its differences with its Palestinian and Arab League neighbors Israel s view of the WMD free zone in the Middle East might be considerably more favorable if it were confident that its sovereignty is respected by all regional players and its borders are agreed and accepted by all relevant parties A genuine and comprehensive peace settlement that ensures Israel s security could include the prospect of eventual Israeli membership in the NPT as a NNWS However such an outcome is not in view in the current harsh and unsettled environment in the Middle East Hence it is hard to see a happy resolution of the nuclear issue in the Middle East in any near or medium term time frame Accordingly this issue will linger on the NPT agenda a chronic unhealed wound that undermines the prospects for reforming and strengthening the regime Continued frustration and disaffection on the part of Arab League member states is to be expected In time the fundamental question may be whether this issue eventually causes some unraveling of the NPT regime Though explicit threats to withdraw from the NPT are generally avoided in official Arab positions they are sometimes voiced and in any case this threat is a latent implication of the Arab perception 52 Reconsideration of the Arab commitment to the NPT may turn out to be unavoidable if the nuclear status quo in the Middle East persists indefinitely with no signs of movement or progress NATO s Extended Deterrence Doctrine For most of the nuclear age the United States has extended nuclear guarantees to most of its allies It has promised to use nuclear weapons if necessary in defense of its security partners most famously in the context of NATO and Japan Within these alliances this nuclear arrangement is regarded as normal accepted and taken for granted as a feature of the international landscape Indeed Washington s nuclear protection commitments were already long in place when the NPT was signed and in the negotiation of the NPT they were specifically excluded from the constraints created by the treaty In Western eyes the negotiating history of the treaty is clear about this Washington and its allies see nothing wrong with or objectionable about the extension of a nuclear umbrella as a core element of the defense strategy of America s coalitions In the NPT context however Washington s nuclear guarantees to allies attract animated criticism This is viewed as yet another way in which the major powers exempt themselves and their friends and allies from the strictures of the NPT even while pressing for the creation of an ever more restrictive nuclear environment for NNWS members of the NPT Within NATO for example twenty eight member states enjoy the security benefits provided by nuclear weapons benefits that are denied all other NNWS members of the regime A substantial subset of the membership of the NPT is thus regarded as de facto members of the nuclear club relying on nuclear weapons and nuclear threats to undergird their security Moreover through NATO s nuclear consultative mechanisms these states have a voice in NATO s nuclear policy even if they do not themselves directly possess nuclear weapons This situation is viewed as unfair discriminatory and impossible to square with fundamental restrictions within the NPT itself In Article I of the NPT the NWS pledge that they will not provide nuclear assistance of any sort to any recipient whatsoever whether directly or indirectly Similarly in Article II NNWS pledge not to receive any such assistance including control over such weapons directly or indirectly To critics the joint pursuit of a vigorous alliance based nuclear deterrence doctrine is not compatible either with the broad purpose of the NPT aimed at limiting nuclear weapons and promoting disarmament or with the basic provisions of the treaty This issue then has become another grievance in the portfolio of dissatisfactions felt by some NNWS The NAM for example has launched explicit criticism of Washington s long standing habit of extending nuclear guarantees It opens its working paper to the 2010 NPT Review Conference with a discussion of Nuclear Doctrine and Nuclear Sharing expressing deep concern over the security doctrines of Nuclear Weapon States including the NATO Alliance Strategic Concept which not only sets out rationales for the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons but also maintains unjustifiable concepts on international security based on promoting and developing military alliances and nuclear deterrence policies In a clear swipe at NATO the NAM document urges states to refrain from nuclear sharing with other states under any kind of security arrangements including in the framework of military alliances And the NAM underscores that in its view this issue raises questions of treaty compliance emphasizing the particular importance attached to the strict observance of Articles I and II 53 Other critics make direct accusations of noncompliance based on their interpretation of the illegality of NATO s nuclear doctrine At the 2010 NPT Review Conference to cite just one example Iran urged that it is imperative for NPT member states parties to take the cases of violation of Article II by the NATO members very seriously 54 Certainly Washington and its close allies are not inclined to take seriously criticism from Iran a state they regard as both irresponsible and in violation of its own obligations in the NPT regime the NAM in startling contrast has chosen Iran to be its next leader beginning in 2012 NATO has always believed and insisted that its nuclear policies are compatible with the NPT and were taken into account when the NPT was negotiated Both historically and legally it has a case The political reality however is that many parties view the U S policy of extended deterrence to be just another example of the one sided and hypocritical character of the NPT regime the major powers and their closest friends can benefit from nuclear weapons others may not These several examples the U S India deal the Middle East Resolution and the NATO extended deterrence question demonstrate vividly that the problems and grievances seen by the have nots in the NPT regime are quite different from the roster of concerns that animate Western nonproliferation policy Indeed in some respects the viewpoints are wildly apart the U S India deal is seen as a diplomatic triumph in Washington but as a blatant breach of the rules by critics in the NPT system NATO s extended deterrence policy is seen as natural and desirable in Washington but as hypocritical and unlawful by critics from the nuclear have nots And with their sense of the regime s flaws being so far apart those on opposite sides of this fault line have highly divergent positions about how the regime should be reformed DIFFERING PERSPECTIVES ON REFORM It is commonly believed in the Western nonproliferation community that decades of experience with the NPT regime have revealed its flaws loopholes and inadequacies 55 Worries about the regime s adequacy to address present or future challenges have given rise to an agenda of reforms intended to strengthen the regime In Western nonproliferation circles there is wide belief if not near consensus that reform is desirable and probably necessary to strengthen the regime and to contain future challenges to the regime Many proponents of reform believe that the necessary steps are obvious the arguments for taking these steps are powerful and the needed international support should be forthcoming Further as Scott Sagan has argued in an important essay the obligation to promote nuclear disarmament as specified in Article VI of the NPT applies to all member states not just to NWS 56 Because nuclear disarmament will not be feasible in a world marked by weapons proliferation NNWS should see support for and participation in the strengthening of the NPT regime as part of their fulfillment of their own Article VI commitment in this view nuclear disarmament is a shared responsibility of both NWS and NNWS Such reasoning if accepted would lead to wide international support for improving the NPT regime In reality however nearly every significant proposed step meets with serious objection and none has attracted the universal support required to be accepted fully and comprehensively as an agreed upon element of the NPT system The often paralyzing disagreements about the need and desirability of reform and about what the elements of the reform agenda should be are laid bare by the effort to press NPT related reform Reinterpret Article IV to Restrict Fissile Material Production Article IV of the NPT confers on member states the inalienable right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy This expansive language is widely taken to mean that member states are entitled if they so choose to acquire the full panoply of technology associated with civilian nuclear power including those elements of the nuclear fuel cycle that have inherent weapons applications and implications From the early days of the NPT regime champions of nonproliferation were concerned that the permitted and legitimate spread of the nuclear fuel cycle was deeply problematic and had the potential to undermine the regime This interpretation allowed as Albert Wohlstetter s famous 1976 article suggested bomb making capability to spread without any rules being broken 57 In a subsequent essay from 1979 Wohlstetter complained about this perceived flaw in the NPT regime If an activity that brings a country very close to a nuclear weapon and that stops just short of assembly is legitimate then by assumption there is nothing wrong with it The government of that country has not violated the agreement 58 These long standing worries have only intensified in the context of the nuclear crises of recent years and in view of the potential for large growth in nuclear power in the coming decades Wohlstetter s prescient comments from more than three decades ago are echoed in contemporary nonproliferation discussions Russian expert Anatoly Dyakov voices the common refrain The fact that the nonproliferation regime has a loophole in the form of the right to develop the nuclear fuel cycle raises questions about whether the NPT meets nonproliferation objectives Dyakov has no doubt about the importance of the issue The biggest risk to the nonproliferation regime today comes from the spread of fissile material production capability 59 From this widely held and powerful diagnosis comes an obvious remedy close the loophole If the highest priority is to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons then it seems sensible if not imperative to limit or forbid the spread of the uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technologies that are necessary for the production of weapons grade fissile material Graham Allison has articulated the unassailable logic no fissile material no bomb 60 Reflecting this logic there has been growing interest in establishing the norm or adopting the rule that fissile material production technologies should not be acquired by or exported to any further states Allison himself has described this as the principle of no new nascent nukes Ashton Carter has similarly urged that t o plug this loophole the United States should champion a revision of the peaceful atom concept encouraging nuclear power where it is needed but opposing any new nations from operating enrichment or reprocessing facilities 61 This notion has become popular in nonproliferation circles and has inspired proposals and efforts intended to promote acceptance of the idea that states that do not now possess these sensitive technologies should not be permitted to obtain them President George W Bush launched perhaps the most prominent such initiative in a speech at the National Defense University in February 2004 Referring to the problem that civilian nuclear programs can be a route to the acquisition of nuclear weapons if uranium enrichment or reprocessing is acquired Bush stated explicitly I propose a way to close the loophole Bush s solution was rooted in a core premise Enrichment and reprocessing are not necessary for nations seeking to harness nuclear energy for peaceful purposes And his proposal was direct and unambiguous The 40 nations of the NSG should refuse to sell enrichment and reprocessing equipment to any state that does not already possess full scale functioning enrichment and reprocessing plants Bush was also clear about the benefit of this bold proposal This step will prevent new states from developing the means to produce fissile material for nuclear bombs 62 At least within the nonproliferation community this idea became a staple in discussions about reforming and strengthening the NPT regime and by 2009 a variant of Bush s proposal had found its way into UN Security Council Resolution 1887 Passed in connection with a UN summit in New York that brought together heads of state to address the international nuclear policy agenda UNSCR 1887 paragraph 13 urges states to adopt stricter national controls for the export of sensitive goods and technologies of the nuclear fuel cycle 63 Advocates of forbidding the spread of fissile material production capabilities recognize that recipient states have a right under the NPT to enjoy the benefits of nuclear power However the inalienable right to peaceful nuclear technology they argue does not necessarily imply assured access to the entire nuclear fuel cycle 64 Moreover it is possible to utilize nuclear power without pursuing enrichment or reprocessing this requires simply that nuclear fuel be purchased on the international market rather than being produced domestically 65 This family of ideas has proven to be controversial and divisive Some recipient states may be willing to pledge to forsake fissile material production as a condition of nuclear cooperation with major supplier countries Abu Dhabi for example made such a promise when negotiating its nuclear cooperation deal with the United States giving rise to the hope that there might be an Abu Dhabi model that would be widely acceptable among recipient states More commonly however this approach meets with skepticism resistance rejection and even anger that the terms of the NPT bargain are being challenged or modified in such a major way Thus President Bush s initiative to prevent any spread of enrichment or reprocessing to any additional countries was opposed widely and rejected even by members of the NSG As one former U S official explained Non nuclear weapon states and developing nations saw the U S proposals as blatant efforts to divide the nuclear world into two separate but unequal parts as a repudiation of the basic bargain of the NPT and as a tactic to widen the divide between the nuclear haves and have nots 66 Moreover those who view themselves sometimes with reason as victims of the restricted international nuclear marketplace are particularly dubious about the advisability of forfeiting national fissile material production capabilities and relying instead on international fuel arrangements or assurances As Iranian nuclear negotiator Naseri commented in 2005 The moves towards restrictions on nuclear fuel production under the pretext of non proliferation are bound to make the developing countries dependent on an exclusive cartel of nuclear fuel suppliers a cartel that has a manifest record of denials and restrictions for political and commercial reasons 67 It is not surprising that Iran would feel this way considering that it has been largely though not entirely cut off from the legitimate nuclear marketplace over a period of several decades However the rejection of this idea is widespread and fundamental deriving from a sense of rights potentially abridged and bargains violated Indeed ElBaradei has noted that Iran s stance resonates for this very reason With Iran being one of the few Muslim countries that stood up to the West during this period it increasingly was viewed by Muslims of many nationalities as the sole defender of their trampled rights 68 The reaction of the NAM is illustrative particularly insofar as it represents a majority of NPT members In the working paper it submitted to the 2010 NPT Review Conference the NAM declared itself to be comprehensively against limits on nuclear technology transfer States parties to the Treaty are called upon to refrain from imposing any restriction or limitation on the transfer of nuclear equipment material and technology to States Parties with comprehensive safeguards agreements In a clear if indirect criticism of efforts to penalize and coerce Iran for its pursuit of enrichment technology the NAM argued that states should be free to choose their nuclear technology path without fear of retribution it reaffirmed that each country s choices and decision in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be respected without jeopardizing its policies or international cooperation agreements and arrangements for peaceful uses of nuclear energy and its fuel cycle policies And on the specific question of limits on the nuclear fuel cycle the NAM could not have been more emphatic the NAM states reject in principle any attempts aimed at discouraging certain peaceful nuclear activities on the grounds of their alleged sensitivity and emphasize that any ideas or proposals pertaining to the nonproliferation of any peaceful technology which are used as a pretext to prevent the transfer of such technology are inconsistent with the objectives of the NPT 69 Tighten Export Controls The Article IV controversy is closely linked to the issue of export controls Whether recipients like it or not nuclear suppliers have established rules and can adopt stricter rules that limit the commercial transfer of sensitive nuclear technologies Disagreement over export controls reflects a basic tension in the NPT regime between promoting and facilitating the use of civilian nuclear power on the one hand and limiting the spread of sensitive weapons related nuclear technologies on the other Coordinated export control arrangements are manifest in intergovernmental organizations such as the NSG as well as in national or multilateral sanctions which are aimed at depriving particular states of access to certain technologies or to the nuclear market more generally These restrictions are unwelcome and indeed sometimes viewed as illegal by recipient countries The NSG did not exist and was not envisioned at the time that the NPT was negotiated and the NNWS were given their Article IV guarantees of access to nuclear technology Now comprising forty six members including all major suppliers the NSG s explicit purpose is restricting the supply of nuclear technology particularly sensitive nuclear technology to states that do not meet agreed criteria The NSG fashions lists of restricted items and establishes standards that must be met by potential recipients if they are to be acceptable partners in nuclear commerce The goal is to harmonize the export controls of the suppliers and thereby limit the spread of weapons related technologies Though it is an informal and voluntary association whose strictures are not legally binding the NSG has been fairly effective in influencing the pattern of nuclear trade Within the Western nonproliferation community the NSG is regarded as a positive feature of the regime to be strengthened and updated to the extent possible 70 Many NNWS however regard the export controls as problematic and the NSG as an unwelcome cartel that denies them access to nuclear technology despite their Article IV rights under the NPT The 2010 working paper of the NAM for example complains explicitly about what it terms undue restrictions on exports to developing countries 71 Regarding the NSG and associated groups Egyptian diplomat and nonproliferation specialist Mohamed Shaker has commented Who would have expected the rise of five major informal export control regimes governing inter alia nuclear trade These regimes place obstacles before non nuclear weapon states that could be interpreted as constituting a serious departure from the inalienable right enshrined in Article IV This is another real challenge that must be met particularly now with the renewed interest in nuclear power worldwide Adopting multilateral approaches for the assurances of supply of fuel and or enriched uranium such as an international fuel bank will not be sufficient to answer the concerns of non nuclear weapon states A dialogue is badly needed between suppliers and users for a fair interpretation of Article IV and users must be involved in decisions affecting their economic development 72 Interest in strengthening the NSG has existed since its founding some four decades ago and complaints about the discriminatory nature of NSG restrictions and their incompatibility with Article IV have been around about as long This perennial conflict is unavoidable because as Harald Müller pointed out long ago efforts to constrain the flow of dual use technologies reflect a more restrictive interpretation of Article IV 73 Indeed as one expert assessment has concluded many NNWS believe that the NSG is engaged in a willful and systematic violation of Article IV sup 74 Here again contrary instincts emerge Western nonproliferators want to strengthen and update NSG constraints on nuclear trade whereas the NAM wants to relax undue restrictions on nuclear exports While the NSG seeks to coordinate common rules among nuclear suppliers export controls are exercised at the national level typically in bilateral arrangements or deals Here too there is considerable potential for friction There is acrimony when states are hostile to one another and prohibitions against nuclear technology transfer are intended to deny market access as much as possible and are strictly enforced as between Iran and the United States Little wonder that Iran complains about its treatment But efforts to restrict flows of nuclear technology or constrain nuclear technology options have caused surprisingly tense interactions among friends and allies The United States and South Korea for example are in the midst of renegotiating their nuclear cooperation agreement in anticipation of the existing agreement s expiration Major contention has arisen over South Korea s interest in pursuing plutonium reprocessing and fast breeder reactors and Washington s refusal so far to accept South Korea s pursuit of that path which is prohibited in the current agreement There appears to be real anger in Seoul at Washington s refusal to fix what South Korea regards as a problem with the current agreement and the issue has produced remarkable outbursts of bitterness The conventional wisdom in Korea writes journalist Lee Byong Chul is that the United States can no longer act like a so called Nuclear Gestapo that attempts to define and dictate what is acceptable and what is not South Korea he complains has been relegated to second class status 75 Thus even in the context of a close alliance the effort by a nuclear supplier to circumscribe the options and veto the preferences of a recipient produces toxic political consequences that reinforce divisions within the NPT regime In sum to prevent the spread of weapons related nuclear technology key supplier states and many nonproliferation experts advocate a more robust export control regime with tighter rules updated lists of restricted items and better implementation and enforcement This instinct is regarded as all the more important as interest in nuclear power has spread around the globe In this view it is imperative to strengthen the export control regime to cope with a more nuclearized international order it is necessary if the world is to benefit from greater utilization of nuclear power while avoiding the potential proliferation risks From the perspective of many recipients and other have not states restrictive multilateral and unilateral nuclear export controls are undesirable and unwelcome They are widely regarded as conflicting with basic rights conferred on NNWS and as a betrayal of one of the core bargains of the NPT Even states that have no interest in the nuclear fuel cycle are reluctant to acquiesce in the abridgment of their presumed right to acquire it if they choose to do so As many recipient critics see it export controls represent noncompliance by the supplier states and provide a vivid example of the major powers hypocrisy in using the NPT regime to constrain nuclear have nots while breaking the promises that brought have not states into the regime in the first place The basic contradiction between these opposing views seems sure to remain a vexing issue on the NPT agenda so long as any recipient states have any interest in pursuing the full fuel cycle Close the Article X Loophole Under Article X of the NPT states have a legal right to withdraw from the treaty Though some legal scholars argue that this right is not completely unconstrained Article X is generally regarded as unconditional because the option to withdraw is entirely at the discretion of member states and requires only notification three months in advance 76 This notification is required to include a statement explaining why the state believes its interests are so jeopardized that it must withdraw from the treaty but otherwise nothing is demanded of the withdrawing state No organization or international body must give assent no adjudicating authority must accept the justification for withdrawal There has been growing concern particularly since the withdrawal of North Korea from the NPT in 2003 and its subsequent acquisition of nuclear weapons that Article X could be misused for purposes contrary to the NPT Two scenarios stand out as especially worrisome First states could withdraw from the treaty and then develop nuclear weapons by utilizing the nuclear technology accumulated while a member in good standing of the regime Second states that are found to have committed violations of their safeguards obligations could respond by withdrawing from the treaty as North Korea did In these scenarios Article X becomes in effect a route to nuclear proliferation that can be exploited by states seeking nuclear weapons Responses to these concerns have caused Article X to become another source of contention within the NPT regime On the one side are those who believe as Pierre Goldschmidt has written that the regime is damaged or undermined by the belief that a state can legally withdraw from the NPT without consequences 77 From this perspective it is highly desirable to reinterpret Article X to be more restrictive or more conditional The most dramatic suggestion has been offered by the prominent International Commission on Nuclear Non proliferation and Disarmament It argued in its 2009 report that withdrawal should no longer be regarded as an available option given the near universality of the NPT and the growing international concern over nuclear weapons 78 This bold idea amounts to a negation of Article X and it would no doubt be highly controversial if it were pushed more centrally onto the international agenda Hence the United States which otherwise is an energetic advocate of strengthening the constraints and conditions associated with Article X has sought to distance itself from this suggestion 79 Several other ideas about how the Article X withdrawal option might be refined have been more widely pushed by advocates of strengthening the regime 80 First there is the proposition that withdrawal should not be an acceptable remedy for cheating States that have been found in noncompliance with their obligations under the NPT and associated safeguards agreements should remain accountable for their transgressions even if they withdraw from the treaty Second it has been proposed that safeguards agreements should not terminate when a state withdraws from the NPT According to this logic nuclear technology accumulated while within the regime should properly remain under international monitoring to assure that it is not used for weapons purposes safeguards in perpetuity as Goldschmidt describes it Third it has been suggested that states that withdraw from the NPT should not be allowed to keep the nuclear technology they were able to acquire because they were members of the regime Many urge that suppliers insist on take back agreements with customers to establish that nuclear technology exports at a minimum any dual use items will be returned to the supplier in the event of a withdrawal Finally the UN Security Council could discourage withdrawal by making it known in advance that it would regard withdrawal as a threat to international peace and security and thereby subject to punitive action Some have urged the UN Security Council to make clear its intention to address NPT withdrawals should they occur Such ideas find wide favor in the Western nonproliferation community and pursuing such norms has been a high priority for a number of states including the United States 81 Some progress has been made in promoting acceptance of these ideas In UNSCR 1887 aimed at promoting global nuclear security paragraphs 17 and 18 echo the Article X reform agenda UNSCR 1887 calls for the Security Council to address NPT withdrawals without delay insists that noncompliant states will remain responsible for violations of the treaty even if they withdraw and encourages supplier states to establish the condition that they have the right to take back nuclear technology in the event of noncompliance or withdrawal by the recipient state 82 UNSCR 1887 is not a legally binding instrument and the UN Security Council is not wholly representative of the international community at large or the 189 members of the NPT Still it is an indication that efforts to reinterpret or attach conditions to Article X are far from universally objectionable Indeed the president s report issued at the end of the 2010 NPT Review Conference says that numerous states support these ideas 83 Yet in many quarters the idea of reinterpreting Article X to make it more restrictive provokes strong criticism and resistance On occasion as at the Abu Dhabi conference organized by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in December 2009 discussion of modifying Article X evokes harsh reactions and the proposal is denounced as an unfortunate initiative that is sure to be polarizing and that will undermine other elements of the NPT reform agenda 84 Respected voices in the international nonproliferation community have urged caution in raising the Article X issue Mohamed Shaker for example has written that the withdrawal clause Article X offers a needed safety valve and should not be tampered with The Security Council should be in a position to differentiate between genuine and false reasons for withdrawing especially in post non compliance situations and act accordingly No penalties should be imposed on a state found by the Security Council to be withdrawing for legitimate and convincing reasons 85 Former UN Under Secretary General for Disarmament Affairs Jayantha Dhanapala warns that making Article X more restrictive may seem like imprisoning states parties cutting at the root of the sovereign right of states to join and leave treaties in accordance with their perception of national security It will cause deep resentment especially among the NAM 86 Such comments reflect the perception that states do not want to feel trapped in the NPT and therefore they object to the notion that major states whose own performance within the regime is questioned should make it more difficult for other states to leave the regime if they so wish The proposed restrictions it is noted are not relevant to NWS whose nuclear armed status is recognized by the treaty Further some states feel as indicated by the position of the Arab League with respect to the Middle East WMD free zone that the threat of withdrawal may be necessary in order to advance their interests within the NPT regime they see ample evidence that in normal circumstances their interests and preferences are ignored or rejected by major players in the regime The Article X issue was raised at the 2010 NPT Review Conference but discussions were inconclusive reflecting the clash of views Review Conference President Libran Cabactulan s report commented neutrally that t here were divergent views regarding Article X s interpretation with respect to other relevant international law 87 Not surprisingly therefore the final document approved by the states parties to the NPT makes no mention of Article X in its enumeration of an action plan Requiring the Additional Protocol In the aftermath of the 1991 war against Iraq it was discovered that Saddam Hussein s regime had made considerable undetected progress on an illicit nuclear weapons program though it had been subjected to regular IAEA safeguards inspections This shocking revelation highlighted the limits of the existing safeguards system and provoked an effort within the IAEA to promote more effective measures to improve the IAEA s ability to detect covert activities related to the development of nuclear weapons What emerged from this exercise was a model document known as the Additional Protocol which was approved by the IAEA Board of Governors in May 1997 A supplement to traditional safeguards agreements and available for adoption by all NPT member states the Additional Protocol increases the transparency of the NPT regime by expanding the IAEA s access to both information and facilities 88 The Additional Protocol requires that states provide information about their nuclear activities more comprehensively and more promptly significantly enlarging the volume and scope of information that must be provided to the IAEA It empowers the IAEA to visit and inspect a wider range of facilities including not only declared nuclear facilities already covered by the traditional safeguards system but also undeclared facilities as specified by the IAEA The Additional Protocol further permits the IAEA to employ more intrusive methods such as short notice inspections and environmental sampling that strengthen the IAEA s ability to discover hidden weapons related nuclear activities Altogether the Additional Protocol is widely regarded as a significant augmentation of the safeguards system a serious confidence building measure and to many an integral and necessary element of an adequate verification framework for the NPT regime Accordingly calls for states to sign ratify and allow the application of the Additional Protocol are ubiquitous in discussions of the NPT reform agenda The International Commission on Nuclear Non proliferation and Disarmament for example urges the universal take up of the Additional Protocol suggests that it has become the contemporary standard for NPT safeguards and recommends that supplier states make acceptance of it a condition for the provision of nuclear exports 89 UNSCR 1887 does likewise describing it as one of the essential elements of the IAEA

    Original URL path: https://www.amacad.org/content/publications/pubContent.aspx?d=1005 (2016-02-13)
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  • A Different Point of View on Reform of the Nonproliferation Regime - American Academy of Arts & Sciences
    has two classes of membership each with different sets of rights and obligations The NPT was never intended by default to be permanent the expectation was that each class of members would eventually fulfill its obligations under the treaty Yet when the NPT was extended indefinitely in 1995 it created the misperception at least to some members that indefinitely means permanently THE PANORAMIC DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEMS In this part of the paper Miller clearly and objectively describes the different aspects of the nonproliferation regime the different opinions about the regime and the obstacles facing it This section considers the criticism that each group has of the other and how each perceives the NPT Miller focuses on a number of important and controversial issues such as rights to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy the universality of the treaty reinterpretations of the different articles particularly the withdrawal clause and the establishment of a nuclear weapons free zone in the Middle East The nonproliferation regime has faced serious crises ever since its inception but this has been particularly the case since the end of the seemingly successful 2000 NPT Review Conference 1 The multilateral community has been divided over a host of controversial issues relevant to the regime including compliance and noncompliance universality of the NPT the status of the three non NPT members India Israel and Pakistan nuclear disarmament including reductions in strategic and nonstrategic nuclear arsenals modernization and replacement of nuclear weapons systems preventing nuclear terrorism concerns about nuclear doctrines and policies including the use of nuclear weapons security assurances the CTBT and FMCT IAEA safeguards and the Additional Protocol export controls nuclear weapons free zones especially in the Middle East concerns relating to the nuclear programs of Iran and North Korea nuclear energy rights under the treaty the dilemma of nuclear fuel supply versus the proliferation risks posed by fuel enrichment the destabilizing force of the U S India nuclear deal and the questions related to the right to withdraw from the NPT These are serious differences and points of contention however they are also symptoms of far deeper problems The discriminatory nature of the NPT has created two classes of members the haves and the have nots The imbalance between the negotiating powers of the two groups has led many to judge the regime as biased and coercive Structural deficiencies in the treaty prevent serious progress these include an institutional deficit that is the lack of direct and effective structures or mechanisms for NPT parties to address issues of compliance implementation accountability and withdrawal Miller touches on this topic but I believe it requires further analysis There is a disconnect between the three pillars of the NPT with NWS focusing on nonproliferation and compliance while NNWS insist that disarmament by NWS is an integral part of the commitments under the treaty International discourse on nonproliferation has been distorted into talk of responsible and irresponsible states and the different rights of each category without establishing criteria

    Original URL path: https://www.amacad.org/content/publications/pubContent.aspx?d=1006 (2016-02-13)
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