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  • Introduction - American Academy of Arts & Sciences
    interest and emphasis given to nuclear disarmament by the leaders of the nuclear weapons powers have waxed and waned throughout the history of the NPT and for much of the past decade many governments in NNWS have complained that the disarmament goal has been given short shrift by those with nuclear weapons Renewed interest in arms control and restated commitments to the long term goal of nuclear disarmament have clearly increased over recent years most dramatically with President Barack Obama s April 2009 speech in Prague With that change in focus comes an opportunity for the international community to rethink how Article VI of the NPT is traditionally interpreted and to move beyond the cycle of repeated complaints from the have nots that the haves are not doing enough to disarm themselves and repeated retorts by the haves that they are already taking every step that is realistic or prudent The promise of a different approach to the commitments made under the NPT forms the basis of the Scott Sagan s valuable article Shared Responsibilities for Nuclear Disarmament which was the concluding essay in the Fall 2009 special issue of Daedalus that focused on the global nuclear future Sagan s paper and its call for rethinking the balance of responsibilities and the relationship between different articles in the NPT now provides the basis for a series of invited response papers from seven distinguished authors These international scholars and diplomats present their interpretations of the commitments made under the NPT regime and suggest new ways in which shared responsibilities for nuclear disarmament may or may not be realized in practice Their contributions serve to expand the discussion that was started by the original Daedalus article and together they are intended to spark renewed policy debates about how best to pursue global disarmament debates that will be prominent at the May 2010 NPT Review Conference in New York City and in the years following that important meeting The distinguished authors in this American Academy of Arts and Sciences Occasional Paper come from a diverse set of countries and reflect a diverse and crosscutting set of perspectives on the disarmament debate With respect to nuclear arsenals Scott Sagan United States and James Acton United Kingdom are from NWS Harald Müller Germany Jayantha Dhanapala Sri Lanka Mustafa Kibaroglu Turkey Yukio Satoh Japan Mohamed Shaker Egypt and Achilles Zaluar Brazil are leading specialists from NNWS Three of these states Germany Turkey and Japan are U S allies and come under extended nuclear deterrence guarantees Sri Lanka Egypt and Brazil however do not With respect to the use of nuclear energy today Brazil Germany Japan the United States and the United Kingdom all maintain nuclear power plants Sri Lanka Egypt and Turkey are aspirant nuclear energy states and have not yet constructed the power plants that they hope to use in the future The differences in national perspectives and the differences in individual opinions about appropriate disarmament steps among the authors should not mask a commitment

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  • Chapter 1: Shared Responsibilities for Nuclear Disarmament - American Academy of Arts & Sciences
    Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency IAEA decides whether or not a state is in compliance with its specific safeguards commitments But the IAEA does not determine the appropriate response to a safeguards violation that is not remedied in a timely fashion instead it reports any such case of noncompliance to the UN Security Council and the General Assembly as it did in 2004 with respect to Libya and in 2006 with respect to Iran and then the Security Council must decide on appropriate responses 9 Second Article IV refers to all the Parties to the Treaty not just the NNWS This should lead to increased opportunities to share responsibility for nonproliferation and disarmament for it suggests that as part of their Article IV commitment the NWS should reaffirm that international safeguards can eventually be placed on all of their nuclear power plants and enrichment and reprocessing facilities Indeed such an agreement in principle with an exception for facilities with direct national security significance was in fact made by President Lyndon Johnson in 1967 as a major compromise during the NPT negotiations 10 Reaffirming this commitment as a responsibility under Article IV should be easy to accept in principle after all if NWS are committed to working in good faith toward nuclear disarmament at some point they would become to coin an acronym FNWS former nuclear weapons states and the safeguard exceptions they currently maintain would no longer apply In practice it would be helpful for NWS to go beyond reaffirmations and expressions of principle and pick one or more model facilities to place under advanced safeguards to demonstrate future intentions and help create best practices Strict safeguards on existing nuclear fuel production facilities in the NWS are not really necessary today to ensure that the materials from the plants are not diverted for nuclear weapons since NWS already have sufficient fissile materials from their military nuclear production programs But placing new facilities under IAEA safeguards would signal equitable treatment and a long term commitment to disarmament Similar safeguards will also be needed if a Fissile Material Cut off Treaty FMCT ending the production of materials for weapons is successfully negotiated though in this case the verification and safeguarding functions would be best handled at least initially by a new organization of inspectors from NWS rather than the IAEA so as to limit access into sensitive former weapons material production facilities Third responsibilities for sharing the financial support of IAEA international safeguards can be improved Today each IAEA member state pays into a regular budget of the Agency from which the Safeguards Division draws funds for its inspection programs but the Agency is strapped for funds to deal with the current level of inspections and will be much more so if nuclear power continues to expand as expected and if the more intrusive regime required by the Agreed Protocol which calls for advanced inspections comes into force One approach that has been advocated is to have states pay more into the IAEA safeguards budget in proportion to the number and kinds of facilities they have on their soil that are subject to inspection This approach however places the financial burden only on the state that benefits from the nuclear power plant or fuel facility in question and ignores that the nonproliferation benefits of the safeguards are shared by all states A better approach would be to have all governments both NWS and NNWS and both states with nuclear power programs and those without nuclear power substantially increase their funding support for the IAEA to enhance its future safeguards capabilities Indeed it would be possible to have private industry and even philanthropic organizations interested in promoting more safe and secure use of nuclear power also contribute to the IAEA safeguards budget 11 Article VI of the NPT states in full Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relatingto cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control Many diplomats from NNWS have complained at virtually every NPT review conference that the NWS have not done enough to meet their disarmament commitments and the May 2009 NPT Preparatory Committee meeting was not unusual in that regard The NNWS complaints are not without some merit for the recent Bush administration did not follow through on some of the disarmament related commitments most specifically seeking ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty that previous administrations had made at NPT review conferences 12 In addition some former U S government officials have unhelpfully claimed that the United States never really intended to keep its Article VI commitments Former CIA Director John Deutch for example asserted in Foreign Affairs in 2005 that Washington was unwise to commit under Article 6 of the Nonproliferation Treaty NPT to pursue good faith negotiations toward complete disarmament a goal it has no intention of pursuing 13 The Bush administraion s 2001 U S Nuclear Posture Review was also widely interpreted to signal movement away from the NPT commitment to nuclear disarmament because the document declared that U S nuclear weapons possess unique capabilities to hold at risk targets that are important to achieve strategic and political objectives it called for the development of new nuclear warheads and it outlined a strategy of dissuasion the policy of maintaining such a large advantage in military forces including nuclear that other states would be dissuaded from even considering entering into a military arms competition with the United States Many diplomats and scholars have spoken about the specific arms control and disarmament steps the United States and other NWS could take to demonstrate that they are pursuing their Article VI commitments more seriously Missing from this debate is a discussion of what the NNWS can do to help in the disarmament process Looking at shared responsibilities points to two specific ways in which the NNWS can better honor their Article VI commitments First just as NWS and NNWS should share responsibilities for funding the increasingly advanced international safeguards necessary for nuclear power facilities the NWS and NWS should both contribute significantly to funding the necessary major research and development effort for improved monitoring and verification technologies that will be needed if nuclear disarmament is to progress to very low numbers of weapons In October 2008 the British government invited the governments of the other NPT recognized nuclear states the United States Russia France and China to participate in a major technical conference examining future verification challenges and opportunities Even more importantly the British government recognized that R D for disarmament verification must not occur in splendid isolation and so jointly sponsored test programs with the Norwegian government laboratories to identify promising technologies that would permit Norway and other NNWS to be more directly involved in implementing and monitoring future global nuclear disarmament 14 Second focusing on shared responsibilities helps identify a more direct and stronger linkage between Article VI and Article IV of the NPT Because NWS will be less likely to accept deep reductions to zero or close to zero if there are more and more states with latent nuclear weapons capability because of the spread of uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technologies NNWS have both an individual interest and a collective responsibility to make sure that constraints are placed on sensitive fuel cycle facilities In short the NNWS should recognize that entering into negotiations about international control of the nuclear fuel cycle is an essential part of their Article VI commitment to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race A third common criticism of the disarmament goal is that nuclear force reductions might backfire inadvertently encouraging nuclear proliferation by undercutting U S extended deterrent commitments In September 2008 for example Secretary of Energy Samuel Bodman and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates declared that the United States will need to maintain a nuclear force for the foreseeable future basing this position in part on the need to protect U S non nuclear allies The role nuclear forces play in the deterrence of attack against allies remains an essential instrument of U S nonproliferation policy by significantly reducing the incentives for a number of allied countries to acquire nuclear weapons for their own In the absence of this nuclear umbrella some non nuclear allies might perceive a need to develop and deploy their own nuclear capability 15 The term nuclear umbrella however should be deleted from the strategic lexicon used by government officials and scholars alike It connotes a defensive passive strategy as if Japan South Korea and NATO countries were protected by some kind of missile defense shield rather than the threat of retaliation with nuclear weapons against a state that attacks a U S ally Even more importantly the nuclear umbrella term does not differentiate between two very different kinds of extended deterrence policies a U S commitment to use nuclear weapons first if necessary to defend an ally if it is attacked by an enemy who uses conventional forces biological or chemical weapons or nuclear weapons and a more tailored U S commitment to use U S nuclear weapons in retaliation against only a nuclear attack on an ally The first form of extended deterrence was the U S Cold War policy in NATO and in East Asia and remains largely intact today despite the end of the Cold War Adopting the second form of extended deterrence maintaining commitments to joint defense but limiting the threat of nuclear weapons use to retaliation against nuclear attacks on allies would not necessarily lead to the nuclear proliferation cascade that Gates and Bodman seem to fear Indeed a more targeted U S nuclear guarantee if implemented properly after alliance consultation could have a number of positive strategic effects First such a change might be welcomed by those allies who continue to value allied conventional military commitments but feel that first use nuclear threats encourage nuclear proliferation elsewhere in the world A more targeted nuclear guarantee would also make U S nuclear weapons doctrine consistent with Negative Security Assurances NSAs commitments not to use nuclear weapons against NNWS which all five NPT recognized NWS have made at past NPT review conferences and at the UN Security Council in 1995 In addition abandoning U S threats to use nuclear weapons in response to another state using chemical or biological weapons against the United States or our allies could be followed by more credible deterrent threats to respond with devastating conventional military retaliation and with a commitment to isolate and overthrow any leader who uses outlawed chemical or biological weapons Finally limiting the role of U S nuclear weapons to deterrence of other states use of nuclear weapons would signal strong support for the eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons for if such a no first use nuclear doctrine became universally accepted the existing NWS could more easily coordinate moving in tandem to lower and equal levels of nuclear weapons on the road to zero Such a change in U S and other powers nuclear doctrine will not be easily accepted by all allies nor will it be easy to implement within military establishments NATO official doctrine for example which has not been revised since 1999 continues to assert though it does not prove that nuclear weapons remain critical for a variety of threat scenarios T he Alliance s conventional forces alone cannot ensure credible deterrence Nuclear weapons make a unique contribution in rendering the risks of aggression against the Alliance incalculable and unacceptable Thus they remain essential to preserve peace 16 Interest in maintaining an expansive form of extended deterrence remains strong in East Asia as well Ambassador Yukio Satoh for example correctly notes that the Japanese government s official Defense Program Outline states only that to protect its territory and people against the threat of nuclear weapons Japan will continue to rely on the U S nuclear deterrent but Satoh has also recommended that the United States should now threaten to retaliate with nuclear weapons if North Korea uses chemical or biological weapons in any future conflict 17 The major responsibility for reducing the roles and missions that nuclear weapons play in the doctrines of the nuclear powers clearly falls on the governments of those nations President Obama called for precisely such doctrinal change in his 2009 Prague speech promising that to put an end to Cold War thinking we will reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy This will require that U S politicians and military officers stop leaning on the crutch of nuclear weapons to shore up deterrence even in situations in which the credibility of such threats is vanishingly thin During the 2008 U S election primary campaign for example Senators Hillary Clinton and Christopher Dodd both criticized then Senator Obama for saying that he would not consider using U S nuclear weapons to attack al Qaeda targets inside Pakistan a U S ally arguing in Clinton s words I don t believe that any president should make any blanket statements with respect to the use or non use of nuclear weapons 18 In May 2009 General Kevin Chilton the commander of the U S Strategic Command took the all options are on the table argument to a new level threatening U S nuclear retaliation in response to cyber attacks I think you don t take any response options off the table from an attack on the United States of America And I don t see any reason to treat cyber any differently I mean why would we tie the president s hands 19 While the United States and other NWS should take the first steps to reduce their reliance on nuclear weapons there is much that NNWS can do to encourage and enable new nuclear doctrines to be adopted in the spirit of shared responsibilities for nuclear disarmament First NNWS that are members of U S alliances can stop asking to be reassured about noncredible military options This is not a new problem Indeed although the global strategic context is different Henry Kissinger alluded to a similar dynamic when he admonished the NATO alliance back in 1979 We must face the fact that it is absurd to base the strategy of the West on the credibility of the threat of mutual suicide Don t you Europeans keep asking us to multiply assurances that we cannot possibly mean and that if we mean them we should not want to execute and that if we execute we ll destroy civilization That is our strategic dilemma into which we have built ourselves by our own theory and by the encouragement of our allies 20 Second it would be helpful if the NNWS that are not members of U S alliances would spend as much time condemning states that are caught violating their commitments not to develop chemical or biological weapons as they do complaining that the NSAs offered at the NPT review conferences should be legally binding Finally those U S allies that remain concerned about conventional or chemical and biological threats to their national security should as part of their Article VI disarmament commitment help to develop the conventional forces and defensive systems that could wean themselves away from excessive reliance on U S nuclear weapons for extended deterrence 21 The final argument against nuclear disarmament concerns breakout scenarios and the challenge of enforcement Harold Brown and John Deutch for example have argued that p roliferating states even if they abandoned these devices under resolute international pressure would still be able to clandestinely retain a few of their existing weapons or maintain a standby breakout capability to acquire a few weapons quickly if needed 22 The breakout problem however applies to both new potential proliferators and former NWS that have disarmed in a nuclear free world Thomas Schelling and Charles Glaser have made similar arguments about the instability of small numbers fearing nuclear use would be more likely at the final stages of disarmament or after nuclear disarmament occurs because states would engage in arms races to get nuclear weapons in any subsequent crisis and the winner in any such arms race would use its nuclear weapons with less fear of nuclear retaliation 23 These are legitimate concerns and addressing the challenges of verification and enforcement of disarmament should be a high priority for future disarmament efforts How can a vision of shared responsibility between the NWS and NNWS help address these vexing problems First NWS and NNWS should work together to punish the violators of currently existing nonproliferation agreements North Korea violated its NPT commitments by secretly taking nuclear material out of the Yongbyon reactor complex in the 1990s and by covertly starting a uranium enrichment program with the assistance of Pakistan Iran similarly was caught in violation of its NPT safeguards agreement in 2002 when the covert Natanz enrichment facility was discovered and evidence of nuclear weapons related research was later released by the U S intelligence community Finally Syria was caught violating its NPT commitments in 2007 when Israeli intelligence discovered a covert nuclear reactor under construction More consistent pressure by all five permanent members of the UN Security Council the P5 are the United States Russia China France and the United Kingdom should be matched by more uniform support by the NNWS at the IAEA and in the UN Security Council to create stronger resolutions condemning these violations and imposing sanctions on the violators Such a display of shared responsibilities would both help resolve these proliferation crises and set better precedents for future challenges Second the NNWS and NWS need to work together more effectively to reduce the risks of nuclear weapons breakout in the future To help deter withdrawal from the NPT the UN Security Council could adopt a binding resolution stating

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  • Chapter 2: U.S. Allies and the Politics of Abolishing Nuclear Weapons - American Academy of Arts & Sciences
    irrespective of the role that it might play in paving the way for deep arms reductions or disarmament To pay open homage to nuclear deterrence is to jeopardize the non proliferation norm and regime Nuclear deterrence is always the ghost at the table whose presence is understood but whose contribution to regional and global security cannot openly be acknowledged or weighed 7 If the NPT Review Conference is to be more than a purely reactive body that once in every two or so tries can agree to recognize half hearted progress and identify a few relatively uncontroversial next steps and instead proactively charts a course toward a world without nuclear weapons it must be able to discuss nuclear deterrence Although nuclear weapons may not play as large or important a role as some critics of the abolition agenda suggest they are a stabilizing factor in international relations This point was made refreshingly in the final report of the International Commission on Nuclear Non Proliferation and Disarmament Although rejecting some of the dogma of nuclear deterrence it did recognize that it is hard to contest the almost universally held view that the absence of great power conflict since 1945 must be at least in part attributed to the fear of nuclear war 8 Without making a similar acknowledgment the NPT Review Conference is not able to recognize the need to develop alternatives to nuclear deterrence let alone make progress toward actually doing so There is a second more political reason why it would be useful for the NPT Review Conference to acknowledge and discuss nuclear deterrence The NWS sometimes complain with some truth that the progress they have already made toward disarmament has not been recognized 9 If Russia and the United States were to make deeper cuts then according to one line of reasoning they might find themselves under increasing pressure to finish the job and eliminate their remaining nuclear weapons regardless of whether the conditions that would make it safe to do so had been established In this scenario NPT politics could become more poisonous and divisive than they are today If the Review Conference could recognize the role played by nuclear deterrence it could acknowledge that going from low numbers to zero is a much greater challenge than reducing from current levels to low numbers In turn this could increase the willingness of Russia and the United States to make deep cuts NNWS allied to the United States have an important role to play in helping the NPT Review Conference engage in a sensible discussion about nuclear deterrence States such as Australia Japan The Netherlands Norway and Turkey which have good disarmament credentials and are protected by U S security guarantees are well placed to acknowledge the importance they place on extended deterrence and initiate a serious discussion of how to develop a security architecture that would render it obsolete Discussing nuclear deterrence at an NPT Review Conference or urging the United States to de emphasize assurance are easy suggestions to make but they would be painful in practice Daring to mention deterrence in an NPT forum would draw howls of protest in some quarters Serious engagement with the United States about doctrine could cause friction And most important either task would expose domestic fissures that many states want to leave buried Some of these fissures have been exposed in Japan with the debate about TLAM N and the advocacy of some Japanese officials for maintaining it Presumably in response to domestic concern that Japan was impeding progress toward disarmament Japanese Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada took the unusual step of writing publicly to his U S counterpart Hillary Clinton to inform her that the Japanese Government has expressed no view concerning whether or not your government should possess particular weapons systems such as TLAM N and RNEP Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator If hypothetically such a view was expressed it would clearly be at variance with my views which are in favor of nuclear disarmament 10 Given that the Strategic Posture Commission report makes clear that the Japanese officials who briefed it strongly supported retaining TLAM N Okada s letter implies a deep division between the new Japanese government and the bureaucracy Japan is hardly the only state internally divided on these issues NATO member states are too The current NATO Strategic Concept contains the claim highlighted by Sagan that nuclear weapons make a unique contribution in rendering the risks of aggression against the Alliance incalculable and unacceptable The adoption of this concept was supported by all NATO member states Yet at the 2005 NPT Review Conference Norway asserted that nuclear weapons must not be seen as an attractive option that will provide additional security 11 Similarly a Canadian working paper from the same meeting argued that doctrinal or policy utterances that give the impression that nuclear weapons are being accorded increased importance in respective security policies are anathema to disarmament efforts 12 Because the NATO Strategic Concept and its doctrinal utterances do not increase the role of nuclear weapons the Canadian statement is not literally inconsistent with them but the spirit of it certainly is It is tempting for disarmament advocates or deterrence advocates to seize respectively upon public endorsement of disarmament goals or private utterances about the importance of nuclear deterrence as representing the real Japan or Norway or Canada The reality however is that both opinions are equally real and both have strong roots It will be difficult to downplay the importance of assurance with the United States while acknowledging the role of deterrence for the NPT Review Conference It will require those who are charged with defense to acknowledge that they must play a role in achieving disarmament goals and those tasked with disarmament to recognize the reality of deterrence Nevertheless there is a potentially unifying vision a disarmament process that recognizes the importance of but also seeks to supplant nuclear deterrence Beyond reconciling internal divisions U S allies will also have to educate themselves

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  • Chapter 3: Common Responsibilities in the NPT–Shared or Asymmetrical? - American Academy of Arts & Sciences
    the text of the Treaty and its negotiating record Clearly all articles of the NPT must be viewed holistically and compliance with all of them is a sine qua non for the enjoyment of NPT benefits There is for example no dispute over NPT parties that the Security Council judges to be in violation of their Treaty obligations being denied Article IV benefits The question that the NNWS raise is why the NWS are not similarly penalized for failure to honor their Article VI obligations and their Review and Extension Conference commitments notwithstanding the 1996 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice Under Article IV all parties have the inalienable right to engage in peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to facilitate and participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment materials and scientific and technological information There is clear reference to parties in a position to do so to making a contribution either alone or together with other states or international organizations toward the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy especially in the territories of NNWS in the NPT with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world The above wording places the NPT squarely in the context of the North South relationship and the global transfer of resources and technology The development aspect of the NPT has been long forgotten For decades developing countries have complained that the developed countries in the International Atomic Energy Agency IAEA used their influence to obtain more allocations for safeguards than for technical cooperation even when the assistance was for non power projects involving agriculture and medicine The special assistance program for developing NNWS within the NPT known as Footnote A projects was always underfunded No incentives were offered to the NNWS Moreover the developing countries among the NNWS cannot be blamed for the general underfunding of the IAEA Similar to the budget of the United Nations contributions to the regular IAEA budget are already shared according to an agreed scale of assessment The NPT already requires the NNWS to accept IAEA safeguards to verify their nonproliferation obligations and some of these states have voluntarily accepted the Additional Model Protocol the universalization of which is a fresh and logical demand The predicted expansion of nuclear power has led to fears of the emergence of virtual nuclear weapon states and to demands that the NNWS accept further constraints beyond the terms of the NPT on the exercise of the inalienable right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy In Article VI although the primary obligation of the NWS for disarmament and nonproliferation that appears in the 1961 Irish sponsored resolution in the UN General Assembly was deliberately blurred when the NPT was drafted in the Eighteen Nation Committee for Disarmament the current wording places the disarmament obligation on each of the parties to pursue negotiations on nuclear disarmament in good faith That the NNWS have done so by for example creating nuclear weapons free zones through

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  • Chapter 4: Turkey and Shared Responsibilities - American Academy of Arts & Sciences
    early 1960s nuclear weapons under U S Air Force custody that could be delivered by F 100 F 104 and F 4 aircraft were also deployed from air bases in Eskisehir Malatya Erhac Ankara Murted and Balikesir 6 On April 14 1963 the U S Polaris submarine USS Sam Houston visited the Turkish port of Izmir in a display of NATO solidarity with Turkey and to demonstrate the alliance s commitment to extended nuclear deterrence 7 Believing that Turkey was safe from attack by countries in the Warsaw Pact Turkish policy makers focused their attention on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction WMD in the Middle East Acquisition of chemical biological and especially nuclear weapons by Turkey s immediate neighbors poses a significant threat to the country s security and stability For this reason during the Cold War the Turkish government opposed Soviet proposals to create a Balkans nuclear weapons free zone NWFZ which would have included Turkey However the Turkish government supported the creation of a nuclear weapons free zone in the Middle East NWFZ ME provided that any agreement establishing this zone did not by definition include Turkey as part of the Middle East Turkish leaders including President Abdullah Gul Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Chiefs of the General Staff Generals Hilmi Ozkok Yasar Buyukanit and Ilker Basbug have repeatedly stated that a lasting solution to WMD proliferation in the Middle East will require the creation of a NWFZ which should eventually be expanded into a regional WMD free zone 8 Recently Turkey has been seen as part of the Middle East because of its involvement in a number of regional political issues Not only has Turkey acted as a mediator between Syria and Israel but it has proposed to take on a similar function concerning the nuclear issue vis à vis Iran Israel and the United States To be consistent with its policy of supporting a NWFZ ME Turkey will be expected to denuclearize its territory first The Turkish government should therefore seek the withdrawal of U S nuclear weapons from Turkey before other states in the region request that it do so This decision should not be tied to for instance cuts in the tactical nuclear weapons in the Russian arsenal as suggested in the Briefing Note published by the Center for European Reform 9 In general Turkish officials attach greater political value to nuclear weapons than they do military value They do not seriously contemplate contingencies where nuclear weapons could or even should be used Yet some believe that U S nuclear weapons deployed in Turkey have a deterrent purpose 10 Uncertainty surrounding the political situation in Iraq the Palestine Israel conflict and Iran s nuclear program which is suspected of having weapons development capabilities make peace and stability in the Middle East and the adjacent regions appear elusive Uncertainties regarding the full scope of Iran s nuclear capabilities and intentions further complicate Turkish threat assessments Against this background some Turkish officials believe

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  • Chapter 5: The Common Project of Nuclear Abolition - American Academy of Arts & Sciences
    operate reprocessing and enrichment facilities for nuclear weapons purposes it would level the playing field between NWS and NNWS The new restrictions would apply to all states and facilities with the relevant technologies without exception At that time multilateral arrangements could become a universal binding principle 2 Persuading reluctant NNWS such as Argentina Brazil or South Africa to consider MNAs would require a monumental shift in how states think about national nuclear activities The requirements go far beyond the various proposals submitted by NWS in the last few years which can be summarized as offering guaranteed services for the civilian fuel cycles such as enrichment fuel fabrication interim storage of spent fuel or spent fuel reprocessing and conditioning while maintaining their national nuclear autonomy 3 This is untenable Sagan s discussion of the role of an FMCT is significant in this regard although I would disagree with his recommendation to establish a new NWS organization of inspectors to verify facilities and fissile material in NWS rather than relying on the IAEA to perform these functions The time for dividing the NWS and NNWS has passed Where access by NNWS inspectors to sensitive former weapons material production facilities is problematic a special office within the IAEA s safeguards department consisting exclusively of NWS origin inspectors could be created The second issue concerns the future of extended deterrence The current extended deterrence situation in Europe underscores the tremendous change in the attitudes of many NNWS NATO allies toward nuclear disarmament Nowhere is this more obvious than in my country Germany In the coalition agreement that now governs the Federal Republic the position of the Conservatives and the Liberals reads as follows We emphatically support President Barack Obama s proposals for far reaching new disarmament initiatives including the objective of a nuclear weapons free world We want to use the NPT Review Conference in 2010 to create new momentum for treaty based regulations In this context and in the context of a new strategic concept for NATO we will strongly promote within the Alliance and vis à vis the American allies the withdrawal of the nuclear weapons still in Germany 4 Liberal and Conservative speakers confirmed this objective in a recent debate in the German Parliament 5 In addition Germany is consulting with other NATO NNWS on ways to promote this goal Given that Germany has historically been the main beneficiary of extended deterrence the coalition s new position indicates that the perceived need for a first use nuclear guarantee in Europe has largely disappeared Nevertheless there are allies for example Poland the Baltic States and Turkey for which the nuclear guarantee maintains a higher degree of salience than it does for the Western and Northern Europeans This brings me to the third key issue the crucial role of the NWS in shaping the security environment for NNWS The security concerns of states in Eastern Europe derive largely from Russia s unfriendly policies toward its neighbors for Turkey this concern has been revived

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  • Chapter 6: On Rethinking Extended Deterrence - American Academy of Arts & Sciences
    their use for fear of being punished with nuclear retaliation Contrary to the assertion made by Sagan in his article I have never recommended that the United States should now threaten to retaliate with nuclear weapons if North Korea uses chemical or biological weapons in any future conflict At the 2009 conference organized by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace I stressed the need for ambiguity in coping with the threats of biological and chemical weapons underscoring the distinction between the option of openly rejecting the use of nuclear weapons in response to a biological or chemical weapons attack and that of not saying anything about the point keeping those to be deterred in suspense At that conference I simply noted that without credible means for deterring the use of biological and chemical weapons it would be too early to limit the purpose of nuclear deterrence solely to deterring the use of nuclear weapons This is particularly true for Northeast Asia where North Korea is suspected to possess both biological and chemical weapons 2 It must also be pointed out that the Japanese government s pronounced policy of relying on the U S nuclear deterrent to protect the country against the threat of nuclear weapons was originally formed as part of the first Defense Program Outlines adopted in 1976 when the so called sole purpose of nuclear weapons was not the question at issue As I noted in my Carnegie conference presentation Tokyo and Washington announced in 2007 that both nuclear and non nuclear strike forces and defense capabilities of the United States formed the core of extended deterrence without specifying the object of this deterrence I believe that the planned revision of the official Defense Program Outlines should reflect this line of thought On the other hand Sagan arguably proposes that those U S allies that remain concerned about conventional or chemical and biological threats to their security should help to develop the conventional forces and defensive systems that could wean themselves away from excessive reliance on U S nuclear weapons for extended deterrence Although Sagan s depiction of the allies reliance on U S nuclear weapons as excessive is his own Japan U S defense cooperation has already been progressing in the direction he suggests Strengthened cooperation in the deployment and development of missile defense systems against North Korean missiles is a case in point Japan U S defense cooperation will no doubt become increasingly important particularly as the role that advanced conventional weapons systems play in the deterrence strategy is expanded Japanese efforts to rectify long recognized deficiencies in sharing responsibilities under the Japan U S Security Treaty are required more than ever This leads to the second subject that must be taken into consideration in rethinking extended deterrence the level of strategic consultations within alliances Unlike NATO the Japan U S security arrangements lack a mechanism for consultations on nuclear strategy as does the South Korea U S alliance so far as I understand The Japanese

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  • Chapter 7: Shared, But Not Equal Responsibilities - American Academy of Arts & Sciences
    not allow the transfer of nuclear weapons or other nuclear exclusive devices to any recipient whatsoever this would prohibit putting this force under international or UN control The NPT could be amended to allow such a transfer in extraordinary circumstances and especially in a world almost completely free of nuclear weapons except for what is needed to face the threat to the planet from outer space Moreover I agree with Sagan that the current nuclear disarmament effort must be transformed from a debate among leaders in the NWS nuclear weapons states to a coordinated global effort of shared responsibilities between NWS and NNWS non nuclear weapons states Under the NPT today however the NWS appear to be more equal than others that is the NNWS Despite Sagan s observation that Articles IV and VI of the NPT are written to apply to the NWS and the NNWS the lack of equality is obvious Here I would note that the NWS definitely bear more responsibilities and obligations than the NNWS whether with regard to the elimination of nuclear weapons and disarmament in general or with regard to the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes In the case of the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes multinational approaches are needed whereby sharing in the decision making process should be among the conditions for cooperation At the same time not all states should necessarily have access to sensitive technologies As I discussed in my article published in the Winter 2010 issue of Daedalus participation in this process is more important than all schemes of assurances of supply that do not make room for a decision sharing mechanism between the supplier and the user With regard to Article IV of the NPT and its relationship to the commitment under Article II not to seek or to receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons I would like to quote from a 1968 statement by William Foster leader of the U S delegation to the UN s Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva in his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee On the meaning of the term manufacture as prohibited by the NPT Foster stated It may be useful to point out for illustrative purposes several activities which the United States would not consider per se to be violations of the prohibitions in Article II Neither uranium enrichment nor the stockpiling of fissionable material in connection with a peaceful program would violate Article II so long as these activities were safeguarded under Article III Thus Article IV of the NPT does not prohibit NNWS from uranium enrichment activities provided they are adequately safeguarded and judged to be in conformity with Article II of the NPT Both the IAEA and the UN Security Council either individually or collectively depending on the type of violation bear the responsibility for judging whether a state is in compliance with Article II In the case of transferring nuclear weapons from one state to another for

    Original URL path: https://www.amacad.org/content/publications/pubContent.aspx?d=1128 (2016-02-13)
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