archive-org.com » ORG » A » AMACAD.ORG

Total: 1374

Choose link from "Titles, links and description words view":

Or switch to "Titles and links view".
  • The key role of the back-end in the nuclear fuel cycle - American Academy of Arts & Sciences
    institutional delays because sufficient inventories must first accumulate or because funding is not yet available Revived interest in reprocessing but not at the present time or with the current technology will lead some countries to extend surface storage in order to keep the option open Therefore global efforts are needed to ensure that safety and security are guaranteed at all storage facilities for spent fuel Reprocessing Reprocessing was first developed on a large scale in military facilities in order to separate fissile materials for nuclear weapons The environmental impacts the security aspects and the treatment of waste residues had lower priorities The technologies commercially applied today are basically the same as they were when the technology was first developed although much improvement has been made in reducing emissions and developing conditioning methods for non high level waste Today there is increased interest in recycling but based on new developments that provide enhanced security by avoiding separated fissile materials The advantage of the current PUREX process is that it has been demonstrated to work in a highly reliable fashion Key disadvantages are that it produces separated plutonium which is a security risk and that the plants required are large and expensive Alternatives are being worked on The UREX process developed in the United States is modified to separate only the uranium which can be recycled leaving the plutonium with the fission products and other actinides in proliferation resistant form The COEX co extraction of actinides process developed in France leaves a small amount of recovered uranium with the plutonium so that the plutonium is never separated Approaches using pyrometallurgical and electrolytic processes to separate the fission products from the actinides have been developed and even operated at the pilot plant stage but not under the current regulatory regimes which may present significant challenges to their widespread use Geological Disposal Geological disposal of high level radioactive wastes and spent fuel is the key part of the nuclear fuel cycle that has not been demonstrated in practice Technologies have been developed and extensively tested in a number of countries These technologies are based on different conceptual designs for deep repositories there are multiple feasible options for the choice of engineered barrier to enclose the used nuclear fuel and also for the geological medium in which the repository will be sited In all of the programs the safety of the deep geological system as assessed by the range of scientific methodologies developed for this purpose is invariably shown to be high In the scientific community there is general acceptance of the feasibility of safe disposal if the site and engineered system are well chosen Unfortunately political and societal acceptance remains a challenge in most countries The technical concepts developed to date in many countries are however generally recognized to be advanced enough for implementation This does not imply that further technical optimization is unnecessary In fact even the most advanced programs are still amending engineering details in order to make the operations in a deep repository safer and more efficient The largely technical information about the nuclear fuel cycle discussed so far makes clear that the necessary technologies for open or closed cycles have been developed to a level that allows their industrial application Furthermore it is clear that the nuclear fuel cycle is a global enterprise This is in part because of the widespread and heterogeneous distribution of uranium ore bodies and partly because of the technological development history The global distribution of fuel cycle technologies today is determined by various factors including The military origins and continued attractions of nuclear technology this led to the present situation of seven countries with fuel cycle capabilities that include reprocessing The distribution of natural resources this has led to countries like Australia with no nuclear power ambitions of its own as of yet being directly involved in the fuel cycle as a producer of uranium ore The desire for some degree of self sufficiency in energy supply this is a key driver in countries like Japan and a claimed driver in others like Brazil and Iran The real or perceived opportunity to provide commercial services to other countries this is a driver for enrichment and reprocessing facilities in Europe the United States and Russia The recent hunger for clean base load electrical energy this is today leading to declarations of interest in expanding or introducing nuclear power in a long list of countries This global situation is in a state of flux The economics and politics of energy supply are changing and this will have repercussions on many aspects of supply and demand in nuclear fuel cycle services More importantly however the issues of global safety and security are becoming of increasing concern Intensive debate on these issues has taken place over the past years Most emphasis has been placed on restricting the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technologies since these can directly produce weapons usable materials A more comprehensive approach however seeks to control the distribution of all nuclear materials that can be misused by states or by terrorist groups In this section we look at actual or potential geopolitical developments in the global fuel cycle that could lead to increased security risks and at measures that could mitigate these risks Nuclear programs expand and seek more independence The spread of nuclear power reactors alone can obviously increase security risks at the back end as well as the front end of the fuel cycle Since new nuclear programs have insufficient spent fuel inventories to justify repository projects and since there are currently few fuel providers that accept the return of spent fuel expansion of reactor operations will also expand storage operations If the stores are to operate for a very long period then they will have to be maintained and safeguarded These tasks become more necessary as the radiation from the spent fuel decays to levels that allow easier handling Expansion of nuclear power plants thus implies that increased efforts to ensure safe and secure storage of spent fuel are needed International initiatives have been suggested to meet this need Greater security concerns will arise if increased use of nuclear power by some states leads them to conclude that they should implement indigenous facilities for sensitive fuel cycle activities reprocessing or enrichment Both of these activities are economically justified only if a sufficiently large nuclear fleet is operated or if services are provided to foreign countries Still some countries may be tempted to push for national fuel cycle facilities even if they do not have this level of nuclear power production Assurance of supply and national independence are obvious drivers Since mastering either of the two sensitive technologies brings a nation close to the point where nuclear weapons can be produced there is great international concern about the spread of these technologies Uranium producers move into other stages of the fuel cycle At present the high tech stages of the nuclear fuel cycle are carried out by countries with nuclear weapons programs and or with advanced civilian nuclear power programs Some of the biggest uranium producers Australia Kazakhstan and Namibia fall into neither of these categories It is not unreasonable for such countries to evaluate periodically the potential economic benefits of moving farther up the supply chain rather than simply exporting ores Enrichment and fuel fabrication are obvious next steps However uranium producers could also conceivably offer back end fuel cycle services Reprocessing is unlikely to be introduced where it has not yet been done since very large scale technology is involved and the economics are not favorable An undeniably attractive offer would however be a disposal service In fact in both Australia and Canada the two largest uranium producers the possibility of taking back as spent fuel the uranium that each country has supplied has been debated at different times It has even been argued that such countries may have a moral obligation to accept spent fuel However the real driver for a uranium producing country to accept returned spent fuel for disposal would be economic Huge benefits could result for the host state but despite this advantage the political and public support for such an initiative has nowhere been evident Disposal becomes multinational For some countries national repositories may be difficult or infeasible because of the lack of favorable geological formations shortage of technical resources or prohibitively high costs Multinational or regional repositories are a potential solution for these countries and in recent years there has been a rapid increase in interest in this possibility especially in small countries The prime drivers were originally the economic and political problems that might be lessened by being shared between countries facing the same challenges The potential safety and safeguards benefits were also recognized at this early stage Increasingly in particular after the terrorist attacks in the United States in 2001 and in connection with nuclear proliferation concerns attention has focused on the security advantages that could result The IAEA has been careful to point out that risks must also be minimized at the back end of the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle that is not only in enrichment and reprocessing but also in storage and disposal of spent fuel in particular In its publications in this area the IAEA has described two potential routes to achieving international disposal the add on approach and the partnering scenario Both of these potential approaches to multinational disposal have seen significant progress The add on option calls for a single country or a network of countries with appropriate facilities working together to provide extended fuel cycle services to countries adhering to the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty NPT and wishing to use nuclear power This option could limit the spread of those sensitive technologies allowed under the Treaty namely enrichment reprocessing and accumulation of stocks of spent fuel Crucial prerequisites would be securing supply of services to all cooperating users and close international monitoring by the IAEA Within this international fuel cycle scheme the fuel leasing component is perhaps the most promising The U S government has indicated its support for such a scheme in Russia through the Global Nuclear Power Infrastructure GNPI proposal or in the United States through the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership GNEP initiative The proposals are primarily aimed at making the nuclear fuel cycle more secure but they ultimately require the fuel suppliers to take back the spent fuel or for a third party trustworthy country to offer storage and disposal services Unfortunately neither initiative appears to be making much progress In both Russian and U S proposals the service providers concentrate on offering enrichment fuel supply and reprocessing to client countries Although both proposals mention the take back of spent fuel this is a sensitive political issue in both countries Even if in the future it becomes acceptable to return to U S or Russian manufacturers fuel that they had provided to client nations this take back will solve only part of the problem Spent fuel from other suppliers in the market must also be accepted there are existing inventories of hazardous radioactive wastes that must also go to a deep disposal facility A more comprehensive offer of disposal services is necessary In fact an offer of this type may be the only sufficiently attractive inducement for small countries to accept the restrictions on their nuclear activities that are currently being proposed by the large powers and the IAEA The emphasis on ensuring security of supply of other services such as reactor construction fresh fuel enrichment and reprocessing is misplaced All of these services are supplied commercially at present and a customer country currently has a choice of suppliers that may well be wider than would result from implementation of initiatives that create a two tier system of nuclear supplier and user countries The key inducement for small countries to give up some of the inalienable rights afforded them in Article IV of the NPT may well be the offer of a safe secure and affordable route for disposal based on a multinational repository in another country The second option for implementing multinational repositories partnering by smaller countries has been particularly supported by the European Union through its promotion of the potential benefits of shared facilities in a regional solution For the partnering scenario in which a group of smaller countries cooperates in moving toward shared disposal facilities exploratory studies have been performed most recently by the Arius Association which also comanaged the European Commission s SAPIERR Strategic Action Plan for Implementation of European Regional Repositories project on regional repositories The project funded by the European Commission has carried out a range of studies that lays the groundwork for serious multinational negotiations on the establishment of one or more shared repositories in Europe The studies have looked at legal and liability issues organizational forms economic aspects safety and security issues and public involvement challenges The proposal that resulted from SAIERR was a staged adaptive implementation strategy for a European Repository Development Organisation ERDO At the pilot meeting of potential participants in an ERDO working group 32 representatives from 14 European countries were present all of whom had been nominated through their national governments as well as observers from the IAEA the European Commission and American foundations ERDO if sufficient numbers of partner nations agree to the final proposals will operate as a sister organization to those waste agencies from European countries such as France Sweden Finland and Germany that have opted for a purely national repository program If nuclear power is to expand in a safe secure and environmentally friendly manner improvements in the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle must occur in the coming years This section outlines some recommendations both technical and institutional for improvement Centralized storage maybe even underground Concentrating national inventories of spent fuel at a few centralized locations rather than having distributed stores some at decommissioned reactor sites can obviously help reduce security risks from malevolent acts in particular Some countries already have underground storage facilities and others are considering this option Given the increasing recognition that spent fuel is a valuable resource but that reprocessing is currently very expensive the probability that used fuel will be stored for many decades is rising If this happens then the arguments in favor of underground stores with enhanced safety and security will grow stronger Research on advanced reprocessing The recent support for nuclear expansion in some countries has also led to proposals for expansion of reprocessing using the current technological approaches originally developed for extraction of plutonium for weapons The GNEP initiative proposed implementing reprocessing facilities that were copies of current commercial plants The scientific community however led by the National Academies in the United States was quick to point out that this is unnecessary and uneconomic at the present time and that it could lead to increased rather than decreased proliferation risks Nevertheless the ultimate need to recycle fissile materials was accepted and the conclusion was drawn that research into advanced reprocessing technologies is the most appropriate strategy today Future technologies may improve the economics environmental impacts and security aspects Optimization of engineering aspects of repositories A variety of repository designs and operational concepts have been developed over the last 30 years Most of these however have tended to be highly conservative with the explicit aim of demonstrating that deep geological facilities can provide the necessary isolation of long lived radioactive wastes over unprecedented timescales up to one million years Relatively soon the first facilities will be licensed and constructed and therefore practical engineering issues will rise in importance Mining and nuclear working methods must be coordinated in a manner that ensures operational safety and efficient operation Quality assurance is a key challenge In addition the potential for cost savings must be addressed The work in the advanced Swedish and Finnish spent fuel disposal programs illustrates this well In both of these cases the original massive copper container has been redesigned to use less copper and more steel Other disposal programs with differing safety concepts will likely face similar challenges Technical and financial assistance to new nuclear states Leading nuclear nations must commit to work closely with young or new nuclear power nations to help them meet their energy needs and aspirations in a manner that preserves and improves security nonproliferation objectives transparency and stability The leading nuclear nations will have much better chances for success in assuring continued nuclear safety security nonproliferation and environmental preservation if they work proactively with emerging nations to understand and help them improve their nuclear capabilities Providing technical and in some cases financial assistance to help emerging nations realize a secure and healthy energy future will be an excellent investment if it results in relationships that promote a high quality nuclear safety and security culture In the context of this essay it is important to note that the assistance offered should extend to the back end of the fuel cycle An improved approach would be for providers of front end services and of nuclear power plants to bundle support for repository design and construction activities with back end services Multinational reprocessing facilities Reprocessing plants that separate uranium plutonium and wastes from spent nuclear fuel can divert the plutonium to weapons use as well As a result there have been several attempts to pursue multinational solutions though with little success to date With the spread of nuclear power the advent of new technologies and a greater focus on assuring decades long supply of fresh fuel for nuclear plants more countries may begin to consider the value of developing indigenous reprocessing facilities It has also been argued that implementing this technology can ease the problems of waste disposal However the waste disposal advantages associated with reprocessing are not enough to justify the technology on their own Thus there are ample incentives to pursue the creation of multinational enrichment and reprocessing capabilities Providing a framework that makes emerging nuclear nations meaningful participants in such

    Original URL path: http://www.amacad.org/content/publications/pubContent.aspx?d=886 (2016-02-13)
    Open archived version from archive


  • Lessons learned from the North Korean nuclear crises - American Academy of Arts & Sciences
    failed to get commercial nuclear power Although Pyongyang now has nuclear weapons its weapons program is much smaller than it would have been if left unchecked With the capabilities it already had or was soon to complete by the early 1990s Pyongyang today could have an arsenal of a hundred or more nuclear weapons Instead it has enough plutonium for four to eight weapons and currently is not producing more It has the capacity to put the 5 MWe reactor back into operation and produce one bomb s worth of plutonium annually for the foreseeable future but it has not taken steps to do so perhaps indicating that it believes its small nuclear arsenal provides a sufficient nuclear deterrent However Pyongyang s export of missiles and nuclear technologies appears not to have been constrained It has widely exported short range missiles and manufacturing technologies We have much less information about its nuclear exports However evidence is overwhelming that Pyongyang built a plutonium producing reactor for Syria that was destroyed by an Israeli air raid in September 2007 It appears quite likely that it exported to Libya uranium hexafluoride the precursor to HEU There are also grounds to suspect nuclear cooperation with Pakistan and Burma 13 Cooperation with Iran is the greatest concern because Iran is putting in place all of the pieces for a nuclear weapons option and its nuclear capabilities complement those of North Korea 14 The nature of the nuclear exports also suggests that North Korea may have undeclared uranium facilities No one outside Kim Jong il s inner circle understands the decision making process and motivations of North Korea s regime I will use Sagan s framework to analyze Pyongyang s nuclear decisions and try to answer why it built the bomb Sagan postulates three models for the bomb the security model the domestic politics model and the norms model The security model calls for states to build nuclear weapons to increase their security against foreign threats especially nuclear threats States that face nuclear armed or vastly superior conventionally armed adversaries will eventually attempt to develop their own nuclear arsenals unless credible alliance guarantees with a major nuclear power exist Security concerns have been the central driver of the North Korean ruling regime since the birth of the nation after World War II Much of Pyongyang s nuclear decision making can be understood by examining how Pyongyang saw its security environment evolve over the years The devastating Korean War resolved only by an armistice and the U S threat to use nuclear weapons likely moved Kim Il sung to pursue nuclear weapons early on He likely strengthened his resolve to pursue his own bomb when China shortly after its own first nuclear test in 1964 turned down his request to share its atomic secrets The late 1960s were turbulent times in Pyongyang s relations with the West South Korea s military was bolstered by U S troops and U S nuclear weapons on its soil Pyongyang watched the Cuban missile crisis unfold in a manner that shed doubt on Soviet commitments to its allies It witnessed the Sino Soviet split and the Chinese Cultural Revolution Each of these developments reinforced the notion that Pyongyang could only rely on itself for the North s security Although Pyongyang fielded an immense conventional army and its deadly artillery along the Demilitarized Zone DMZ was poised to destroy Seoul nuclear weapons would help to balance the U S nuclear presence in the South Therefore the political drivers existed to match Pyongang s sustained technological drive to develop or import the necessary reactor and reprocessing facilities to eventually build nuclear weapons a technological base that it completed by 1990 By the early 1990s Pyongyang s security environment deteriorated dramatically As the Cold War drew to a close Pyongyang lost financial assistance from the former Soviet bloc Its archrival South Korea had pulled ahead economically as well as strengthened its military China focused on its economic rise and reached out to South Korea and Russia recognized the South as well Pyongyang was devastated by these changes and began seriously to explore accommodation with the West especially with the United States Carlin and Lewis 15 believe that Kim Ilsung made the strategic decision to engage the United States and even accept U S military presence in the South as a hedge against potentially hostile Chinese or Russian influence Kim Il sung took bold steps toward reconciliation with the South He signed a North South reconciliation agreement and North South denuclearization agreement which altered the security landscape and offered a potential resolution to the nuclear issue 16 Following a difficult start with the Clinton administration Pyongyang agreed to trade its gas graphite reactors and associated fuel cycle facilities for two LWRs and interim energy assistance in the form of heavy fuel oil Carlin and Lewis point out that Pyongyang viewed the political provisions of the Agreed Framework which called for both sides to move toward full normalization of political and economic relations to be the heart of the pact However reconciliation between Washington and Pyongyang proved difficult as Washington saw the Agreed Framework primarily as a nonproliferation agreement Struck by the Clinton administration as the best alternative to avoid war and put the North on a path to denuclearization the Agreed Framework was opposed immediately by many in Congress who believed that it rewarded bad behavior Congress failed to appropriate funds for key provisions of the pact causing the United States to fall behind in its commitments almost from the beginning The LWR project also fell behind schedule because the legal arrangements were much more complex than anticipated The Agreed Framework which began as a process of interaction and cooperation quickly turned into accusations of non compliance by both parties The 1990s were also particularly difficult times domestically for North Korea In addition to geopolitical changes North Korea lost Kim Il sung and had to cope with a series of natural disasters that added to its economic devastation and decimated its industrial capacity Its once mighty conventional military was decaying Its hope for receiving the benefits of nuclear electricity to help bolster its sagging economy appeared a distant hope because of delays in implementation of the Agreed Framework However the diplomatic crisis resulting from its 1998 rocket launch over Japan was resolved by the Perry Process which brought Pyongyang s second ranking official Vice Marshal Jo Myong rok to the White House in October 2000 17 The two sides issued a joint communiqué that pledged neither would have hostile intent toward the other and confirmed the commitment of both governments to make every effort in the future to build a new relationship free from past enmity This communiqué signaled to Pyongyang for the first time that the United States recognized the right of North Korea to exist The follow up meeting between Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Kim Jong il that was held in Pyongyang a couple of weeks later appeared to put the nuclear crisis on a path to final resolution With the change in administrations in Washington hope for a settlement was quickly dashed Whereas Pyongyang was waiting for a U S response to the Perry Process it ran into the Bush administration s adamant opposition to the terms of the Agreed Framework and to political accommodation Pyongyang practiced restraint with the incoming Bush administration until North Korea was accused of a covert uranium enrichment program and saw the Agreed Framework come to an end During the confrontation over enrichment in October 2002 First Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Kang Sok ju told his American counterpart We are a part of the axis of evil If we disarm ourselves because of U S pressure then we will become like Yugoslavia or Afghanistan s Taliban to be beaten to death 18 Pyongyang withdrew from the NPT and restarted its dormant Yongbyon facilities to produce fuel for a plutonium bomb Pyongyang s security fears were further heightened by the invasion of Iraq Pyongyang now believed the bomb would assure its survival so it no longer hid its nuclear weapons aspirations At the six party negotiations Pyongyang again declared its willingness to denuclearize in return for political accommodation and economic and energy assistance Although Pyongyang signed the Joint Denuclearization Statement on September 19 2005 the talks were mired in distrust and accusations They led to alternate cycles of dialogue and confrontation Pyongyang viewed U S financial sanctions imposed at the same time as a breach of the denuclearization pact It withdrew from the talks and launched a second long range rocket in July 2006 and conducted its first nuclear test in October 2006 The test drew UN Security Council sanctions but Pyongyang appeared to offset the negative effects of sanctions with increased diplomatic leverage Later that year the Bush administration radically changed its negotiating strategy with Pyongyang for the remainder of its term It conducted bilateral negotiations under the umbrella of the six party talks something that Pyongyang had desired but that the Bush administration had refused to do for six years Pyongyang viewed this change as a direct result of its new nuclear status whereas domestic U S politics and the results of the 2006 congressional elections may have played a greater role During the remainder of the Bush administration Pyongyang agreed again to halt its nuclear program but not to eliminate it During my visit three weeks after the nuclear test in 2006 North Korean officials made it clear that their negotiation strategy had changed They considered North Korea to be a nuclear power and wanted to talk arms control with Washington not denuclearization focused on the North 19 In early 2009 Pyongyang decided not to wait for engagement by the Obama administration but instead took aggressive steps to enhance its missile program These steps prompted more UN sanctions which Pyongyang used as an excuse to walk away from all its international nuclear obligations and to restart its nuclear program including testing a second nuclear device in May Although security concerns continue to dominate its decision making Pyongyang s actions were most likely driven by domestic and diplomatic factors rather than an increased sense of insecurity Sagan s domestic politics model posits that nuclear weapons may serve the bureaucratic or political interests of individual actors such as the military the nuclear establishment politicians or the public Such actors or coalitions of actors may influence the state s decision making Sagan cites the Indian nuclear program as a particularly convincing case of the importance of domestic politics and the influence of domestic advocacy groups He further demonstrates that domestic political factors played strong roles in nuclear decision making in South Africa Ukraine Argentina and Brazil Domestic politics are clearly different in North Korea The Kim dynasty father and son has ruled the country with an iron fist and based its legitimacy in large part on a cult of personality of its leaders To stay in power the regime tightly controls all information limits contact of its people with the outside world and warns its people that external forces constantly threaten the very existence of their nation External threats are used to justify keeping the country on a constant war footing that requires continued sacrifices by and harsh treatment of its people Natalia Bazhanova 20 points out that in communist countries the pursuit of nuclear weapons to meet external threats helps to increase tensions at home and distract people s attention from their daily grievances and the failures of the regime The need for nuclear weapons drives home the severity of the external threat The need for nuclear weapons was not directly invoked with the public until 2003 when Pyongyang openly declared its pursuit of nuclear weapons Propaganda was greatest after the long range missile and nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009 Although Pyongyang s leaders have not had to contend with political opposition or public uprisings the nuclear card along with the missile program has helped to emphasize the power and prestige of the regime There was much speculation that a succession crisis was driving Pyongyang s decision making in 2008 after Kim Jong il was reported to have suffered a stroke and appeared frail Kim Jong il reemerged and appeared to have rearranged the domestic power structure and solidified his control Still any future succession crisis in the DPRK may make cooperation with the United States less likely as potential leaders would want to avoid being branded as weak or as appeasing Washington in negotiations about the nuclear program Sagan s norms model views nuclear decisions as also serving important symbolic functions externally both shaping and reflecting a state s identity Norms and shared beliefs about what is legitimate and appropriate in international relations can drive nuclear decision making Symbolism becomes important Nuclear weapons become part of what defines a legitimate modern state Sagan contends that the French decision to build nuclear weapons was more the result of French leaders perceptions of the bomb s symbolic significance than its security calculus Sagan also shows how international norms such as the NPT helped to restrain nations nuclear ambitions and in cases such as Ukraine to relinquish a nuclear arsenal inherited from the Soviet Union Pyongyang does not appear to have allowed international norms to influence its nuclear decision making The record shows that its own needs always trumped international norms and obligations Pyongyang signed the NPT because of the promise of Soviet LWRs but did not sign the required safeguards agreement with the IAEA for years because it wanted to keep its nuclear construction hidden from the world Pyongyang withdrew from the NPT in 2003 and defied international norms and UN sanctions with its two nuclear tests and long range missile launches Pyongyang decided to hedge its bets during the Agreed Framework violating the agreement and its NPT commitments by acquiring export controlled materials and equipment from abroad in order to explore the uranium enrichment route to the bomb However international symbolism and prestige derived from nuclear technologies and weapons played an important role North Korea views itself as a small and weak nation in spite of its domestic propaganda to the contrary Once Pyongyang acquired and demonstrated the bomb it used the power and prestige derived from the bomb as a diplomatic lever to strengthen its negotiating position Its decision to confront the Obama administration with a missile launch and a nuclear test was more likely an attempt to gain diplomatic leverage and possibly to support domestic changes rather than an effort toward deterring an increased security threat Pyongyang may also simply have decided to take advantage of the transition to accomplish two objectives while the Obama administration was still formulating its Northeast Asia security policies and assembling its executive team North Korea s long range missile program needed additional flight tests and Pyongyang needed to demonstrate to itself and the world that its nuclear weapons could do better than the 2006 test The missile and nuclear tests must have been on the shelf ready to go for some time looking for a convenient window What can we learn from how and why North Korea built the bomb North Korea is unlikely to give up its nuclear arsenal anytime soon because it has become crucial to how the regime assures its security Nuclear weapons also play a supportive role domestically and provide diplomatic leverage Pyongyang views its security concerns as existential They are deeply rooted in history and hence are unlikely to be resolved by alliances with its neighbors each of which North Korea believes to have ulterior motives Pyongyang turned to the United States but it found Washington unreliable and inconsistent In spite of having received numerous security guarantees that promised to respect its sovereignty along with assurances not to invade the country Pyongyang still feels threatened today It will require much more than another security guarantee to make Pyongyang feel secure Even if North Korea s security fears are assuaged domestic factors favor keeping the bomb The external threat is used to justify the need for the bomb and the sacrifices North Korea s people are asked to make That threat also helps keep its people submissive and isolated from the international community It also helps the regime continue to control all information and to blind its people to progress in the rest of the world especially south of the DMZ Paradoxically compared to a more democratic country an autocracy like North Korea may find it easier to give up its weapons if doing so is seen to help the regime survive because it does not have to deal with domestic opposition Military might is the only source of Pyongyang s diplomatic power today Nuclear weapons have become central to the projection of its military might in spite of the fact that its nuclear arsenal has little war fighting utility Pyongyang views nuclear weapons as diplomatic equalizers with its much more prosperous and powerful but non nuclear rivals South Korea and Japan Without nuclear weapons North Korea would get scant attention from the international community Many believe that the bomb is only a bargaining chip and that North Korea is willing to sell it for the right price However for reasons stated above there is no price high enough for Pyongyang to sell It is also not about to give up its nuclear weapons first as a condition of normalization Pyongyang may agree to denuclearize in principle but it will drag out implementation as it did during the six party process It is also unlikely that North Korea can be forced to give up the bomb Realistically military options are off the table unless North Korea initiates a conflict Additionally sanctions are ineffective without China s support but China will not support sanctions that bring Pyongyang to its knees Beijing fears U S intervention in North Korea more than it does nuclear weapons in its neighbor s hands It wants peace

    Original URL path: http://www.amacad.org/content/publications/pubContent.aspx?d=887 (2016-02-13)
    Open archived version from archive

  • The management of NPT diplomacy - American Academy of Arts & Sciences
    is that the adoption of a Final Declaration is the expression of collective political will Failure to do so could be a symptom of deeper political malaise or a demonstration of dissatisfaction with specific aspects of the review process such as when the Arab group of countries focuses on a demand for Israel to join the NPT as a NNWS The adoption of a Final Declaration is also influenced by the prevailing global atmosphere Thus a Final Declaration at a review conference is undoubtedly a political barometer The 1975 Review Conference As the first review conference the 1975 Conference served as a precedent with those NNWS that were part of NAM functioning under the title Group of 77 ready to confront the three NWS in the NPT at the time the United States the USSR and the United Kingdom Article VI was the key area of dispute and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty CTBT was a principal demand in addition to security assurances for the NNWS The adoption of a Final Declaration was less a reflection of diplomatic agreement among the parties and more a tribute to the forceful personality of Conference President Inga Thorsson of Sweden who is said to have pushed her own draft through after the Drafting Committee failed to reach consensus on the nuclear disarmament aspects Mexico as spokesman for the Group of 77 made an interpretative statement of the Final Declaration that was incorporated as a Conference document Thus participants arrived at an uneasy compromise The 1980 Review Conference The 1980 Review Conference followed the remarkable success of the 1978 First Special Session of the UNGA devoted to disarmament SSOD I and expectations were high The Carter administration had been weakened considerably by the overthrow of the Shah in Iran and the subsequent student takeover of the U S Embassy with its staff held in a prolonged hostage crisis U S diplomats were in no mood to accommodate NAM demands Relations between the United States and the USSR were strained by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan NAM itself was divided by tensions between Iran and Iraq which erupted into a nasty war after the Review Conference Sharp divisions arose over Article VI and the CTBT security assurances Article III and nuclear sharing insofar as it was contrary to Articles I and II After the success of SSOD I NAM was not prepared to settle for anything less than disarmament and so a deadlock resulted with no Final Declaration adopted The 1985 Review Conference In preparation for the 1985 Review Conference I chaired the third session of the Preparatory Committee which decided on the current structure of the three Main Committees and apportioned the chairs of these committees to the Western Eastern and NAM groups and went on to chair Main Committee I of the Conference which was held during U S President Reagan s first term Israel had attacked and destroyed Iraq s safeguarded nuclear reactor by the time of the 1985 Conference Despite this inclement atmosphere NPT diplomacy reached new heights under the able presidency of Ambassador Mohamed Shaker of Egypt himself an authority on the NPT His innovative diplomacy included assembling a representative group of advisors who helped to steer the Conference to the successful adoption of a Final Declaration Before that however numerous hurdles had to be cleared as sharp and irreconcilable divisions arose over disarmament issues especially the CTBT It was evident that instructions given to the U S delegation were very tight and I conceived of a drafting exercise similar to the Shanghai Communiqué of February 28 1972 from the end of President Nixon s historic visit to China That communiqué had stated China s position and the U S position on many controversial issues separately and with no attempt to bridge the differences Thus a draft that reflected an overwhelming majority of delegations expressing support for a CTBT with a few delegations holding a contrary view was drawn up and finally accepted helping to break the stalemate that was preventing a consensus This formula of agreeing to disagree was unusual but helped in the adoption of a Final Declaration The personal diplomacy of the leader of the U S delegation Ambassador Lewis Dunn who painstakingly built relationships with the main officers of the Review Conference throughout all sessions of the Preparatory Committee was another ingredient in the success of the 1985 Conference In the final hours of the Conference the hard work on the more substantive issues was almost wrecked over a non NPT related dispute between Iran and Iraq This dispute was also resolved by a drafting exercise which satisfied both parties and in the small hours of the morning with the clock having been stopped the Conference was successfully concluded The 1990 Review Conference The 1990 Review Conference had to confront NAM s renewed demand for a CTBT which could not be resolved through drafting tricks or innovative diplomacy Although the Mexican delegation is accused of having wrecked the Conference standing out resolutely against any compromise it must also be stated that the president of the Conference and other key delegations lacked the flexibility to devise diplomatic solutions or procedural fixes On the other hand the 1990 Conference is possibly an example of the limits of NPT diplomacy when the political context is so difficult that no diplomacy could overcome the differences among delegations The lesson to be drawn is that politics and diplomacy must go together if multilateral conferences are to succeed There has to be political will to adopt decisions in a conference creative diplomacy alone will not be enough Preparations for the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference NPTREC and its month long conduct presented a huge diplomatic challenge 5 The NPT depositary states led by the United States were clear that an indefinite extension was their goal and U S diplomats particularly Ambassador Thomas Graham Jr worked with national governments to achieve this end Ambassador Graham s book Disarmament Sketches describes his efforts While Russia the United Kingdom and France supported the same objective there was no evidence of the same organized diplomatic offensive from them China maintained publicly that it wanted a smooth extension but with one eye on NAM declined to be more explicit or active The political atmosphere around the 1995 NPTREC was made favorable by the Clinton administration s decision to begin negotiating a CTBT in the Conference on Disarmament thus removing one of the most contentious issues in NPT conferences South Africa was a key target of U S diplomacy following Nelson Mandela s assumption of leadership of the nation and its emergence as a non racial democracy replacing the white minority regime of the past More significantly South Africa had joined the NPT as a non nuclear weapons state after destroying its nuclear devices under International Atomic Energy Agency IAEA supervision A special link on key NPTREC issues is said to have been established between U S Vice President Al Gore who addressed the opening of the NPTREC and South African Vice President Thabo MBEKI ensuring South Africa s support for an indefinite extension of the NPT This was an undoubted diplomatic triumph especially as South Africa had proposed another 25 year extension during the Preparatory Committee stage The United States attempted similar diplomacy with the Arab group of countries Egypt in particular but was less successful The Egyptian Foreign Minister at the time Amr Moussa remained critical of Israel s rejection of the NPT and demanded a solution to this rejection calling for the Middle East to become a weapons of mass destruction free zone Another critic of U S NPT policy was the able Mexican diplomat Miguel Marin Bosch who was marginalized under U S pressure A series of articles in The Washington Post on the eve of the NPTREC outlined U S policy and its diplomatic efforts In marked contrast to the well organized U S diplomatic offensive the NAM countries had no similar campaign No alternative to indefinite extension was conceptualized clearly or pursued vigorously although many delegations proposed extensions of varying length since an extension would have given NAM the leverage it wanted Even the critics outside the NPT like India made no effort to see that their wishes for a deadlocked conference were realized by way of an organized NAM stance The officers for the 1995 NPTREC principally the president were identified at an early stage Two names including my own were proposed for the presidency at the very first session of the Preparatory Committee and I was confirmed as president at the second session This jump start provided ample time for consultations to be conducted and for diplomatic strategies to be planned In contrast the confirmation of the president elect for the 2010 NPT Extension and Review Conference was confirmed at the third session of the Preparatory Committee in May 2009 Because of the complexity and importance of the 1995 NPTREC in comparison to other five year review conferences four sessions of the Preparatory Committee were necessary and yet there was no complete agreement on the rules of procedure The diplomatic wrangling surrounding the rules of procedure was concerned with the mode of voting would voting be conducted by secret ballot or by open ballot if the Conference came to voting NAM countries overwhelmingly preferred the former while the Western group preferred the latter The importance of this decision revolved around the wording of Article X paragraph 2 which stipulated that the extension decision be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty This deadlock remained unresolved throughout the NPTREC and it was just as well that the final package of three decisions and the Resolution on the Middle East were adopted without a vote At the opening of the Conference it was clear to me as president through interviews with delegations that had not openly announced their extension preferences that the majority needed for an indefinite extension did exist It was therefore left to me to craft a procedure that would legitimize this as well as reflect the overwhelming view that the extension should be conditioned on specific guarantees that nuclear disarmament would be achieved To respond to that challenge a small group styled the President s Consultations along the lines of Ambassador Shaker s group from 1985 was adopted The group included all Conference officers the chairs of the political groups and key delegations selected by me It was conceived as an inner cabinet or a laboratory to discuss the all important extension issue which transcended the normal business of the Main Committees The device was not entirely undemocratic or lacking in transparency because group leaders and all delegations belonged to a group except for China were encouraged to report back to their groups regularly and seek their endorsement on the decisions being taken The fact that the results of these consultations were endorsed by the entire Conference proved that success came from effective multilateral diplomacy rather than from seeking to arrive at decisions in the plenary through unwieldy debate The composition of the group was undoubtedly arbitrary and that was resented by some of the delegations that were excluded particularly by their ambassadors whose egos were bruised In terms of conference diplomacy however it was the practical and effective thing to do It was within this group that two decisions Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty and Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non proliferation and Disarmament were drafted over a two week period With all delegations now asserting their right to participate fully in decision making it is doubtful that the same device could be adopted in the future As president I handled the drafting of the key legal decision on extension and the weaving of it and the other two decisions into a package which I announced to a large representative gathering The dispute over the rules of procedure whether voting should be secret or open was unlikely to have been resolved given the strongly held positions I would have had to break the deadlock with a vote and my decision whether that was to be by open or secret vote would itself have been highly contentious It was also my conviction which I voiced repeatedly that voting on a treaty as important as the NPT would expose the Treaty membership as a house divided eroding the viability of the Treaty As president of the Conference my main task was to fulfill the terms of Article X paragraph 2 that a decision on extending the Treaty had to be taken by a majority of the parties to the treaty What better way to accomplish this task than by agreeing that there was a consensus that such a majority existed The formulation thus presented by me was irrefutable and was met with widespread agreement In any event the package was not unwrapped but some tinkering of the wording in Decision I was agreed upon including dropping the words a consensus for simply deciding that as a majority exists This satisfied the purists among the NAM members who resisted being a part of the consensus And yet because they could not deny that a majority did exist for an indefinite extension they agreed that the entire package would be adopted without a vote The contentious issue of the Middle East which according to the wishes of the Arab Group had proceeded on a separate track had not made any progress and I was approached for a solution at a very late stage of the Conference This resulted in special consultations on a Resolution on the Middle East with key delegations present and an agreement was finally reached Failure to consult Iran proved almost disastrous when the Resolution came up for adoption but was resolved during a recess in the plenary on the final day While the extension aspect of the Conference appeared to have been conducted successfully the review aspect in the key political areas handled by Main Committee I was a diplomatic failure Main Committees II and III thanks to the efficiency of their chairmen successfully concluded their work on technical aspects on the NPT My last minute intervention to rescue the process in Main Committee I did not succeed This was not in the final analysis a major setback since the main outcome a decision on extension had been achieved The two conferences of 2000 and 2005 offer a study in contrast 2000 saw the adoption of a landmark Final Declaration with its well known 13 Steps see Figure 1 2005 ended in disarray Figure 1 The 2000 NPT Review Conference and the 13 Practical Steps A Summary At the 2000 Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty NPT Review Conference states parties agreed to take 13 practical steps to meet their commitments under Article VI of the NPT The early entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty CTBT A nuclear testing moratorium pending entry into force of the CTBT The immediate commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a nondiscriminatory multilateral and effectively verifiable fissile material cutoff treaty The negotiations should aim to be concluded within five years The establishment in the Conference on Disarmament of a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament The principle of irreversibility to apply to all nuclear disarmament and reduction measures An unequivocal undertaking by nuclear weapons states to eliminate their nuclear arsenals The early entry into force and implementation of start II the conclusion of start III and the preservation and strengthening of the Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty The completion and implementation of the Trilateral Initiative between the United States the Russian Federation and the International Atomic Energy Agency IAEA Steps by all nuclear weapons states toward disarmament including unilateral nuclear reductions transparency on weapons capabilities and Article VI related agreements reductions in nonstrategic nuclear weapons measures to reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies the engagement of nuclear weapons states as soon as appropriate in a process leading to complete disarmament The placement of excess military fissile materials under IAEA or other international verification and the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes Reaffirmation of the objective of general and complete disarmament under effective international control Regular state reporting in the NPT review process on the implementation of Article VI obligations The development of verification capabilities necessary to ensure compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements Source Taken from the compilation by Claire Applegarth in Arms Control Today January February 2005 One conference saw active diplomacy working toward a positive conclusion while the other under the Bush administration and with Ambassador John Bolton as Permanent Representative of the United States was polarized from the beginning with little or no bridge building efforts The run up to the 2000 Review Conference was helped by the conclusion of the CTBT and its signature by several countries although the U S Senate rejected its ratification The Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests of 1998 were undoubted setbacks however these two countries were bound neither by the NPT nor the CTBT The Preparatory Committee sessions were also marred by persistent efforts of the NWS to conduct business as usual ignoring the major changes achieved in 1995 in terms of strengthening the review process In marked contrast the 2000 Review Conference itself proved a success Conference President Ambassador Baali of Algeria demonstrated that a background in disarmament diplomacy was not necessarily a prerequisite so long as you had multilateral diplomatic skills Main Committee I Chairman Ambassador Camillo Reyes of Colombia and the chairman of the subsidiary body on Article VI issues Ambassador Pearson of New Zealand showed great diplomatic skills in guiding their discussions to a consensus The conference almost ran aground on a dispute between Iraq and the United States but even this was eventually resolved Thus the needs of good conference management were well served The 13 Steps and the unequivocal undertaking of the NWS to achieve the elimination of

    Original URL path: http://www.amacad.org/content/publications/pubContent.aspx?d=908 (2016-02-13)
    Open archived version from archive

  • The NPT & the sources of nuclear restraint - American Academy of Arts & Sciences
    see them through to completion and acquire nuclear weapons 12 The Influence of Non Material Incentives Yet another way to view nuclear choice is to look beyond security considerations and to recognize that even power politics can be tempered by human practice According to this perspective under appropriate conditions the international social environment may foster the development of norms institutions and behavior conducive to states renunciation of nuclear weapons 13 From this vantage point the NPT represents the embodiment of the international nonproliferation norm and has important symbolic value in addition to its promise of material benefits 14 Maria Rost Rublee s analyses of Japanese and Egyptian nuclear decision making are very much in this tradition and suggest that the creation of the NPT not only had the effect of altering elite perceptions about the value of nuclear weapons but also spawned commitments that grew legs in the form of supportive bureaucracies budgets and organizational power 15 Although plausible this interpretation is challenged by Etel Solingen who examines a number of the same and other cases According to Solingen s research the operation of pragmatic considerations of a political economic nature typically takes precedence over normative ones Most of the 13 case studies prepared for the Center for Nonproliferation Studies CNS project on Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation in the 21st Century similarly provide little evidence that normative factors by themselves account for much variation in national decisions to acquire or forgo nuclear weapons Jacques Hymans s research on the demand side for the bomb also is relevant to an assessment of the power of non material incentives His approach is unusual as it stresses neither the dampening effect that broad trends in international norms have on proliferation tendencies nor the corresponding constraints that may follow from societal pressures Rather his focus is on deviant oppositional nationalist leaders whose combination of fear and pride propels them down the nuclear weapons path According to Hymans the apparent success of the NPT in containing proliferation results primarily from the fact that few state leaders have desired the things it prohibits 16 Approaches that emphasize normative influences on nuclear decision making often are criticized for their lack of clarity in explaining how when and why norms influenced nuclear weapons decisions One of the few studies to tackle this issue directly is by Harald Müller and Andreas Schmidt Their research points to a decline after 1960 in the number of states with nuclear weapons activities relative to the total number of states in the international system a trend the authors attribute in part to a shift in the global norm regarding nuclear nonproliferation The authors attach particular importance to the unanimous adoption in 1961 of a resolution introduced by Ireland to the United Nations General Assembly The resolution called upon all members to conclude an international agreement prohibiting states not possessing nuclear weapons from acquiring them and states with nuclear weapons from assisting other members in their manufacture or acquisition by other means 17 According to Müller and Schmidt For states that gained their independence late after the Irish Resolution being non nuclear was seen as an appropriate status the attribute of a good citizen of the world community of states For the old states the new norm competed with the old understanding that a state was entitled to acquire armament according to the standard of the time This is an indication that the debate and codification of a new though yet weak international norm had an impact upon the way the new states viewed proper behavior and shaped their own understanding of security For the old states the impact was weaker but the series of terminations of nuclear weapons activities started during that period In 1968 a much stronger norm was created the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty 18 An alternative interpretation of when and why that de emphasizes the role of norms is provided by Christopher Way and Karthika Sasikumar in what is arguably the most carefully crafted aggregate data analysis of when and why states join the NPT 19 Assuming that states rely on cost benefit analysis when choosing whether or not to accede to the NPT the authors employ event history models and a variety of economic security and political indicators for the 1968 to 2000 time period to assess the power of alternative explanatory variables They conclude among other things that those states that enjoy benign security environments or for whom developing nuclear weapons would be technologically or economically difficult sign on relatively quickly while those paying higher opportunity costs in giving up the nuclear option are more likely to be NPT laggards 20 The Force of Domestic Politics A growing body of research suggests that one cannot properly understand nuclear weapons restraint without reference to the domestic context in which nuclear decisions are made Indeed the interplay of bureaucratic politics organizational processes and individual personalities may be more consequential in shaping proliferation outcomes in a number of states than the threats emanating from the international security environment As Scott Sagan points out from this vantage point t he NPT regime is not just a device to increase states confidence about the limits of their potential adversaries nuclear programs it is a tool that can help to empower domestic actors who are opposed to nuclear weapons developments 21 The most persuasive evidence about the force of sub national dynamics in explaining nuclear outcomes is marshaled by Etel Solingen who emphasizes the importance of the domestic ruling coalition s orientation to the global political economy Nuclear weapons programs she argues are less likely to emerge in countries when the domestic political landscape is sympathetic to economic openness trade liberalization foreign investment and international economic integration This thesis largely is borne out in her comparative analysis of nine states from East Asia and the Middle East which also finds that NPT considerations were not central to the nuclear renunciation decisions of these countries Findings from my own research on nuclear decision making in Belarus Kazakhstan and Ukraine following the collapse of the Soviet Union offer qualified support for Solingen s thesis and also suggest that the NPT was only a secondary factor influencing nuclear reversal decisions 22 Solingen s model fits best with Ukraine where the main threats to the country s territorial integrity were seen by the key political players as domestic rather than external These acute dangers were in the form of economic collapse and Crimea s attempt to assert its independence from Ukraine threats unlikely to be mitigated by nuclear weapons Moreover there was recognition in Kyiv reinforced by U S policy of the connection between Ukraine s nuclear policies and its access to foreign capital and technology In Kazakhstan the linkage was less direct and the perceived threats also were much less urgent As a consequence Kazakhstani policy makers were in no hurry to denuclearize and were aware that the weapons on their territory might have practical value as bargaining chips related to a variety of economic environmental and security needs The leadership however was very pragmatic and was receptive to the U S argument that the future of the country s peaceful nuclear energy program was dependent upon its non nuclear weapons status Solingen s thesis works least well in the case of Belarus whose president Stanislav Shushkevich saw little value in a Belarusian nuclear force even if it could be afforded His attitude appears to have had little to do with international economic considerations but instead reflected his professional training as a nuclear physicist and view of nuclear weapons as immoral and unnecessary As the preceding discussion indicates the scholarly literature on nuclear weapons decision making including the small body of relevant quantitative studies is divided on the importance one should attribute to the NPT in explaining past nuclear weapons renunciation decisions Although a number of country analyses touch on the role played by the NPT in individual cases surprisingly few studies focus specifically on the topic Instead NPT advocates and critics alike typically assert their preferred views about the merits of the Treaty and its in dispensable contribution in retarding the spread of nuclear weapons The period during which the NPT received the most sustained attention was the five year run up to the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference At that time it was by no means assured that the Treaty would be extended indefinitely and a number of analyses were undertaken to assess how the demise of the NPT might affect the international nonproliferation scene Particularly noteworthy was a collection of essays on Beyond 1995 The Future of the NPT Regime 23 In one of the book s most cogent contributions Lawrence Scheinman sums up the prevailing view of scholarly thinking at the time which does not differ markedly from the present the NPT alone cannot and does not prevent proliferation As he notes Studies of national decisions on acquiring nuclear weapons or acceding to the NPT show that in virtually every case the decision made can be explained by reference to something other than the NPT either to domestic considerations the impact of acquiring nuclear weapons on bilateral relations assessment of technological limitations political costs or security consequences 24 To paraphrase Scheinman s conclusions Does this mean that the NPT doesn t matter No Would its demise negatively impact efforts to contain proliferation Yes Would the nonproliferation norm international safeguards and general nonproliferation restraint continue in the absence of the NPT Perhaps In short according to Scheinman the NPT is a necessary but not sufficient condition for nonproliferation it may not prevent proliferation but it significantly impacts the nuclear decision making environments in many countries 25 Scheinman s essay also highlights the various nonproliferation roles played by the NPT and the logic of assessing the value of the Treaty in terms of the importance one attaches to these different functions For example it is useful to distinguish among the NPT s roles as a legal barrier a normative standard and a confidence building measure The latter function which may be less obvious than the others includes important international safeguards commitments that states party to the NPT are obliged to undertake These commitments are legally binding and entail verification procedures designed to reassure other states about the peaceful uses of a country s nuclear activities Although international safeguards and the confidence they instill are not dependent on the NPT it is extremely doubtful if a global system of stringent safeguards approaching those currently in existence would have developed in the absence of the NPT 26 Many nonproliferation analysts maintain that the NPT as a multilateral treaty has some constraining effect on states party to the Treaty As Scheinman argues Formalized commitments containing reciprocal obligations establish thresholds that are more difficult to cross 27 This assessment is logical in terms of the psychological bureaucratic and domestic political obstacles that treaties impose notwithstanding their withdrawal clauses And indeed most research on international treaties suggests that states generally comply with the accords they conclude Less clear cut however is the extent to which states comply because of any legal commitment to do so or because of the conditions that prompted them to sign the treaty in the first place 28 Based on the aggregate data analysis of Way and Sasikumar and a number of country specific case studies especially those by Rublee the NPT would appear both to constrain and screen One of the most unusual aspects of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference was the near unanimity among more than a hundred national statements during the first week of general debate about the benefits of the NPT for the specific states in question These statements were by no means uniform and made reference to a variety of arguments ranging from reduced regional arms racing increased confidence in the peaceful intentions of potential adversaries progress in promoting disarmament among the NWS expansion of NWFZs harnessing of the atom for peaceful use and the promise of greater peace and stability in the international system Although these statements emphasized different points and perspectives what was striking to this observer was the general consistency of the message that the NPT was net a significant plus and should be extended either indefinitely or for a long duration as well as the apparent heartfelt manner in which many of the statements were delivered 29 Today the rhetoric about the value of the Treaty as reflected in national statements in the NPT review process remains much the same Nevertheless one has the impression that many of the speakers are simply going through the motions reiterating past declarations about the importance of the Treaty but without much passion or conviction This lackadaisical approach to the business of the NPT aptly described by former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan as sleep walking was most apparent at the 2005 NPT Review Conference which finished early without any substantive result It was almost as if the heads of delegations mostly Conference on Disarmament ambassadors were anxious to catch an early flight back to Geneva or otherwise beat the traffic home One probably should not attach much importance to this very unscientific and impressionistic observation of diplomatic sentiment regarding the state of the nonproliferation regime Even a cursory comparison of today s nonproliferation scene with that of 1995 however suggests the need to view nonproliferation in dynamic terms and to examine if only briefly how the regime may have changed in recent years and how evolving international developments may alter the future effectiveness of the NPT as a means of nuclear restraint Although one can identify many changes three of the most important pertain to the growth of nonstate actors as proliferation threats the diminished benefits of NNWS status under the NPT in the aftermath of the U S India nuclear deal and the increased centrality of Article IV peaceful use provisions in many states assessments of the benefits and limitations of the NPT Non State Actors At the time the NPT was negotiated little attention was given to the proliferation risks posed by nonstate actors either as suppliers of sensitive nuclear material technology and know how or as end users that is parties who sought to acquire and use nuclear weapons As a consequence the NPT did not seek to address the potential risks of nuclear terrorism posed by non state actors and steps to remedy this oversight recently have been introduced in a variety of multilateral bilateral and unilateral initiatives only some of which represent legally binding mechanisms 30 Although it remains to be seen how effective these new initiatives will be in forestalling efforts by non state actors to act as nuclear suppliers middlemen and end users it is apparent that the provisions of the NPT per se are not well suited to address either the supply or demand side of the nuclear terrorism equation As such one should not expect the NPT to serve as a major source of nuclear weapons restraint for non state actors even as such entities emerge as a growing proliferation risk 31 The U S India Nuclear Deal One of the major benefits of NPT membership for NNWS is the promise of access to equipment materials and scientific information for the peaceful use of nuclear energy In return NNWS pledge to place all of their nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards and to refrain from pursuing nuclear weapons activities It is this core bargain that has been used to good effect by advocates of nuclear restraint typically outward looking elites to use Solingen s terminology in a number of countries Although the long term effects of the U S India nuclear deal and the associated exemption granted to India by the Nuclear Suppliers Group in 2008 remain to be seen almost certainly they will include an erosion of the perceived value of NNWS membership in the NPT Indeed representatives from a number of relatively recent adherents to the npt have expressed the view privately that had their governments anticipated that a non NPT state and nuclear weapons possessor would be so rewarded they would have hesitated to join the Treaty 32 The readiness on the part of NPT states parties to willfully ignore politically binding pledges made at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference to refrain from nuclear trade with states lacking comprehensive safeguards also can only undermine the nonproliferation norm and provide ammunition for institutional advocates of revisiting the value of the NPT for their country s economic political and security interests 33 Article IV The most contentious article of the NPT during most of its existence has been Article VI which commits parties to the Treaty to pursue disarmament negotiations in good faith At most NPT Review Conferences for example the greatest division among states and the most difficult issue on which to forge consensus has involved progress or the lack thereof on nuclear disarmament It is unlikely that the gulf separating NWS and NNWS over implementation of Article VI will disappear soon although the readiness of the new U S administration to embrace the vision of nuclear disarmament can only be helpful in this regard There are indications however that it may prove even more difficult in the future to build consensus on issues related to peaceful use than on disarmament as many current nuclear exporting states insist upon more stringent safeguards on nuclear use for example adoption of the Additional Protocol to the IAEA as a condition of export and limitations on the further spread of sensitive nuclear fuel cycle activities These proposed measures designed to address misuse of peaceful use provisions for military purposes are regarded by a number of key NNWS and especially Non Aligned Movement NAM members such as Egypt and South Africa as a restriction on their inalienable right to peaceful nuclear use as expressed in Article IV Although it is possible that meaningful progress on the disarmament front may yield more flexibility by NAM on peaceful use measures related to export

    Original URL path: http://www.amacad.org/content/publications/pubContent.aspx?d=950 (2016-02-13)
    Open archived version from archive

  • Toward a robust nuclear management system - American Academy of Arts & Sciences
    300 GWe but 200 GWe Thus the global nuclear power scene in 2050 will be entirely different from the current scene The amount of nuclear electricity in developing nations would be nearly the same as the amount in developed nations say 500 GWe for each and in terms of capacity in individual nations China and India would be the leading countries possibly surpassing the United States or Europe and Canada unless more is done in those regions A world where China and India are the champions of nuclear power production would be a totally different playing field as far as the world nuclear regime and the world nuclear industry go Thus and returning to the original premise of this paper how to develop a robust nuclear management system the architecture of that system should be designed with the assumption that a number of new entrants will operate their own nuclear power plants and that China and India will have the greatest nuclear power production In other words a robust nuclear management system must recognize that the total amounts of nuclear electricity in developing nations will be greater than or at least comparable to the amounts in developed nations The evolution and improvement of safety management will be crucial to our nuclear future How is safety best managed in a world where nuclear power expands remarkably in developing countries and also spreads to a number of new entrants that construct and operate their own nuclear reactors Nuclear energy can play an important role worldwide only when nuclear power development and reactor operation is safe with no concerns about serious accidents The challenge for us is to create a safer global nuclear option A robust nuclear management system in which all countries are granted the right to use nuclear energy for civilian purposes needs to emphasize the development of comprehensive safety management To this end safety standards as a minimum requirement must be implemented on an international basis In particular any nuclear country will have to follow safety obligations to ensure that no accidents with serious consequences take place Every nuclear power nation is to a large extent hostage to the safety performance in other nuclear power nations by virtue of the adverse consequences that would arise from a serious nuclear accident Therefore only countries capable of meeting comprehensive international safety management norms should be in a position to utilize nuclear power How should the world pursue comprehensive safety management More particularly how can nations currently utilizing nuclear energy maintain and advance safety management and how should nations developing nuclear power programs build on and utilize the safety management practices currently in place in nations with developed nuclear power infrastructures First the defense in depth concept is employed within the nuclear safety area to lessen the frequency of trigger events to prevent them from leading to more severe events and to mitigate the consequences if they occur Except for the Chernobyl accident this defense in depth concept has contributed significantly to the avoidance of serious consequences within the nuclear industry The usefulness of this concept should not be understated but it could benefit from further strengthening The concept together with multiple physical barriers should be advanced with some additional requirements for accident management tools which have been increasingly demanded in the aftermath of the Three Mile Island and the Chernobyl accidents Looking at the experiences over the past few years however it is clear that defense in depth even with accident management tools has not been sufficient because defenses can deteriorate as time passes This realization is one of the most instructive lessons learned from the history of nuclear safety that technical engineering systems are inclined to age and thus face diminished effectiveness in safety performance Furthermore human factors have also contributed to lapses in safety To compensate for such deficiencies quality management systems have been increasingly developed to ensure consistent safety performance and quality of human operations As a result of increased focus on quality management and a defense in depth concept complemented by proper accident management tools nuclear safety is now well managed With an appropriate combination of the above mentioned measures nuclear safety as a whole has been maintained successfully to date and many countries with nuclear power programs have shown excellent safety performance over the last couple of decades This record of excellence is due not only to the application of technical engineering systems but also largely to interaction with society Regulatory systems have been improved over time and these improvements have been based significantly on society s demands for elevated nuclear safety This societal aspect of nuclear safety is sometimes perceived as a stakeholder s involvement issue A more robust nuclear system would include a more structured relationship between nuclear safety and society to maintain the safety scheme in a way that encourages timely detection of deterioration in technical engineering measures The effectiveness of any such detection system will depend greatly on how much accountability the people request from operators and regulators The social system required for safety management is critical There is a variety of stakeholders and no one stakeholder should dominate However related stakeholders should work together to reach consensus through an interactive communication process A safety management system must incorporate substantive and procedural aspects and thereby would be perceived as a more democratic process In the social sciences this process is interpreted as a communicative action in the public sphere advocated by German philosopher Jürgen Habermas 8 a well known scientist insisting on the emergent need to facilitate communication between specialists professionals or technocrats and the general public I believe that a part of sustainable nuclear development is ensuring that every nuclear country creates its own communication system that enables all related stakeholders or sectors to participate Communicative actions are essential to maintain and enhance safety for two reasons One is transparency which is not merely openness or information disclosure but more importantly accountability to the public complemented with feedback on safety measures The second reason is flexibility as social requirements for safety change with time depending on an operator s past safety performance or how often troubles and incidents have occurred This type of communication system is employed not merely in the nuclear safety area but in many other fields as well A well known American social scientist Nobel laureate Herbert Simon argued in his seminal book The Sciences of the Artificial 9 that we need to pay greater attention to so called procedural rationality rather than substantive rationality Simon writes Economics illustrates well how outer and inner environment s interact and in particular how an intelligent system s adjustment to its outer environment its substantive rationality is limited by its ability through knowledge and computation to discover appropriate adaptive behavior its procedural rationality 10 Simon s ideas apply to nuclear safety management The inner system that is the defense in depth concept with quality management is owned by an individual operator or regulator and needs to adjust to its outer environment the ability to do so however is unfortunately limited Only through improved knowledge obtained from communication between nuclear energy s inner and outer environments can appropriate adaptive behavior be promoted Undoubtedly there is no absolute safety The defense in depth concept with quality management is designed to help make up for any safety deficiencies in individual parts of the system Looking at nuclear history it has worked well With regard to the goal of sustainable nuclear development however more than traditional measures need to be employed According to Simon s suggestion to rest only on the rationality invented in the inner environment is inherently limited What would be better is to communicate with the outer environment and thereby discover appropriate adaptive behavior In other words nuclear operators and regulators should actively communicate with the broader society particularly with the local communities and others affected by and interested in the development of nuclear power The most important factor in such communication is transparency because on the one hand it is tremendously helpful for confidence building in society and on the other hand it gives good incentives for operators and regulators to improve safety performance As an analogy with the Simon s theory this type of interaction between the inner and outer environments brings about procedural rationality which might significantly strengthen or complement substantive rationality that is resting on the defense in depth concept with quality management Safety management based on procedural rationality together with substantive rationality has been developed in advanced nuclear power countries and as a result safety performance in those countries has been enhanced remarkably The same type of management must be employed in countries new to nuclear power if the nuclear option is to be robust in terms of safety Managing spent nuclear fuel is an additional critical issue for nuclear power development because of both public concerns about safety and concerns regarding nonproliferation and terrorism The latter pertains to the risk that materials within spent fuel could be used for either nuclear weapons or radiological dispersal devices The nuclear industry governments and the public in countries with nuclear power programs as well as the international community at large continue to struggle with how best to manage spent nuclear fuel At the heart of the issue is the fact that spent fuel contains plutonium as well as other highly radioactive fission products The plutonium in spent fuel raises the long standing question of whether or not to reprocess and recycle plutonium together with uranium for new fuel to be burned in nuclear power reactors The question is connected to a variety of factors economics energy self sufficiency environmental burdens of waste management resource conservation and nonproliferation as well as safety Each country s policy decisions should take into account not only domestic situations but also relevant international situations France Japan Russia China and India are the countries presently conducting or pursuing recycling programs alongside reprocessing The United States Canada Finland Sweden and South Korea do not use reprocessing and recycling programs rather they are seeking to implement programs for direct disposal of spent fuel at a geological repository Whether or not reprocessing is involved a geological final repository is necessary to dispose of highly radioactive wastes The programs for such final repositories are always very controversial because of the tremendously high potential hazards related to the extremely high radioactivity The programs are also increasingly complicated politically mainly owing to domestic factors Currently there are two extreme cases both in non reprocessing countries One is the Yucca Mountain project in the United States which the Obama administration stated is no longer an option for waste disposal after the United States had spent billions of dollars on the project The other extreme case is the Swedish program 11 In Sweden a site was eventually selected to be one of two candidate repository sites following a decades long patient discussion process The site selection is a milestone for the program and the Swedish case suggests the great success of the country s prudent approach The lesson to be learned from Sweden s success is how useful social communication and acceptance by the local community can be Long term safety assurances for high level waste disposal is a central issue intensive and extensive attention must be paid to safety based on procedural rationality that relies on social communications as well as to safety based on substantive rationality that is the multiple barrier confinement concept used in geological disposal design Social communications are based on a step by step decision making process and require non confrontational dialogue with the public This is exactly what Sweden has done bringing about fruitful success in terms of selecting a site To obtain public understanding one must demonstrate the safety concept based on the substantive rationality geological disposal with multiple barrier confinement In Sweden an underground research laboratory was constructed at a site where the geology is very similar to that of the real repository site The research laboratory helped show the public the basic idea of geological disposal and that was extremely helpful in gaining public understanding One of the advantages in Sweden is that geology there is relatively uniform nationwide making the technical identification of a geological environment for the actual repository relatively simple In Japan the geology is extremely heterogeneous and there is a variety of geological environments that could be candidates for a repository Therefore assuming that the Japanese repository site selection process will be particularly time consuming because of both technical assessment and public involvement Japan is pursuing a multiple track approach whereby the reprocessing and recycling program is under way with interim storage as a means to manage the spent fuel At the same time geological disposal research has been implemented using underground research laboratories with different geological characteristics This multiple track approach is effective in providing flexibility for decision making around repository site selection but this approach also presents a disadvantage because due to a short and intermediate term expedience associated with the approach there is no sense of urgency for the government to make a decision This lack of urgency lessens the political leadership which is necessary for advancing the site selection process Japan s new Democratic Party administration led by Prime Minister Hatoyama issued an official statement that the nuclear policy in Japan will not change although the new government was elected in a landslide the result of the main campaign message Let us make a big change As far as the global nuclear energy situation is concerned however significantly new political leadership is necessary For instance the new government declared that Japan aims to reduce CO 2 emissions until 2020 by 25 percent against the 1990 level if other major countries also provide such a progressive commitment to resolve the global warming issue If this is to be the case Japan has to rely more on nuclear energy which in turn requires greater public support for expanded use of nuclear energy To obtain such public support more visible progress is needed in the back end of Japan s nuclear fuel cycle program reprocessing and geological disposal as well as better performance of reactor operations which will not be possible without more efficient and effective regulations Selecting a site for a final repository will take time and the only way to lead a successful decision making process is to base it on social communication that isn t confrontational but rather is an open dialogue with the public There are two points to be stressed First for nations pursuing the reprocessing and recycling option transparency is especially required to fulfill an international commitment to nonproliferation Nonproliferation concerns are growing and correspondingly the need for international communication and cooperation is indispensable for improving the robustness of each nation s program Second there is a great need to have international collaboration in the area of final repository By and large the construction cost of final repository depends heavily on its scale that is the amount of highly radioactive wastes that can actually be disposed at the facility For the new entrants to nuclear power for instance it does not seem to make any economic sense for each one to have its own facility If that were the case the cost incurred might be too high for nuclear power to be an economically attractive option in that country Thus international cooperation is necessary to spread nuclear power use Given the difficulty in selecting repository sites as indicated from past experiences in developed nations a special arrangement may be necessary when considering international cooperation in this area I think that the most practical way to implement international cooperation is to establish interim storage facilities of spent fuel and not to make a rapid attempt to build an international repository Again the final decision making process must be based on open dialogue internationally How should the global community pursue an appropriate course of nuclear power development beyond considerations of safety security and stakeholder involvement communication Within industry there are new trends and activities meant to take advantage of the growth in nuclear power around the world In terms of reactor construction business a merger and acquisition M A trend has developed in global nuclear industrial sectors Partnerships with the Multinational Design Evaluation Program MDEP originally proposed by the United States and France and now under multinational discussion at the OECD NEA for instance would make remarkable sense for creating an economically healthier market for countries new to developing nuclear power In terms of business related to the nuclear fuel cycle more robust global partnerships seem necessary for nuclear energy to expand steadily As far as the front end of the nuclear fuel cycle is concerned a number of efforts have been undertaken to assure uranium resources and their enrichment For example the International Atomic Energy Agency IAEA 12 has proposed the idea of a nuclear fuel bank Proposals for the back end of the fuel cycle however are limited regardless of the spent fuel management program used The key is transparency of the program which is a prerequisite for safe and secure use of nuclear energy It will be critical to have multiple dimensions in new global partnerships developed and developing nations large and small nations recycling and non recycling countries and nuclear weapons states NWS and non nuclear weapons states NNWS all working together toward common goals As for countries with developed nuclear power systems versus countries developing nuclear power nuclear regulatory infrastructures in developing countries will have to be provided with appropriate aid from developed countries In particular comprehensive safety management needs to be established in countries developing nuclear power the way to introduce it will depend on the social system in each country The system should enable communication between society and the nuclear industry and at a transitional phase developed nations should help stimulate such communication through an international institution like the IAEA or the OECD NEA Cooperation between large and small

    Original URL path: http://www.amacad.org/content/publications/pubContent.aspx?d=928 (2016-02-13)
    Open archived version from archive

  • Nuclear power in the Arab world & the regionalization of the nuclear fuel cycle: an Egyptian perspective - American Academy of Arts & Sciences
    the Additional Protocol to its safeguards agreement with the IAEA It has a 10 MW research reactor at Tajoura that is being converted to run on LEU formerly it used highly enriched uranium In March 2006 Libya signed an agreement with France to develop civilian nuclear power French President Sarkozy and his government which took power in 2007 have confirmed that orientation In Tunisia the possibility of using nuclear as an alternative energy source to counter its limited natural gas resources has been studied since the early 1990s At that time Tunisia conducted a site survey and participated in an IAEA region wide feasibility study of the use of nuclear energy for desalination in the North African states In 2002 Tunisia undertook a more intensive nuclear desalination feasibility study with the French Atomic Energy Commission for the Skhira site in the south of the country The study concluded that as long as gas prices remain constant the nuclear option would not be economical for Tunisia Yet it also concluded that in the future the country would experience electricity shortages unless new natural gas reserves were found Tunisia has no nuclear infrastructure other than a National Center for Science and Nuclear Technology and a National Center for Radioprotection Tunisia is the host of the Arab Atomic Energy Agency an Arab scientific organization and one of the Arab League subsidiary organizations with an independent identity The Agency is concerned with peaceful uses of nuclear energy including development and technological applications The main role of the organization is to coordinate Arab states in peaceful applications of the atom and to assist in research activities manpower development and technical and scientific information It seeks to set up unified regulations for radiological protection and safe handling of radioactive materials and to coordinate scientific and technical activities with concerned regional and international organizations It supports and protects the patents in the peaceful uses of atomic energy encourages Arab scientists in the field of nuclear sciences and technologies and assists them in attending relevant Arab conferences 3 Algeria has a Chinese 15 MW heavy water research reactor at Al Oussera the reactor went critical in 1998 Algeria also possesses an Argentinean 1 MW research reactor that began producing isotopes in 1989 and also has a small fuel fabrication plant and rich deposits of uranium ore Algeria is a leading candidate for nuclear power in the Arab world Finally Morocco had a long standing interest in nuclear power for seawater desalination In the late 1990s it carried out a feasibility study for a Chinese built 10 MW demonstration plant at Tan Tan with IAEA technical assistance and financial backing from the European Union EU Later Morocco studied the economics of coupling nuclear reactors with desalination systems at Agadir and Laayounne To provide the infrastructure to help implement the program Morocco has a nuclear research center and a radiation protection authority In late October 2006 Morocco hosted a 12 country conference to discuss the necessary steps to implement the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism which was sponsored in July of the same year by the United States and Russia at the G8 Summit in St Petersburg Russia The number of supporters of that initiative has dramatically increased since the conference Apart from sponsoring a number of studies the Arab Atomic Energy Agency has generally been dormant and its impact has not been felt in the Arab world or outside of the region However the 2007 Arab Summit of Riyadh was a turning point and perhaps a new lease on life for the Agency At the Summit the Council of the League of Arab States decided to undertake joint cooperative activities for the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and related technology in the Arab world including a practical program devoted to applications in various fields especially energy water medicine agriculture and industry The Council requested that the Secretary General of the League of Arab States form groups of experts and specialists with the participation of the Arab Atomic Energy Agency to consider ways and means for such cooperation to take place within an integrated Arab framework In Riyadh attendees adopted a previous resolution inviting Arab countries to use or expand the use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes for all fields of sustainable development with due consideration of the diversity of their needs and of the fact that they were strictly observing provisions of all international treaties conventions and regulations that they have signed Among the executive steps to be taken the Summit provided support to the Arab Atomic Energy Agency as the organ for joint Arab action in this field and called upon Arab countries that have not yet joined the Agency to do so without delay for their own benefit as well as that of joint Arab action in this field The Summit requested that the Agency develop an Arab strategy for mastering nuclear sciences and technology for peaceful purposes by 2020 The Riyadh Declaration Decisions struck a balance between peaceful nuclear ambitions for the Arab world and reaffirmation of the importance of clearing all weapons of mass destruction WMD from the region The decisions moved away from double standards and selectiveness and warned against launching a dangerous and devastating nuclear arms race in the area It was decided at the Summit to suspend the work of the Technical Committee established in 1994 at the initiative of Arab countries on the preparation of a draft treaty to establish a WMD free and especially nuclear weapon free zone in the Middle East The committee was suspended so that Arab policies followed during past decades could be assessed in light of current international conditions Over the last 13 years the Technical Committee of the League of Arab States had been drafting a treaty to establish a WMD free zone in the Middle East The Arab League found no reason to make the draft text available as it had not yet been approved by the League and as other parties outside the framework in which the draft was negotiated had not been involved or approached The suspension of the work of the Arab League Technical Committee reflects frustration on the part of the Arab states because of the lack of implementation of the Middle East Resolution The Resolution came out of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference sponsored by the three NPT depositary governments the United Kingdom the United States and Russia and was put forward in conjunction with efforts to seek consensus on a decision to extend the NPT indefinitely It also conferred on the nuclear weapons states as sponsors of the resolution the responsibility to achieve universal adherence to the NPT including by Israel and other states not party to the Treaty and to establish the Middle East as a nuclear weapon free and WMD free zone The clear message of the Riyadh Summit was that the Arab states would rather develop their peaceful nuclear activities in a Middle East completely free of WMD and in conformity with all the relevant international instruments they have adhered to There would be no stability or security in the region in the presence of any nuclear weapons capability whether from Israel or from an Iranian potential capability The Riyadh spirit prevailed as well at the Doha Summit held in Qatar in March 2009 and underlined the importance of Arab cooperation and coordination in the nuclear field Will the Riyadh Summit be the basis for ongoing joint Arab action in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy Will the success of the Summit give a boost to the Arab Atomic Energy Agency and lead to a regional or an Arab nuclear fuel cycle fostering greater coordination and cooperation and at the same time ensuring regional control that could be effectively verified internationally Based on the tour d horizon provided above it is clear that Arab states would have the expertise uranium ore deposits research reactors fuel fabrication skills on a small scale accelerators and other nuclear related laboratories including hot cell laboratories necessary to develop an Arab nuclear fuel cycle However within the present international context and in light of policies imposed by the Nuclear Suppliers Group NSG Arab states individually or collectively would face difficulties in investing in and importing the so called sensitive technologies uranium enrichment and fuel reprocessing technologies Iraq and Libya had dramatic experiences with regard to those technologies The vehement opposition we are currently witnessing against the Iranian enrichment program is another signal that an Arab enrichment plant would not be tolerated regardless of its location even though enrichment is not prohibited under the NPT and a number of nonnuclear weapons states that are party to the NPT are investing in enrichment including Germany The Netherlands Brazil and more recently Japan How can the Arab states get around this dilemma in such an atmosphere We must consider the possibilities in light of an IAEA expert group s 2005 report on multinational approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle 4 The regionalization of the nuclear fuel cycle raises a number of basic questions 5 Gradual buildup of a nuclear fuel cycle The internationalization of the nuclear fuel cycle can only proceed in phases Success achieved in the first phases may be an incentive to involve other stages and more actors The IAEA including the expert group mentioned above tends to focus on the so called sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle namely uranium enrichment reprocessing of spent fuel and spent fuel disposal and storage These are definitely important stages in the nuclear fuel cycle from the point of view of nonproliferation and supply but other stages could be of great interest to a number of countries such as uranium ore supply fuel fabrication and even supply of spare parts to nuclear power plants Other stages could also be included in a multilateral arrangement At any rate buildup of a regional nuclear fuel cycle in the Arab region could be expected to be slow and gradual Restructuring the Arab Atomic Energy Agency to promote cooperation and coordination is expected to take a longer time The need for a supply mechanism A supply mechanism is needed to address The possible consequences of interruptions to nuclear fuel supply for political reasons the risk of interruptions might dissuade countries from initiating or expanding nuclear power programs and The vulnerabilities that create incentives for building new national enrichment and reprocessing capabilities A mechanism to assure the supply of nuclear fuel would be envisaged solely as a backup measure to the operation of the commercial market states would make use of the mechanism only when supply was interrupted for political reasons It would neither be a substitute for the existing commercial market in nuclear fuels nor would it deal with disruption of supply due to commercial technical or other nonpolitical reasons If such a mechanism operated reliably Arab countries might be relieved from looking for other alternatives which I will say more about later Could a renewed and bolstered Arab Atomic Energy Agency be entrusted with such a task The material to be assured Existing proposals deal with supply assurance in different complementary ways Some proposals focus on assuring supply of natural uranium and LEU stocks and still others focus on assurance of supply of nuclear fuel itself 6 It has been asserted that there is also a complementary need for greater transparency in uranium markets and that assured access to a broader range of nuclear reactor technology would be important to operators and countries seeking to reduce the risk of supply interruptions on political grounds A number of Arab countries have made small scale developments in fuel fabrication technologies for example Egypt and Algeria and they may be more interested in assuring the supply of enriched uranium Modalities of assurance s mechanism The possible modalities could include a virtual reserve of natural uranium and LEU based on binding contractual agreements for supply of such materials plus parallel binding commitments assurances of fuel fabrication services A virtual reserve does not involve separate physical storage of natural uranium or LEU but instead relies on availability from suppliers that have agreed to be part of the fuel assurance mechanism While an actual physical bank of natural uranium or LEU could be established it was found impractical for technical and economic reasons to have an actual bank of nuclear fuel assemblies given the different types of reactor designs and many variants of nuclear fuel required for them A virtual reserve of Arab fabricated fuel would face the same problem presupposing heavier investment in fuel fabrication by those Arab countries presently knowledgeable about this technology Conditions governing eligibility for benefiting from assurance mechanisms Committing to nonproliferation would be considered a qualifying criterion However in accordance with the IAEA statute an assurance mechanism would be available to all member states in a nondiscriminatory manner For any mechanism whether or not it involves a role for the IAEA certain release criteria would need to be defined and agreed upon either by the IAEA Board of Governors or a supply consortium Another aspect requiring further assessment is how best to ensure that the application of the release mechanism is demonstrably nonpolitical and based upon objective criteria If an Arab nuclear fuel cycle were to be established it would also have to abide by IAEA standards of nondiscrimination as well as by nonproliferation criteria An important issue here is the acceptability within the Arab world of the Additional Protocol to be attached to the safeguards agreement between the IAEA and the Arab states Some have accepted the Protocol including Libya and the UAE Others have not done so yet including Egypt An Arab nuclear fuel cycle should aim for harmony on this matter Possible role s for the IAEA Existing proposals envisage different roles for the IAEA and there are still others that can be considered The suggested roles range from IAEA administration or ownership of natural uranium or LEU stocks to administration of virtual stocks and associated parallel fuel fabrication commitments The IAEA statute is sufficiently broad to allow the Agency to establish its own stocks of nuclear fuel purchased from or donated by member states for supply to another member state against charges determined by the IAEA Board to facilitate the supply of nuclear fuel from one member state to another and to facilitate inter alia the provision of enrichment and fuel fabrication services by one member state to another or to the IAEA In this respect a number of legal arrangements would be required especially if the IAEA were to establish an actual bank of nuclear fuel The UN High Level Panel on Threats Challenges and Change established by former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan produced the 2004 report A More Secure World Our Shared Responsibility 7 in which they urged that Negotiations be engaged without delay and carried forward to an early conclusion on an arrangement based on the existing provisions of Article III and IX of the IAEA Statute which would enable IAEA to act as a guarantor for the supply of fissile material to civilian nuclear users Such an arrangement would need to put the Agency in a position to meet through supplies it authorized demands for nuclear fuel supply of low enriched uranium and for reprocessing of spent fuel at market rates and to provide a guarantee of uninterrupted supply of these services as long as there was no breach of safeguards or inspection procedures at the facilities in question Privileging the IAEA as a guarantor of supply is due to the fact that the Agency s membership is much broader than that of the commercial consortium Furthermore the IAEA s track record reputation credibility and relevant experience justify this reaction However one must take into consideration that those with permanent or semi permanent seats on the Board of Governors are the most advanced countries in nuclear energy and also are the major supplier countries They are also parties to the export control regimes that might not necessarily be favorable toward certain potential recipient states In this case the solution might be to democratize the export control regimes especially the NSG By offering universal admission to the regimes suppliers and users could consult about guidelines that would be adopted for the export of nuclear equipment and material At present these guidelines are usually adopted without consultation with the user states We must not assume that seeking consultation would suffice as a remedy a new democratic setup is badly needed The NSG practices and the domination of the IAEA Board by supplier countries may invite Arab countries to ponder whether their Arab Atomic Energy Agency could play the role of a guarantor of fuel supply in a regional context Again let us reiterate that the Agency would have to be restructured to play such a role The role of the nuclear industry Consultations with the nuclear industry would be useful particularly with the understanding that the nuclear industry would provide the required goods and services to support a supply assurance mechanism that does not have negative effects on the diversity and stability of the existing commercial market in nuclear fuels Other related issues These issues pertain to how an assurance mechanism can be structured in a manner that would not result in a division whether real or perceived between nuclear fuel and nuclear reactor technology haves and havenots Also necessary is a structure that does not undermine existing multilateral treaty based nuclear nonproliferation norms of state sovereignty and rights In this respect it is important to reread Article IV of the NPT which has encouraged parties to the Treaty to engage fully in cooperation on peaceful uses of nuclear energy The Riyadh declaration and decisions are very much in line with the letter and spirit of Article IV of the NPT Arab participants in a regional nuclear cycle would be equal partners sharing decisions together Aside from the basic questions raised by

    Original URL path: http://www.amacad.org/content/publications/pubContent.aspx?d=813 (2016-02-13)
    Open archived version from archive

  • Iran's nuclear file: recommendations for the future - American Academy of Arts & Sciences
    regional influence and increasing its global vulnerabilities Iran does not need nuclear weapons to protect its regional interests in the immediate neighborhood In fact to augment Iranian influence in the region it has been necessary for Iran to win the confidence of its neighbors an effort that will inevitably suffer from such perceptions Furthermore with the current state of its technological development and military capability Iran cannot reasonably rely on nuclear deterrence against its adversaries in the international arena or in the wider region Engaging in a spiraling arms race to establish and maintain nuclear deterrence would also be prohibitively expensive draining the limited economic resources of the country 12 New multinational mechanisms to assure supplies of nuclear fuel at market prices to countries with peaceful nuclear energy programs should be given a key role in nuclear power development These mechanisms not only assure fuel supply but also promote nonproliferation and the sharing of nuclear energy opportunities on a multilateral basis 13 The West Asia region including the Persian Gulf would particularly benefit from exploring the feasibility of an International Nuclear Consortium INC for multilateral nuclear enrichment and management of spent fuel under the supervision of the IAEA and with several operators There are two options for Iran s participation in such a consortium 1 Designing a consortium with the joint participation of the AEOI and European companies or 2 Establishing a regional organization that would lead to the creation of a consortium in the West Asia region called the West Asia Atomic Energy Agency WAAEA The WAAEA would set up a regional fuel cycle It remains to be determined politically if this INC can include Iran or if it would be parallel to another international fuel cycle under strict IAEA surveillance The most difficult question is whether multinational enrichment facilities should be encouraged in potentially unstable areas in return for rolling back incipient nuclear weapons programs In 2005 using the model suggested by IAEA experts Iran proposed to convert its enrichment facilities to regional or multinational schemes which provide the greatest degree of transparency by allowing the concerned parties to participate in the ownership and operation of these facilities However none of these proposals which were presented by Iran from January 2005 to October 2006 received any meaningful consideration primarily due to the tendency of the United States to manufacture a nuclear crisis instead of searching for a solution It is worth noting that Iran s proposal for the establishment of an international consortium was initially considered very promising by the EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana leading to public statements of progress following his meetings with Iran s nuclear negotiator In a letter dated May 8 2008 to the UN Secretary General from the Foreign Minister of Iran the Iranian government stated that it is ready to consider establishing enrichment and nuclear fuel production consortiums in different parts of the world including in Iran The letter also spoke of nuclear disarmament In 2007 a study by John Thomson and Geoffrey Forden of MIT suggested that measures can be taken to prevent the expropriation of a multinational facility by the Iranian government and that the likelihood of discovering any concealed enrichment facility in Iran would be enhanced by establishing a multinational facility They proposed a multinationally owned and operated enrichment facility located in Iran using Urenco or Russian centrifuges that would supplant Iran s nationally operated enrichment facility A requirement for international staffing should be a part of the agreement in places like Iran where regional security considerations are a factor Their analysis describes legal organizational and technological barriers to nuclear proliferation as well as barriers to nationalization 14 In the model they outline consumer countries would be heavily involved in ownership and management 15 Forden and Thomson reported that Iranians they spoke with expressed an interest in involving India and South Africa in such a facility Experts at MIT have proposed another approach that could resolve the impasse if tailored to meet the bottom lines of all sides 16 A joint venture enrichment plant could be established in Iran meeting the Iranian desire for enrichment on their soil but with an international staff on duty around the clock and with the use of efficient European centrifuges enclosed in black boxes meeting the Western demand that the approach not give Iran a leg up in centrifuge technology which could be applied to military use Iran would own the plant jointly with European countries possibly with Russia and China as well making any attempt to shift the facility to weapons work a seizure of other nations property The countries would manage the facility jointly under continuous and intensive international inspection The black box arrangement is the same one planned to protect proprietary European centrifuge technology at a new nuclear plant in the United States This arrangement would be coupled with a no attack commitment political dialogue verification steps and a halt to Iran s own enrichment work Reliable assurance of fuel supply is key to effective multilateral mechanisms Assurance of supply for non nuclear fuel cycle states in other words putting the multilateral approach to the nuclear fuel cycle in practice would be significant in shaping and embedding robust nonproliferation norms and habits in the international community Further research on international involvement in Iranian nuclear facilities has been done at Harvard s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs Associate Professor of Public Policy and Co Principal Investigator of the Project on Managing the Atom Matthew Bunn has expressed his views on potential contributions of international staff or ownership of key facilities in Iran He suggests an international staff on duty around the clock but one that would work with Iranians He believes that having zero centrifuges in Iran would be the best outcome for U S and international security but that insisting on zero centrifuges is likely to lead to no agreement 17 In late 2006 President Ahmadinejad said that in five years that is by 2012 Iran would begin to produce nuclear fuel and sell it to Western countries at a 50 percent discount The offer was made contingent on the West ceasing its programs to reprocess spent nuclear fuel Iran s initiative was reinforced by the first test run of the second centrifuge cascade 164 P 1 centrifuges at the Natanz isotope separation facility The productivity of one Iranian centrifuge is about three separative work units SWU the buildings at the Natanz factory can hold up to 54 000 centrifuges of Iranian production wit14h a total capacity of about 150 000 to 160 000 SWU of uranium hexafluoride for the production of civilian nuclear fuel At the current price of about 160 per SWU the sale of all fuel produced at the Natanz factory in a year given a capacity of 150 000 SWU even with a 50 percent discount would bring in 12 million per year 18 This is an insignificant sum for oil exporting Iran but a successful contract would allow Iran to take the first step toward establishing itself as a provider of nuclear fuel cycle services on the world market At around the same time that Iran announced this initiative Tehran was offered the opportunity to host a Urenco enrichment facility on its territory The facility would produce materials for an international fuel bank controlled by the IAEA As Forden and Thomson proposed the facility could be controlled jointly by the IAEA and the investor the European Troika and Urenco Moreover their proposal did not exclude the option of using the Iranian P 1 centrifuge and replacing it in the future with new Urenco models TC 12 or even the TC 21 19 According to the Forden and Thomson proposal the factory could house 3 000 TC 12 centrifuges which would correspond to the production volume of 120 000 SWU worth 56 to 84 million At the same time the production of 5 million SWU per year would require the installation of 125 000 centrifuges while the expenses on the construction of the enterprise would reach 2 3 to 2 4 billion The installation of 50 000 TC 21 centrifuges would allow the production of about 840 tons of enriched uranium per year at 4 percent enrichment which would be enough to load 40 standard 1 000 MW reactors fully covering Iran s potential needs for enriched uranium and still allowing for exports However this initiative was not embraced by Urenco and was not pursued any further 20 Iran s nuclear file has pivotal impacts on Iran s relations with other countries Bilateral multilateral regional and international ties between Iran s government and other players have been affected tremendously by Iran s stance on nuclear technology Iran s Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki must manage the future of Iran s international relations following the post election chaos of June 2009 Iran s relations with the P5 1 have been mixed After October 2003 Iran continued some of its enrichment related activities but Tehran and EU3 Germany France and Britain agreed in November 2004 to a more detailed suspension agreement Iran resumed uranium conversion in August 2005 under the leadership of President Ahmadinejad who had been elected two months earlier In January 2006 Iran announced that it would resume research and development on its centrifuges at Natanz In response the IAEA Board adopted a resolution on February 4 2006 that referred the matter to the UN Security Council Two days later Tehran announced that it would stop implementing the IAEA s Additional Protocol which provides for broader IAEA inspections In June 2006 the P5 1 presented a proposal to Iran that offered a variety of incentives for Tehran The proposal called on the government to address the IAEA s outstanding concerns through full cooperation with the Agency s ongoing investigation of Tehran s nuclear programs to suspend all enrichment related and reprocessing activities and to resume implementing its Additional Protocol 21 These requirements have also been included in several UN Security Council resolutions the most recent of which Resolution 1803 was adopted March 3 2008 That resolution called on IAEA Director General ElBaradei to report within 90 days on whether Iran had complied with the Security Council requirements adding that the council would respond to Iranian noncompliance with additional sanctions ElBaradei s May 26 2008 report to the Security Council and the IAEA Board indicated that Tehran has continued to defy the council s demands by continuing work on its uranium enrichment program and heavy water reactor program Iranian officials have repeatedly stated that Iran will not suspend its enrichment program EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana traveled to Tehran on June 13 2009 to present a revised version of the June 2006 offer on which the P5 1 had reached agreement in early May Tehran has told the IAEA that it would implement its Additional Protocol if the nuclear file is returned from the Security Council to the Agency It is however unclear how the council could meet this condition Even before the confirmation of a new term for President Ahmadinejad it was always likely that Iran s response to the months old invitations to talk from both President Obama and the six negotiating countries would be wary and tough Still the Iranians are likely to return to the negotiating table at some point when they do so will depend on how soon the turmoil within the political establishment dies down Given skepticism in the West about Iran s election results fresh Iranian government resentments will now be on the table alongside old ones Crucially though these grievances are unlikely to sink the talks before they get started the issues are too important Neither side for that matter has a better policy in mind Political relations between Europe and Iran are strained because their interests often clash they do not trust each other and they run their domestic affairs very differently as Richard Dalton former British Ambassador to Tehran has said 22 Perceptions matter In the last year Iran s rulers have interpreted sympathetic Western media reports of demonstrations especially post election as interference arising from hostility Continued multilateral talks and diplomacy are needed to de escalate the crisis over Iran s nuclear program and Europe should be heavily involved in this process even if it is long and difficult Relations or lack thereof between the United States and Iran following the Islamic Revolution were often not warm but since 1996 the relationship has worsened because of Iran s intention to invest seriously in nuclear technology Iran was worried by the United States post 9 11 wars in Iraq and Afghanistan which serve to encircle Iran its categorization of Iran as part of an axis of evil and its branding of Iran as a new Cold War enemy as recommended during the Bush administration thus precluding the politics of engagement In 2004 the United States changed its nonproliferation threshold from objecting to any nuclear facility in Iran to objecting to enrichment activities Many commentators in Iran believe that a solution to the nuclear standoff will come from reestablishing relations between Washington and Tehran 23 I think Iran s economic political and social problems are rooted in cultural and historical trends that will not be resolved overnight by resuming relations Hard liners in Iran feel that America s power is in decline and that Tehran should take advantage at this juncture However they leave two questions unanswered first will American power diminish before it can damage Iran Second will the end of American dominance coincide with the appearance of a new unipolar power or with the creation of a multipolar world system If the latter will Iran be prepared for a multipolar environment Iran s relationship with Russia has been somewhat more productive Russia has proposed a Russian Iranian joint venture whereby fuel for Iran s reactors would be enriched in Russia rather than in Iran The venture would use Russian centrifuges and Iranian scientists would not have access to them Iran already has experience with delays in Russian nuclear supplies and insisted on continuing its own centrifuge development which the United States and some European countries reject Russia s proposal could serve the interests of all sides if coupled with several additional steps First all sides should agree on three steps to guarantee that fuel to Iran s reactors will not be cut off 1 the major nuclear fuel suppliers should form a commercial consortium that would guarantee to step in if Russian supply were interrupted 2 the United States Russia and other countries should contribute enriched uranium to an IAEA controlled fuel bank whose rules would require it to provide fuel if there were an interruption of supply unless it was ordered not to do so by the Security Council and 3 Iran and the major powers should establish a stockpile of some three years worth of nuclear fuel to be held in Iran much like the U S strategic petroleum reserve There is hope for Iran s future successful engagement with these international partners and for Iran s plans to pursue a robust nuclear power program I offer these final recommendations in international domestic diplomatic multilateral mechanisms and technical areas to suggest ways forward as Iran seeks to strengthen and expand its nuclear file International Issues An ambitious reinvigoration of the grand bargain that was struck 40 years ago in the NPT is needed to usher in a new era of cooperation on preventing proliferation The renewed grand bargain will need to combine steps that can be taken immediately alongside a vision for the longer term It will also need to draw in states that are not parties to the NPT Rather than rushing toward confrontation with all its risks all sides must put historic antipathies aside and find face saving solutions To give the Iranian advocates of compromise a chance to succeed the United States and the other major powers need to put offers on the table that will show the people of Iran that nuclear restraint and compliance will put their nation on a path toward peace and prosperity Article VI of the NPT legally obligates the nuclear weapons states parties to negotiate in good faith toward nuclear disarmament At the 2000 NPT Review Conference those states agreed that the Treaty represented an unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals 24 This commitment is an integral part of the NPT bargain and the need for the NPT to become universal cannot be stressed enough Nuclear weapons states must recommit to the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons and take firmer steps in that direction Iran does support a path toward a world free of nuclear weapons Any viable solution needs to meet the bottom lines of all sides For Iran this means reliable civilian nuclear energy defense of its rights under the NPT maintenance of its pride and technological development and assurances against attack For the United States and Europe the bottom lines are no nuclear weapons in Iran a broad and verifiable gap between the nuclear activities that would continue in Iran and a nuclear weapons capability and full Iranian cooperation with verification including resolving all questions about past nuclear activities The West s longstanding complaint about Iran s other policies and Iran s complaints about the West must be addressed however it is unlikely that all of these problems can be solved in an initial nuclear deal All participants including the United States should assure Iran that they will not attack or threaten to overthrow Iran s government as long as Iran complies with the nuclear deal and does not commit or sponsor aggression Such a pledge is key to changing Iranian perceptions that Iran should retain a nuclear weapons option Iran has already offered to sign mutual non aggression pacts with its neighbors Domestic Issues Iranians have no desire for international

    Original URL path: http://www.amacad.org/content/publications/pubContent.aspx?d=885 (2016-02-13)
    Open archived version from archive

  • The nuclear "renaissance" & preventing the spread of enrichment & reprocessing technologies: a Russian view - American Academy of Arts & Sciences
    a loophole in the nonproliferation regime This loophole and recent violations of commonly accepted obligations by certain countries raises questions about the NPT s capacity to protect international security adequately from threats that may occur It would be wrong to blame the authors of the NPT for this loophole Over the four decades that have passed since the NPT first came into effect the world has changed dramatically The NPT to a large extent was initially intended to prevent creation of nuclear weapons by industrially advanced countries such as West Germany Italy Sweden Switzerland South Korea Taiwan and others while simultaneously providing them the benefit of peaceful nuclear use and security guarantees When the NPT was being negotiated in the 1960s hardly anyone could have imagined that with time the main actors in proliferation and the dangers arising from it would come to be those countries that had recently become liberated from Europe s colonial dominion at the time called developing or third world countries and also non state entities namely terrorist organizations Considering that objective forces are compelling more and more countries to turn to nuclear energy to satisfy their energy needs and that they have the right to develop the nuclear fuel cycle it is necessary to search for solutions that on the one hand would prevent proliferation of sensitive nuclear technologies and on the other hand would ensure interested countries guaranteed access to external sources of nuclear fuel cycle services and products In light of the expected broad utilization of nuclear power the strengthening of the nonproliferation regime should be sought in two ways One way presupposes that states abandon plans to acquire uranium enrichment and spent nuclear fuel reprocessing technologies if they do not possess them already However this proposal has practically no chance to be realized at least not in the near future Furthermore attempts to implement it at present would be counterproductive to strengthening the nonproliferation regime since it would require amending the NPT In other words the NPT would have to be reopened and another discriminatory division among NPT member states countries permitted to have the nuclear fuel cycle and those not would have to be created in addition to the nuclear and non nuclear weapons countries division that already exists Considering the unwillingness on the part of most non nuclear states to undertake additional restrictions it is difficult to expect that the negotiations process involving participation from all 140 NPT member states would be successful Many countries believe that restrictions on development of technologies should be universal for all NPT participant states and should not permit some to develop technologies while prohibiting others For example Canada has no enrichment plants at present although it is considering the possibility of creating an enrichment facility for production of low enriched uranium for its CANDU reactors Brazil which does have an active enrichment program would be permitted to have it Efforts to create and enforce this further division would do more to weaken the NPT than it would to strengthen it As the example of Iran shows additional division of states into those permitted to have enrichment and reprocessing and those forbidden not only undermines the unity of NPT member countries but also facilitates development of a black market for nuclear technologies The second way to strengthen the regime entails switching to innovative nuclear power technologies that could sustain the nonproliferation regime by means of inherent physical and technological properties This would require development of new types of power reactors and the fuel cycles for them To this end work is presently being conducted through a number of international programs including the International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles INPRO Generation IV and GNEP ANFC However progress has been slow in these programs and the possibilities for the creation and use of such innovative nuclear technologies lie in the distant future Therefore the expansion of nuclear power in the world even if started by 2020 to 2025 will be based on the use of light water reactors and existing fuel cycle technologies Taking into account the current trend toward increasing the operational lifetime of nuclear power reactors up to 60 or 70 years it becomes obvious that there is a need to find such solutions that could work during a period of at least a century In the view of Russian experts efforts to prevent the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technologies as it relates to the broad expansion of nuclear power should be focused on Creating international institutional barriers Providing assurances of nuclear fuel supply and services and Offering various incentives to newcomer countries from advanced countries supplying nuclear technologies and services Taken together these measures while not creating legal obstacles for development and use of nuclear power by newcomer countries would induce them voluntarily to renounce acquisition of nuclear fuel cycle technologies Institutional barriers Institutional barriers require newcomer countries to adhere to a number of binding obligations without which they cannot expect to get assistance from the nuclear technology supplier countries in developing their plans for nuclear power Such obligations may include Acceptance and ratification of the Additional Protocol 1997 with the IAEA on application of advanced safeguards Joining the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage and Creating the legislative basis and organizational infrastructure necessary for operation of a NPP A document titled Milestones in the Development of a National Infrastructure for Nuclear Power was published by the IAEA in 2007 It enumerates the basic infrastructural elements that a state desiring to use civilian nuclear energy should have The IAEA makes the decision about a country s readiness to develop nuclear energy taking into account a country s success in implementing these infrastructural elements To keep newcomer countries from perceiving these requirements as the creation of another discriminatory regime it will be expedient for nuclear states to extend the provisions of the 1997 Additional Protocol to their own entire civil nuclear infrastructures Assurances of nuclear fuel supply and services

    Original URL path: http://www.amacad.org/content/publications/pubContent.aspx?d=924 (2016-02-13)
    Open archived version from archive



  •