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  • Alternative nuclear futures - American Academy of Arts & Sciences
    bearing on decisions about whether states pursue or expand nuclear power by how much and how quickly But from a global security perspective the degree to which the future nuclear order promotes safe secure proliferation resistant and effectively monitored and governed nuclear power is of paramount importance Given these concerns there are some experts including some in this special issue 7 who oppose the further spread of nuclear power on security grounds There are other experts again including some in this special issue 8 who are skeptical about the wisdom of expanding nuclear power worldwide on grounds that other renewable energy resources will be more effective in combating global climate change Here we are agnostic on the question of whether there should be an expansion and spread of nuclear power in the future Instead we simply assume that there will be some degree of growth in the use of nuclear energy including some new states acquiring nuclear power plants Who will determine which states acquire nuclear technology and how the resulting security concerns are addressed The fact is that the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty NPT regime is first and foremost a system of states Within the governments of those states however there are often diverse bureaucratic and political interests affecting nuclear issues And within those states the innovators the providers the owners the operators the sellers and the exporters of nuclear technology are often found in the private sector Accordingly it is in central governments and corporations around the world where the fundamental decisions are being made that will play the largest role in shaping the future global nuclear order To be sure these decisions are not wholly independent of one another The relevant actors are often influenced by the nuclear policies and programs of others They are often at least indirectly connected and constrained by varying levels of engagement with the international nuclear marketplace They are typically participants in the international institutions created to provide some structured governance of the world s nuclear affairs whether the IAEA and the Nuclear Suppliers Group NSG for states or WANO for corporations They all operate in the context of existing treaty obligations legal constraints regulatory requirements export control guidelines and normative expectations however imperfectly the rules based regime may operate at times And in a substantially integrated and highly mobile globalized world the intellectual infrastructure for thinking about nuclear power and nuclear weapons can spread worldwide and produce many common or overlapping frameworks for addressing nuclear issues Rarely will nuclear decisions be made in complete isolation from these wider realities Within this web of potential constraints and influences however governments and companies will decide and act on the basis of their own self defined perceptions preferences policies and calculations of self interest They will make their own judgments about the desirability or unattractiveness of nuclear power as a component of their overall approach to energy Their choices will determine how fast and how widely nuclear power expands and spreads As part of its long term energy strategy China for example has chosen to pursue a policy that will more than double its nuclear power capacity within a decade and that aims to increase that capacity by fivefold or sixfold by 2050 China currently has 17 nuclear power reactors under construction Countries such as Egypt Jordan and the United Arab Emirates have already decided to acquire nuclear power plants and other regional powers may follow suit with the result that the Middle East will become a much more nuclear region 9 Similar decisions by other states so called nuclear aspirant states will gradually but eventually change the strategic geography of nuclear power on a global scale States and firms will also determine within the constraints of the politicized international nuclear marketplace which technology paths to follow in developing their nuclear programs A crucial question for the future is whether the spread of nuclear power reactors will be accompanied by the spread of sensitive fuel cycle technologies that can produce bomb material as well as reactor fuel There may be international norms and pressures against the acquisition of such worrisome technologies but ultimately states will choose for themselves For example proponents of the nonproliferation regime have long argued that countries like Iran or Brazil do not need and should not seek independent uranium enrichment capabilities however both of those governments at least thus far have decided otherwise Similarly the feasibility of proposed international or multinational nuclear fuel cycle arrangements intended to discourage the spread of sensitive weapons usable technologies will depend on whether states embrace or reject such schemes Washington for example may believe that it is a good idea for Iran to have its nuclear fuel produced in Russia or Western Europe but Tehran has yet to find the proposal acceptable In short national governments play the central role in shaping the governance of global nuclear affairs They decide which rules to accept and which to reject which to respect and which to violate which are enforced and which are ignored Whatever constraints or restrictions for strengthening the NPT regime may seem obvious or desirable to the international community of nonproliferation experts they have no hope of acceptance unless they are found agreeable by the overwhelming majority of states Similarly the IAEA is an international organization comprised of member states that provide its funding oversee its policies and determine its powers If the IAEA is to be given additional resources and greater investigative powers it will be because states have agreed that this should happen Within those states however different actors often hold different views about which nuclear policies their governments should adopt at home and support abroad The evolving nonproliferation regime will therefore be strongly influenced by whether supporters of international cooperation and compromise or supporters of national fuel cycle facilities win the debate at home Fortunately in many states the central government and industry leaders are committed to the cause of nonproliferation and will act in support of a stronger NPT regime Six conclusions follow from this analysis First as nuclear power spreads a growing number of states will become active players in the NPT system Their investment in nuclear power will mean that they can be directly affected by the functioning of the regime Moreover they will be different states Once nuclear power was with a few exceptions found in the wealthy industrial nations the United States Japan France and Britain among others In the future many developing countries Egypt Iran Malaysia Indonesia and many others will be in the nuclear power club and will have interests to be defended in the NPT regime Their views will no doubt sometimes be different from those of the established nuclear power states The mix of states active in NPT diplomacy will be different than in the past and these states decisions will help determine the future global nuclear order Second in an NPT system of 189 states that relies on voluntary commitments by members and that operates generally on a consensus principle inclusive diplomacy is an imperative if progress is to be made States need to be persuaded that new rules or reinterpreted norms are desirable and in their interests The perceptions and preferences of nuclear newcomers need to be understood and taken into account outreach is essential States need to believe that they have a stake and a voice in the system or they are unlikely to invest much effort in preserving and strengthening it This need for broad participation and cooperation is why occasions such as the periodic NPT Review Conferences are so important despite all their well known difficulties and problems They represent the sort of inclusive diplomacy that is necessary if the NPT regime is to be strengthened and if states are to be convinced to choose nuclear policies that are compatible with the needs of the NPT system Third any deviations from the principle of consensus within the npt regime must be perceived by the majority of states as being legitimate if they are to be effective This is true regarding both new interpretations of NPT rules and any future efforts to enforce them As Jayantha Dhanapala s essay in this volume suggests it is possible that future NPT Review Conferences may adopt a resolution to strengthen the NPT regime overriding the votes of one or more member states this could be highly disruptive unless there are widespread perceptions that any such resolutions are fair and legitimate 10 In his April 2009 speech in Prague President Obama also emphasized the importance of enforcing nonproliferation commitments Rules must be binding Violations must be punished Words must mean something The world must stand together to prevent the spread of these weapons 11 Enforcement decisions in the UN or in other international institutions are almost by definition not consensus decisions since those states being punished will dissent The degree to which the vast majority of states however views any resulting sanctions or military actions as legitimate and fair enforcement of commitments as opposed to being raw coercion will help determine whether the act strengthens or weakens the overall NPT regime in the long term Fourth the points discussed so far highlight the importance of the IAEA and other international organizations Will the IAEA be able to cope effectively with a world in which there is more nuclear technology spread across more countries In the design of the nonproliferation regime the IAEA is intended to play a crucial role in reassuring the international community that civil nuclear programs are not contributing to weapons acquisition Through a scheme of inspections and safeguards the IAEA is meant to bring transparency to the world s peaceful nuclear activities and thus to serve as a buffer between peaceful nuclear programs and possible development of nuclear weapons Across time the IAEA increasingly has been expected to fulfill the additional role of investigating concerns about the possible existence of clandestine nuclear weapons programs an issue of obvious importance in judging compliance with the NPT The IAEA attempts to perform these pivotal roles with limited many would say inadequate resources and many political and legal constraints on its ability to act In his remarkably candid farewell address IAEA Director General ElBaradei stated Our ability to detect possible clandestine nuclear material and activities depends on the extent to which we are given the necessary legal authority technology and resources Regrettably we face continuing major shortcomings in all three areas which if not addressed could put the entire nonproliferation regime at risk 12 As nuclear power spreads the IAEA s challenge will become even more demanding and the shortfalls could become even more acute A crucial question for the future of the nuclear order is whether the member states that fund the IAEA and determine its legal mandate will be prepared to strengthen the Agency so it is adequate to its responsibilities in a more nuclear world If not one of the principal barriers between energy production and weapons programs will be seriously weakened Fifth an important determinant of future proliferation will be the degree to which the spread of the nuclear power industry produces civilian nuclear power bureaucracies in different states that want to maintain peaceful programs and oppose turning civilian energy programs into nuclear weapons programs Indeed how best to ensure that civilian nuclear power bureaucracies maintain a strong interest in opposing nuclear weapons proliferation may be the 64 000 question for estimating the effect of the global spread of nuclear power on the likelihood of nuclear weapons proliferation This is ironic for although some nonproliferation specialists may not want more countries to start nuclear power programs once those states do so it will be important for nonproliferation that their nuclear power programs are successful The leaders and bureaucratic organizations that run successful nuclear power enterprises will want to maintain strong ties to the global nuclear power industry to international capital and technology markets and to global regulatory agencies and hence will be more likely to cooperate with the nuclear nonproliferation regime Leaders of less successful or struggling nuclear power enterprises in contrast might be more likely to support clandestine or breakout nuclear weapons development programs as tools to justify their existence prestige and high budgets within their state Research on Japan and South Korea for example has shown that the liberalizing governments supported maintaining their close relationship to global markets and institutions and that this decision influenced the capability and willingness of nuclear bureaucracies to push for weapons programs In the case of India by contrast the power and autonomy of the state s strategic enclave coupled with the record of failure in producing nuclear energy strongly encouraged the leaders of India s nuclear bureaucracies to lobby Indira Gandhi to test a weapon in 1974 to encourage the Bharatiya Janata Party BJP to test another set of weapons in 1998 and to oppose constraints on their ability to test new nuclear weapons today 13 Sixth and finally a critical factor shaping our nuclear future will be whether leaders in the non nuclear weapons states NNWS see the NPT merely as an effort to get the nuclear weapons states NWS to disarm or whether they conceive of the NPT as a solution to a collective action problem This clearly was part of how leaders conceived of the NPT when they signed and ratified it in the late 1960s and subsequently The Treaty and the IAEA inspection regime it created were valued because they provided a sense of confidence that other states in the region were not developing nuclear weapons and that therefore the state in question could renounce nuclear weapons as well But over time that vision was lost and many NNWS began to see the NPT as merely an unfair constraint on them and as a largely unsuccessful goad to encourage nuclear disarmament in the NWS The possibility of international control of the nuclear fuel cycle and the accompanying constraint on national nuclear fuel production programs will be more likely if all nuclear power states see a danger in their neighbors operating sensitive nuclear fuel facilities This perceived fear may make states more willing to accept international control of the nuclear fuel cycle and the constraints on their national programs that come along with it in exchange for constraints on their neighbors programs Many possible outcomes could arise from the complicated unpredictable decentralized process of nuclear decision making Expectations have often been confounded and predictions have often been wrong The notion of nuclear electricity too cheap to meter for example has long ago faded into history Forecasts that there would be dozens of nuclear armed states have fortunately proven wrong so far Previous predictions that there would be a rapid expansion of nuclear power around the globe turned out to be wildly off the mark Though we can see today features of the nuclear landscape that will materialize well into the future it is not easy to predict what the global nuclear order will be A long legacy of incorrect predictions should keep us humble and remind us that we too can be wrong It is possible however to envision how things might turn out if things go well or badly The most optimistic vision of the future sees the substantial expansion and spread of nuclear energy use around the globe but with effective constraints placed on the potential adverse security consequences There would be many more nuclear reactors on a global scale contributing to the mitigation of climate change and to energy security but fuel cycle capabilities would not have spread Nuclear newcomers would rely on international arrangements for the fuel to run their reactors and would use international or regional repositories to store spent fuel rather than hold it or reprocess it at home In this way the link between nuclear power and nuclear weapons could be limited Ideally further reassurance about the purely peaceful applications of the world s additional investments in nuclear power would be provided by a larger stronger better funded IAEA presiding over a regime that institutionalized high levels of transparency and empowered the IAEA with sufficient investigative powers to produce confidence that cheaters will not undermine the regime If the international governance of the world s nuclear affairs can evolve and strengthen then it may be possible to establish and promote compliance with high common standards for safety and physical security for example through the refinement and enforcement of UN Security Council Resolution 1540 which already calls on states to ensure appropriate and effective levels of security at their nuclear facilities but without ever defining what steps meet that standard It will never be possible to eliminate all risk of course but the world would be a safer place if all states possessing nuclear technology were not only obliged to accept desirable standards but made more genuine and monitored efforts to meet those standards A system that possessed this set of attributes would be a robust nonproliferation regime that would allow the wide exploitation of nuclear power while circumscribing the potential risks and problems associated with nuclear power The likelihood of reaching this nuclear future would be increased if steps were taken to delegitimize and marginalize nuclear weapons and if the NWS were judged to be making sincere efforts to move toward nuclear disarmament in fulfillment of their obligations under Article VI of the NPT 14 It is difficult to dampen the appetite for nuclear weapons when existing NWS enshrine those weapons at the center of their security policies tout the unique and indispensable security contributions of these weapons and proclaim their intention to retain nuclear weapons for the indefinite future It is also difficult to credibly call for a strictly enforced rules based nonproliferation system when the NWS are seen to be flouting their own obligations under the nonproliferation regime It is too soon to tell where the arms control initiatives launched by President Obama notably in his nuclear disarmament speech in Prague in April 2009 may lead but

    Original URL path: http://www.amacad.org/content/publications/pubContent.aspx?d=814 (2016-02-13)
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  • A Contextual Approach to Privacy Online - American Academy of Arts & Sciences
    a meeting place overflowing with services and content much of it generated by users themselves 25 Each of these ideations captured salient aspects of the vast socio technical system that I have been calling the Net as it developed through progressive phases and as it continues to do so today Indeed the Net is characterized by enormous malleability both over time and across applications Although the brute technical substrate of digital media architecture design protocol feature sets may constrain or afford certain activities it does so no more than say gravitational force which similarly constrains and affords human activity while leaving plenty of room for variation For example the Net may have seemed essentially ungovernable until China asserted control and territorial borders quietly reemerged Yet even that maneuver is incomplete leaving intact exhilarating pockets of autonomy 26 A snapshot of today s Net conceived as an abstraction of technical layers and social economic and political systems operates as infrastructure bustling spaces and medium Whether online in cyberspace on the Internet or on the Web individuals engage in banal practices such as banking booking travel and shopping in many instances doing so with the same institutions and companies they could call on the telephone or visit at a physical location Other activities viewing movies listening to recordings reading literature talking on an IP phone seeking information communicating via email worshipping and some forms of shopping are transformed in their migration to the Net In many instances these transformations are not merely experiential but reflect institutional innovations such as online churches and dating services virtual universities websites such as Amazon Netflix Mayo Clinic WebMD eBay and E TRADE and programs and services such as e government e zines e vites e readers iTunes and iShares Even greater novelty and more fundamental transformations are found in the activities practices and institutional and business forms built on top of these offerings including meta engines that aggregate index organize and locate sites services goods news and information examples include kayak com Google search Google news and Yelp com Web 2 0 has wrought an additional layer of changes notably in production creativity and social life These changes include interacting via social networks networking on platforms and facilitating peer production and user generated content by way of innumerable individual and small group blogs wikis and personal websites repositories of global scale such as Wikipedia IMDb Flickr MMORGs massively multiplayer online role playing games and YouTube the online patient support community PatientsLikeMe as well as mash ups folksonomies crowdsourcing and reputational systems Questions about protecting privacy online particularly when framed as questions about online privacy suggest that online is a distinctive venue sphere place or space defined by the technological infrastructures and protocols of the Net for which a single set of privacy rules can or ought to be crafted I resist this notion However exhilarating the vision of cyberspace as a new frontier experience reveals no insulated domain divorced from real life and deserving distinctive regulation The Net does not constitute drawing on the terminology of contextual integrity a discrete context It is not a single social realm but the totality of experience conducted via the Net from specific websites to search engines to platforms and on up into the cloud crisscrossing multiple realms Activities online mediated by the Net on the Web are deeply integrated into social life they may be continuous with brick and mortar correlates or at the very least have the power to affect communications transactions interactions and activities in those realms and vice versa Not only is life online integrated into social life and hence not productively conceived as a discrete context it is radically heterogeneous comprising multiple social contexts not just one and certainly is not just a commercial context where protecting privacy amounts to protecting consumer privacy and commercial information 27 To be sure the contours of technology architecture protocol design and so on shape what you can do say see and hear online but while alterations or disruptions due to particular characteristics of the Net impose puzzles and pose challenges for social contexts they do not warrant sui generis uniform cross cutting rules determined by the medium Instead the contexts in which activities are grounded shape expectations that when unmet cause anxiety fright and resistance 28 Answering questions about privacy online like those about privacy in general requires us to prescribe suitable or appropriate constraints on the flow of personal information The challenge of privacy online is not that the venue is distinct and different or that privacy requirements are distinct and different but that mediation by the Net leads to disruptions in the capture analysis and dissemination of information as we act interact and transact online The decision heuristic derived from the theory of contextual integrity suggests that we locate contexts explicate entrenched informational norms identify disruptive flows and evaluate these flows against norms based on general ethical and political principles as well as context specific purposes and values To be sure locating contexts online and explicating the presiding norms is not always straightforward in the same way that it is not when dealing with unmediated social spaces Some of the more familiar cases however may provide insight into the task Whether you transact with your bank online on the phone or person to person in a branch office it is not unreasonable to expect that rules governing information will not vary according to medium In the United States banks and other financial institutions are governed by privacy rules formulated by the FTC which was given this authority by the Gramm Leach Bliley Act 29 Auxiliary information for example IP address or clickstream the artifacts of online transaction should not simply be deemed up for grabs just because that information was not explicitly considered in rules formulated before online banking became common Instead it should be held to the same standards that guided financial privacy in the first place Similarly while expectations of visitors to Bloomingdales com NYTimes com and MOMA org may be affected by corresponding preexisting brands they are also shaped by the respective social contexts that these entities inhabit including the types of experiences and offerings they promise Accordingly Amazon com which came on the scene as an online bookstore with no brick and mortar precursor is nevertheless recognizable akin to say the Moravian Book Shop in Bethlehem Pennsylvania which was founded in 1745 and is believed to be the oldest continually operating bookstore in the United States 30 As Amazon com expanded into other arenas selling and renting DVDs for example one would assume personal information flows generated in these transactions to be regulated by constraints expressed in the Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988 31 in the same way that West Coast Video must adhere to the Act Whether laws applicable to brick and mortar video rental stores actually apply to online video rental providers such as iTunes and Amazon seems uncertain still the requirements of contextual integrity which anchors privacy rules in social contexts and social roles would imply that they should These examples merely scratch the surface of the Net s remarkable heterogeneity Online offerings range from specialized information providers and distributors such as MayoClinic com and WebMD federal state and local government portals providing services and information directly to citizens and structured repositories of user generated content such as Wikipedia YouTube Flickr Craigslist and social networks including Facebook Religious denominations around the globe have online presences ranging from The Holy See claiming to be the official Vatican website 32 to online churches 33 offering in home Web based religious engagement that replaces or supplements regular church attendance This list does not capture the fluidity and modularity of existing offerings which include combinations and permutations mash ups constrained only by human creativity and the technological limits of the moment Many popular websites for example combine modules of enterprise generated content with user generated feedback or storefronts with varieties of social networks political content with open blogs and more To the extent that the Net is deeply embedded in social life context specific informational norms may be extended to corresponding online activities Thus privacy rules governing financial institutions for example would extend to E TRADE even though it operates primarily via an online portal Online offerings and experiences may defy existing norms ever as they incorporate some of the novel forms mentioned above In such circumstances the theory of contextual integrity directs us beyond existing norms to underlying standards derived from general moral and political considerations as well as the ends purposes and values of respective contexts 34 Novel activities and practices which implicate different types of information expanded groups of recipients and altered constraints on flow are evaluated against these standards Applying this reasoning to online filing of income tax returns is fairly straightforward In the United States rigorous confidentiality requirements governing individual tax records impervious even to certain types of law enforcement needs have developed over the past 150 years 35 Although present day code formalized in the 1970s may have little to say about e filing specifically we would not expect auxiliary information generated through online interactions to be up for grabs freely available to all comers Even in the absence of explicit rules guidance can be sought from the values and purposes that have yielded existing confidentiality rules for information in traditional paper based tax records In the Disclosure and Privacy Law Reference Guide the IRS asserts that there must be public confidence with respect to the confidentiality of personal and financial information given to us for tax administration purposes The confidential nature of these records requires that each request for information be evaluated in light of a considerable body of law and regulation which either authorize or prohibit disclosure 36 This connection was acknowledged as far back as 1925 when Secretary of the Treasury Andrew Mellon remarked While the government does not know every source of income of a taxpayer and must rely upon the good faith of those reporting income still in the great majority of cases this reliance is entirely justifiable principally because the taxpayer knows that in making a truthful disclosure of the sources of his income information stops with the government It is like confiding in one s lawyer 37 A presumption of strict confidentiality is derived from values and purposes public compliance trust confidence in government that prohibit all sharing except as allowed on a case by case basis by explicit law and regulation The more challenging cases confronting us include forms of content service and interaction that are specific to the Net or that do not have obvious counterparts elsewhere Search engines such as Google and Bing essential for navigating the Web may constitute an important class of cases And while sites such as Mayo Clinic and WebMD might seem similar enough to familiar reference resources health information sites are prodigious 38 offering everything from personalized and interactive services that allow users to sign in and pose questions about their particular problems to personal health record repositories that provide space to store health records for example Microsoft Health Vault and to social networking sites devoted to communities of fellow sufferers for example PatientsLikeMe Without denying that the Net has yielded much that is novel and strange including new types of information and new institutional forms online activities themselves are strangely familiar connecting with a friend collaborating on a political mission applying for a job seeking religious or spiritual sustenance pursuing educational opportunity catching up on local and world news or choosing a book to read music to enjoy or movies to watch Although searching on Google is different from looking up material in a library catalog in part because the contents of the Web are quite different from the contents of a library there is similarity in these two activities both may include the pursuit of research knowledge and intellectual enrichment In all such activities liberal democratic societies allow great freedom unconstrained by the watchful gaze or approbation of authorities just as they allow citizens to seek political or religious information or affiliation Just as with the offline environment we would expect the same standards to prevail online dictating that online footprints should not be recorded and registered in order to minimize risk of interference by either human or machine The interest in privacy online that the FTC and Commerce Department have recently shown is a positive development particularly because it acknowledges a growing concern over privacy and amplifies public discussion of the wildly unrestrained collection of personal information by nongovernmental actors Their interest has been limited though by a focus on protecting privacy online as predominantly a matter of protecting consumers online and protecting commercial information that is protecting personal information in commercial online transactions 39 Neither agency has explicitly acknowledged the vast landscape of activity lying outside the commercial domain As long as public discourse about privacy online takes the marketplace and commerce as proxies for the whole conceptions of privacy will be inadequate We need to take full account of the radical heterogeneity of online activity and practice One might argue that the Net is almost completely commercial pointing to the prevalence of private payment as the means supporting online activity Aside from government presences the Net is almost wholly owned by private for profit entities from the underlying physical infrastructure to network service providers providers of utilities and applications and retailers of goods content and services Furthermore commercial advertising managed through the complex ecosystem of ad networks ad exchanges and analytics and marketing companies has emerged as a dominant business model for supporting online content and services This model prevails in a variety of online locations from large corporate websites to personal blogs such as Noob Cook a site with seventeen trackers or Dictionary com with nine trackers from advertising companies such as Doubleclick Media Math Microsoft Atlas and others 40 Wikipedia remains a rather remarkable standout supported by the nonprofit Wikimedia Foundation and sporting no trackers 41 By this logic the Commerce Department and the FTC would be precisely the governing bodies to have oversight of online activity and norms of the competitive free marketplace would make the most sense for regulating it Yet private payment whether through direct charges for goods services access or participation or through income from advertising does not on its own signal complete surrender to marketplace norms According to political philosopher Elizabeth Anderson many functions in society straddle boundaries between the commercial and noncommercial How they are supported is not decisive but rather how they measure up to standards of quality or excellence Private payment as a form of support does not require total concession to marketplace norms instead we expect functions such as education health care religion telecommunication and transportation whether privately paid for or not to meet independent ideals As Anderson warns When professionals sell their services they enter into market relations that impose norms on their activities which potentially conflict with the norms of excellence internal to their professional roles 42 But we expect more from professionals from doctors lawyers athletes artists church ministers and teachers than the pursuit of profit People pay for medical care at private practices and hospitals for instance and for education at a variety of institutions In these and other cases in which complete surrender to marketplace norms would result in corrupt and impoverished practice Anderson advocates a proper balance of market norms with internal standards of excellence This point might seem obvious but certain brands of free market capitalism make it easy to confuse the quest for profit with the pursuit of internal standards of excellence 43 When Sergey Brin and Larry Page first launched the Google search engine they regarded commercial influences as contrary to a search engine s core mission as a performance driven tool serving individuals interests in locating information on the Web Eschewing advertising they wrote in the appendix of a 2007 paper The goals of the advertising business model do not always correspond to providing quality search to users We believe the issue of advertising causes enough mixed incentives that it is crucial to have a competitive search engine that is transparent and in the academic realm 44 In other less visible cases similar concerns may be raised for example Amazon s purchase of IMDb a website of information about movies developed and initially maintained by volunteers Even in the case of the familiar lending library originally conceived in the United States by Benjamin Franklin as publicly funded many functions have been taken over by private for profit companies online 45 The point is not to see Brin and Page or other developers as sellouts Confounding sources of support with guiding norms obscures our recognition of the internal standards of excellence that we can hold search companies to even as they seek commercial support independent of their performance in the marketplace 46 The same argument holds for content vendors and information services providing in the private sector many services also provided by public libraries I am not suggesting that there is consensus or that questions about internal norms of excellence are easily settled endless struggles over what constitutes a good newspaper school or health care system attest to this But they also reveal a strong belief that beyond profit such standards are at play and are socially important Recent attention given to the challenge of protecting privacy online is a positive development Although success is hamstrung by the foot dragging of those whose power and profit are served by unrestricted flows of personal information it is also limited by underdeveloped conceptions of privacy and the role it plays in sustaining the Net as a public good capable of serving diverse interests Early portrayals of cyberspace as a new frontier different distinct and out of the reach of traditional law have for the most part been abandoned yet no other single vision has captured public imagination in

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  • Events Friday Forum 2015 2016 Schedule Past Meetings and Events Fellowships Overview Visiting Scholars Program Hellman Fellowship in Science and Technology Policy Policy Fellowship in the Humanities Education and the Arts Policy Fellowship in Global Security and International Affairs The Exploratory Fund Member Login User Name Password Forgot your password Welcome by Leslie Berlowitz The Evolution of the Internet Emerging Challenges and Opportunities Leslie Cohen Berlowitz The Evolution of the

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  • Events Friday Forum 2015 2016 Schedule Past Meetings and Events Fellowships Overview Visiting Scholars Program Hellman Fellowship in Science and Technology Policy Policy Fellowship in the Humanities Education and the Arts Policy Fellowship in Global Security and International Affairs The Exploratory Fund Member Login User Name Password Forgot your password Greetings from Phil Budden The Evolution of the Internet Emerging Challenges and Opportunities Phil Budden The Evolution of the Internet

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  • Events Friday Forum 2015 2016 Schedule Past Meetings and Events Fellowships Overview Visiting Scholars Program Hellman Fellowship in Science and Technology Policy Policy Fellowship in the Humanities Education and the Arts Policy Fellowship in Global Security and International Affairs The Exploratory Fund Member Login User Name Password Forgot your password Remarks by Tim Berners Lee The Evolution of the Internet Emerging Challenges and Opportunities Tim Berners Lee The Evolution of

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  • Events Friday Forum 2015 2016 Schedule Past Meetings and Events Fellowships Overview Visiting Scholars Program Hellman Fellowship in Science and Technology Policy Policy Fellowship in the Humanities Education and the Arts Policy Fellowship in Global Security and International Affairs The Exploratory Fund Member Login User Name Password Forgot your password Remarks by David Clark The Evolution of the Internet Emerging Challenges and Opportunities David Clark The Evolution of the Internet

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  • Introduction - American Academy of Arts & Sciences
    was already formed in literature A good scholar he wrote in 1847 will find Aristophanes Hafiz Rabelais full of American history 5 About America as an actual country Emerson could be as Poirier notes energetically dismissive as in a selection from his journal dated June 1847 Alas for America as I must so often say Eager solicitous hungry rabid busy body America attempting many things vain ambitious to feel thy own existence convince others of thy talent by attempting hastily accomplishing much yes catch thy breath correct thyself and failing here prosper out there speed fever are never greatness but reliance serenity waiting perseverance heed of the work negligence of the effect America is formless has no terrible no beautiful condensation 6 But the myth being timeless has endured Exceptionalism is a peremptory ideology but is vulnerable to bad news Gordon Wood has remarked that since the late 1960s American historians have become less and less interested in celebrating the uniqueness of the United States The war in Vietnam if nothing else convinced many Americans that the moral character of the United States was not different from that of other nations and that the nation had no special transcendent role to bring liberty and democracy to the world During the past several decades many American historians if not the general public have shed whatever faith they might once have had in the traditional idea of American exceptionalism 7 But the claim can be retained in another form that of covenant Historian J G A Pocock has observed that a conventional model of American historiography would present it as obedient to two imperatives The first is the necessity of a foundational myth felt for obvious reasons by a nation founded in experiment and sustained by immigration In the United States whose history is so largely a history of the mutations of Protestantism into civil religion the myth of foundation further takes the form of a myth of covenant The nation is held to have made at its beginnings a commitment in the face of God or history or the opinion of mankind to the maintenance of certain principles and it is the historian s business to ascertain how the commitment was made what the principles were and whether the covenant has been upheld or allowed to lapse Pocock s easy slide in God or history or the opinion of mankind shows that he regards these values as having about equal force that is not much The covenant such as it was offers an apparent choice of two styles One is liturgical the recital of how the covenant was kept the other and by far the commoner is jeremiad the recital of how it was not kept and of what sufferings have fallen on the nation by reason of its sins and shortcomings 8 Pocock continues The recital of historical change of how altering conditions of existence may have rendered the terms of the covenant obsolete or their performance impracticable will in

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  • Manning & Financing the Twenty-First-Century All-Volunteer Force - American Academy of Arts & Sciences
    for a prolonged period in a war or combat zone the Selective Service would be engaged so that the active duty volunteers would be able to spend at least two months at home for every month they spent in a combat zone as was the case during the ten year war in Vietnam Moreover the National Guard and reserve personnel would not have to be mobilized more than one year out of every six Not only would this arrangement ease the strain on the troops but it would prevent the ground forces from having to lower their standards to meet recruiting and retention goals in prolonged conflicts a necessary step given that Americans tend to become impatient and less supportive when wars drag on The Joint Chiefs of Staff JCS made the point forcefully in 1981 when the Reagan administration was on the verge of reversing President Carter s action to reinstitute draft registration which had been temporarily suspended between 1975 and 1980 In a memo to the secretary of defense the JCS stated The AVF provides peacetime manpower In their view Selective Service registration supports mobilization for war 8 Third to allow the now more costly military personnel to focus on their core missions and competencies the Pentagon would privatize civilianize or contract out as many support functions as possible New recruits would no longer be required to perform such nonmilitary tasks as cooking and cleaning KP or kitchen police as it was then known The use of civilians has been part of the American way of waging war since before the Civil War 9 However the downsizing of the military coupled with the increase in the number of U S missions and deployments in the wake of the Cold War resolution in Europe has resulted in an unprecedented number of civilians supporting the active duty military including in the battle space 10 After 1973 if the Pentagon had a task to be performed it would look first to private contractors as long as doing so did not compromise national security If the job was an inherently governmental function the DOD would assign it to a civilian government employee If it required a military person the DOD would recruit a member of the reserve component Using active duty military personnel would be a last resort indeed recruiting and retaining AVF members were much more costly and difficult than outsourcing tasks to members of the private sector civilians or the reserve component After a bumpy start that led many civilian and military leaders to call for a return to the draft the AVF came into its own in the mid 1980s The force performed so well in the first Persian Gulf War in 1991 that many who had been skeptical about ending the draft became convinced that the AVF was the best model for the United States Moreover when the Cold War ended in Europe in the early 1990s the military was able to reduce the size of the active force from 2 2 million to 1 3 million or by 40 percent and thus meet its recruitment and retention goals at a comparatively low cost during a period of low unemployment and an economic boom in the private sector Between FY 1990 and FY 1999 the cost of maintaining military personnel declined by 31 billion or 26 percent in real dollars The second reason for the reduction in active duty forces was that in order to compete in the marketplace for personnel the military had to substantially raise basic pay particularly for new recruits From 1948 to 1973 when the draft was in existence the Pentagon could pay those individuals it compelled to serve only subsistence wages In FY 1968 the average pay of an individual on active duty was 5 780 With 3 4 million people on active duty in that year the peak year for the size of the force the total cost of military personnel for military annual compensation basic pay and benefits was 19 9 billion By 1974 the number of people on active duty had been slashed to 2 2 million a 35 percent reduction Yet military personnel costs had gone up By 1974 expenses had risen to 24 2 billion a 22 percent jump from 1968 and the personnel portion of the budget grew from 28 to 35 percent The cost per individual had risen to 10 895 a 90 percent increase compared with the days of the draft The services could not simply raise the pay of new service members to attract volunteers To maintain pay equity and avoid pay compression among the ranks basic pay was increased across the board However the civilian leadership failed to use the period from the end of the Cold War to 9 11 to bring military pay and benefits under control In fact senior officials took steps or allowed policies to be adopted that made the force more expensive One of the major military personnel expenses the military retirement system was designed in an era when active duty pay was comparatively low very few people served on active duty until retirement and Social Security and Medicare did not exist Nor was life expectancy very high Until 1986 the system allowed a person who spent twenty years on active duty to receive an immediate annuity of 50 percent of his or her base pay indexed to inflation and free medical care including for dependents for life A member who served for at least thirty years would receive 75 percent Most military personnel did not serve long enough to earn retirement In the 1980s and early 1990s fewer than 10 percent of separations were retirements with most people leaving because they had completed contractual periods of service or for disciplinary medical or other reasons However in 1993 after twenty years of the AVF the retirement figure reached 15 percent of separations showing that while most people did not serve for a full career the size of the career force had grown significantly And with increased longevity the people who served for a career were likely to draw retirement pay for more years than they served active duty Enlisted personnel who joined at age eighteen could start drawing retirement pay at thirty eight while officers who were likely to have been commissioned upon graduation from college at age twenty two could draw retired pay at age forty two Moreover retirements are not equally distributed among the services The Marine Corps which places a premium on youth prefers the great majority of its personnel to serve for less than ten years The Air Force which invests heavily in technical training seeks to retain personnel to realize a return on its investment Between 20 percent and 30 percent of Air Force separations have been retirements since the 1980s and fewer than 30 percent have been simply fulfillment of enlistment contracts Given that neither the Pentagon nor individual service members put money into a trust fund to pay for the cost of retirement the DOD paid these benefits off the top of each year s budget By the 1980s the unfunded liability of the military retirement system had grown to almost 1 trillion while retirement funds for civilian federal employees and social security were running surpluses because workers had to contribute to these plans To bring this situation under control Congress directed the DOD to switch to an accrual system and reduce benefits after twenty years of service to 40 percent for those joining the military after August 1 1986 However in 1999 under pressure from lobbyists for military retirees the DOD reversed the decision and went back to allowing those who completed twenty years once again to receive 50 percent At about the same time the DOD also permitted retirees and their dependents who turned 65 to retain their medical benefits even after they became eligible for Medicare Finally after 1995 the DOD and Congress stopped raising premiums for the military health care program TRICARE 11 and allowed individuals to pay 19 a month or 38 for a family a rate that is still in effect After the attacks of 9 11 the Bush administration made preventive war the cornerstone of its national security strategy to win what it labeled the war on terror It invaded Afghanistan in October 2001 and Iraq in March 2003 Although the administration declared the mission accomplished in both theaters in Spring 2003 it became clear that the United States would have to keep hundreds of thousands of troops on the ground in both countries for a significant period of time How would the military provide vast ground forces within the confines of the AVF If the Joint Chiefs had followed the original blueprint for the AVF they would have demanded that the secretary of defense and the president activate the Selective Service which by 2000 had on file some twenty million men between the ages of eighteen and twenty four But they lacked the political will to challenge their civilian superiors Moreover when General Eric Shinseki the Army chief of staff told Congress that the administration seriously underestimated the number of troops that would be needed to stabilize Iraq after the invasion he was marginalized by his civilian superiors Similarly the Bush administration s national security team did not want to raise the issue of Selective Service with Congress and the American people for fear that they might ask more questions about the necessity and cost of regime change and nation building in Iraq And Congress did not want to broach the subject without support from the military or the administration Thus the American military began to rely on the reserve forces to a degree not seen since World War II but in this case without the support of conscription It deployed both reserve and active forces more frequently and for longer periods of time than it knew was optimal for combat performance It accepted more recruits at the lowest mental and moral standards deemed acceptable since the advent of the volunteer force The services also found that the racial and ethnic composition of the force was changing Recruitment among African Americans who had high propensities to serve and had been overrepresented in the volunteer force since its inception declined Recruitment among Hispanic Americans who form the most rapidly growing sector of the population but were not recognized as numerically important in 1973 increased Women in the military who are barred by law from assignment to small ground combat units found that the nonlinear battle spaces of Iraq and Afghanistan placed them in combat the highways on which they operated military vehicles became the most dangerous places to be and they have accompanied infantry units conducting patrols in hostile territory because unlike male soldiers they can both search and interrogate Muslim women without offending the local population As a result of waging these two large ground wars which required the deployment of about two hundred thousand troops to Iraq and Afghanistan on a continuous basis from 2003 to 2009 the civilian and military leaders overstretched and abused the active and reserve components of the AVF particularly the ground forces Not only did this overextension undermine the readiness of the Army and Marines but it was a moral outrage perpetrated against the troops and their families To understand how much strain the failure to activate the Selective Service has put on the troops consider the horrendous situation of the Army which bore the brunt of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan The Army has reorganized so that the brigade combat team BCT rather than the division has become its major maneuver unit in ground combat A BCT consists of a combat arms brigade along with its artillery and support units and contains about two thousand soldiers with some variation based on the type of combat unit at its core In Spring 2007 at the height of the so called surge in Iraq the Army had twenty of its forty four combat brigades on the ground in either Iraq or Afghanistan Of these twenty brigades nine were already on second tours seven were serving a third tour and two were on a fourth deployment of at least twelve months Moreover of the twenty four brigades not deployed in Spring 2007 ten had already been deployed for two tours and three had been deployed three times in the previous five years 12 Of the twenty brigades in Iraq or Afghanistan in Spring 2007 none had been back home for a full two years between deployments the time period regarded as optimal for recovery from combat and four had one year or less at home between combat tours Of the twenty four brigades not in theater eleven had less than two years between deployments and five had less than one year Moreover ten of the brigades had served longer than one year in theater All told by Spring 2007 forty three of the Army s forty four brigades had served at least one tour see Table 2 only the brigade in Korea was not deployed to one of the combat zones 13 Table 2 Deployment History of Currently Deployed U S Army Combat Brigades as of Spring 2007 Combat Brigades Serving 1st Tour Combat Brigades Serving 2nd Tour Combat Brigades Serving 3rd Tour Combat Brigades Serving 4th Tour 1st Cavalry Division 4th Brigade 2nd Infantry Division 4th Brigade 1st Cavalry Division 1st Brigade 1st Cavalry Division 2nd Brigade 1st Cavalry Division 3rd Brigade 1st Infantry Division 2nd Brigade 1st Infantry Division 4th Brigade 2nd Infantry Division 2nd Brigade 2nd Infantry Division 3rd Brigade 25th Infantry Divi sion 3rd Brigade 25th Infantry Divi sion 4th Brigade 3rd Infantry Division 1st Brigade 3rd Infantry Division 2nd Brigade 3rd Infantry Division 3rd Brigade 82nd Airborne Divi sion 1st Brigade 82nd Airborne Divi sion 3rd Brigade 82nd Airborne Divi sion 4th Brigade 173rd Airborne Bri gade Combat Team 10th Mountain Divi sion 2nd Brigade 82nd Airborne Divi sion 2nd Brigade Source Lawrence J Korb Peter Juul Laura Conley Myles Caggins and Sean Duggan Building a Military for the 21st Century New Realities New Priorities Washington D C Center for American Progress 2008 The reserve component which includes the National Guard and the service or federal reserves was also severely overstretched Fifty three percent of the Army s combat forces are in the National Guard 14 by early 2007 about 600 000 reservists had been mobilized and about 420 000 or 80 percent of the Guard and reserve had been deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan with an average of eighteen months per mobilization Of these service members about 85 000 or 20 percent had been deployed more than once Every one of the Army National Guard s sixteen enhanced brigades had been deployed overseas at least once and two were deployed twice Moreover by the end of 2007 four more enhanced brigades were sent to Iraq even though none of them had been demobilized for less than three years 15 The members of the Guard had signed up to serve as part of a strategic reserve training one weekend a month and two weeks each summer to maintain their skills They expected to serve primarily if needed for domestic contingencies such as natural disasters Like their colleagues in the federal reserves they could also serve as a strategic reserve for the active component until the Selective Service could be activated or they could serve short tours in peacekeeping operations in places like the Balkans or in short conflicts such as the first Gulf War But now they had effectively become an operational expeditionary force This abuse of the Total Force s Army component had severe repercussions on the service the effects of which can be grouped into four categories First in order to meet its recruiting goals the Army had to raise its recruiting budget as well as the bonuses paid to new recruits It also had to increase the proportion of personnel it recruited at the lowest acceptable mental and moral standards for incoming soldiers In the early years of the volunteer force recruits were drawn largely from the middle range of the socioeconomic structure That is the bottom quartile was underrepresented because its members disproportionately did not qualify for service based on educational aptitude or legal grounds and the upper strata disproportionately elected not to serve 16 This pattern held throughout the remainder of the twentieth century 17 a period in which the services recruited above the minimum standards set by the DOD From FY 2005 through FY 2008 the Army did not achieve its goal of bringing in 90 percent Tier I recruits those with high school diplomas and who scored at least average on the Armed Forces Qualification Test In fact in FY 2007 it did not even reach 80 percent 18 The percentage of high school graduates recruited by the Army dropped from 92 percent in FY 2004 to 87 percent in FY 2005 and this downward trend continued 19 The Army also reported a decline in recruits scoring high on its aptitude tests from 72 percent in FY 2004 to 67 percent in FY 2005 at the same time it accepted more recruits in the lowest acceptable mental category The Army compounded the problem by increasing the number of moral waivers that it issued In FY 2004 about 12 percent of the recruits received waivers including for criminal convictions and even felonies In FY 2006 the Army approved waivers for 8 219 recruits in FY 2007 the number rose to 10 258 Waivers for felony convictions for serious crimes such as theft and assault increased from 249 to 511 20 By FY 2008 the number of waivers exceeded 25 percent All told the Army gave eighty thousand moral waivers in the FY 2005 to FY 2008 period Even though it lowered its standards and increased waivers the Army had to increase its maximum enlistment bonus from 6

    Original URL path: https://www.amacad.org/content/publications/pubContent.aspx?d=779 (2016-02-13)
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