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  • Employment Opportunities Projects Overview Academy Data Forum Humanities Arts and Education Science Engineering and Technology Global Security and International Affairs American Institutions and the Public Good Publications Overview Dædalus Journal of the Academy Bulletin Magazine of the Academy Books Research Papers Monographs and Project Publications Meetings Overview Induction 2015 Upcoming Meetings and Events Friday Forum 2015 2016 Schedule Past Meetings and Events Fellowships Overview Visiting Scholars Program Hellman Fellowship in

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  • Light Weapons and Civil Conflict - American Academy of Arts & Sciences
    User Name Password Forgot your password Submit a Question Date 12 5 2012 Name Email Needed only if you expect a reply Subject Message Home Publication Overview Books Light Weapons and Civil Conflict Light Weapons and Civil Conflict Edited by Jeffrey Boutwell and Michael T Klare Lanham MD Rowman and Littlefield 1999 Order from the Publisher Table of Contents Introduction Part One Light Weapons and International Conflict The International Trade in Light Weapons What Have We Learned Michael T Klare Light Weapons and Conflict in the Great Lakes Region of Africa Kathi Austin Controlling the Black and Gray Markets in Small Arns in South Asia Tara Kartha Part Two Controlling the Supply of Light Weapons U S Policy and the Export of Light Weapons Lora Lumpe The European Union and the Light Weapons Trade Paul Eavis and William Benson Domestic Laws and International Controls Natalie J Goldring Part Three Regional Efforts to Control Light Weapons Mali and the West African Light Weapons Moratotium Joseph P Smaldone Controlling Light Weapons in Southern Africa Hussein Solomon Part Four International Cooperation in Controlling Light Weapons The United Nations and the Control of Light Weapons Graciela Uribe de Lozano Light Weapons and International Law Enforcement James P McShane Part Five Light Weapons Human Rights and Social Development Light Weapons and Human Development The Need for Transparency and Early Warning Edward J Laurance Arms Transfers Humanitarian Assistance and Humanitarian Law Peter Herby The World Bank Demobilization and Social Reconstruction Nat J Colletta Conclusion Light Weapons and Civil Conflict Policy Options for the International Commmunity Jeffrey Boutwell and Michael T Klare Appendix A Recommendations of the Report of the UN Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms Submitted by the Secretary General to the General Assembly August 27 1997 Appendix B An International Agenda on Small

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  • The Transition from Paper: Where Are We Going and How Will We Get There? - American Academy of Arts & Sciences
    International Affairs The Exploratory Fund Member Login User Name Password Forgot your password Submit a Question Date 12 5 2012 Name Email Needed only if you expect a reply Subject Message Home Publication Overview Books The Transition from Paper Where Are We Going and How Will We Get There Books The Transition from Paper Where Are We Going and How Will We Get There Edited by R Stephen Berry and Anne Simon Moffat Published online 2001 Table of Contents Introduction R Stephen Berry University of Chicago and Anne Simon Moffat American Academy Midwest Center The Transformation of Teaching and Research 1 Electronics and the Future of Education Andrew Odlyzko AT T Bell Laboratories 2 The Changing Landscape of Academics As Affected by New Communications Technology Neil Kestner Louisiana State University 3 The Future of Science Textbooks Neil Kestner Louisiana State University 4 Scientific Journals of the Future Steven Bachrach Trinity College San Antonio 5 The Future of Peer Review Thomas von Foerster Springer Verlag New York City 6 Management of the New Infrastructure for Electronic Publications Stephen R Heller NIST Gaithersbrg MD 7 Electronic Clones vs the Global Research Archive Paul Ginsparg Los Alamos National Laboratory 8 Science and Science Online Wired and HotWired Alexander Fowler The Electronic Frontier Foundation 9 Electronic Conferences Steven Bachrach Redirecting Science Commerce and Society 10 Advancing the Electronic Information Marketplace Through Library Licensing Ann Okerson Yale University 11 Midnight in the Garden of Good and Evil Academic Publishing Copyright and other Miasmas Ann Okerson 12 The Legal Foundation for Electronic Information How Will It Affect Scientists Ronald Wigington American Chemical Society 13 Competition and Cooperation Libraries and Publishers in the Transition to Electronic Scholarly Journals Andrew Odlyzko 14 On Who Should Own Scientific Papers Martin Blume American Physical Society Global Impacts of the Transition

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  • Goals of "2001 and Beyond: A Plan for Renewal" - American Academy of Arts & Sciences
    Renewal has charted the direction of the Academy into the next century so it is essential that the Academy s major programs the keystone of that document reexamine their own agendas to ensure that each has a clear perspective on how it will advance the overall mission of the Academy A planning grant from a private foundation will provide funds to support a review of the past and current project activities of the Academy s major initiatives enabling the project directors and committees who direct these activities to set priorities for the coming years Projects selected for review will deal with both national and international concerns All will share a strong commitment to serving both the intellectual community and the larger society through an expanded program of public outreach a major component of the Strategic Plan Coupled with the strengthening of existing projects is the development of new studies that would help inform public policy choices Participants would include not only representatives of the academic community but also leaders from the corporate foundation and public sectors Major funding has been received for an important new Academy project an Initiative for Humanities and Culture It marks the Academy s most ambitious undertaking in the humanities since the establishment of the National Humanities Center this country s only independent institute for advanced study in humanistic scholarship in 1976 To begin its work the Initiative has organized two task forces one on academic and policy oriented research needs and a second on the development of a database in the humanities An initial meeting to advance the research agenda held at the Getty Center in Los Angeles last November focused on two themes the history of the humanities disciplines and the changing relation of the humanities to selected sciences In the fall the Academy and the American Council of Learned Societies cohosted two meetings in New York to review the experiences of other organizations in establishing their own data collection processes Information on the development of the Science and Engineering Indicators database and the role of the National Science Board in overseeing it was particularly helpful for the purpose of planning the steps required to develop the humanities database Support for the start up phase of the Initiative has come from individuals corporations and foundations with lead gifts provided by the William Hewlett Trust and Walter Hewlett Major funding has also been received from the Sara Lee Corporation A planning grant from the Andrew W Mellon Foundation has enabled the Academy to initiate the database planning phase of the project The Strategic Plan also focused on the publication program of the Academy with particular attention to its journal Dædalus There was general agreement that Dædalus the Academy s most visible representation to the public should more clearly express the Academy s reinvigorated purpose of public engagement and that each issue should reflect the varied interests of its membership The appointment of a new Editor later this spring will provide an appropriate opportunity to review

    Original URL path: https://www.amacad.org/content/publications/pubContent.aspx?d=432 (2016-02-13)
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  • Pugwash Report: Study Group on Intervention, Sovereignty, and International Security - American Academy of Arts & Sciences
    July 1999 on the interrelated issues of NATO s intervention in Kosovo the West s relations with Russia and the prospect of future military interventions by the international community for a report on the workshop in Spain see the November 1999 Pugwash Newsletter or the project report on the Pugwash website Given the complexity of the issues discussed in Spain George Rathjens secretary general of Pugwash was convinced of the need for more in depth analysis by Pugwash of the important and continuing tensions on issues relating to intervention and sovereignty In particular it was thought that Pugwash could draw upon its international network of policy specialists and scientists to convene a series of meetings with the aim of bridging where possible the very real differences that exist among nations and regions regarding international intervention to deal with cases of widespread humanitarian abuse and failed states To help plan the work of the study group Rathjens and the US Pugwash Committee convened a meeting at the House of the Academy in October 1999 Participants at this meeting included Carl Kaysen chair of the Academy s Committee on International Security Studies CISS Robert McNamara former president World Bank and former US secretary of defense Peter Galbraith former US ambassador to Bosnia Gen William Nash former commander of US forces in Bosnia Owen Harries National Interest Paul Doty Harvard University and Steven Miller cochair of US Pugwash The group discussed the pros and cons of seeing the Kosovo intervention as a precedent for future military interventions by the international community and the need especially for a group like Pugwash to seek common ground among sharply divergent international attitudes on the legitimacy and feasibility of humanitarian interventions Pugwash then convened the first meeting of the international Study Group on Intervention Sovereignty and International

    Original URL path: https://www.amacad.org/content/publications/pubContent.aspx?d=433 (2016-02-13)
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  • How to Organize a Rich and Successful Group: Lessons from Natural Experiments in History - American Academy of Arts & Sciences
    conceived within Second any society undergoes local fads that is customs that do not make economic sense Societies either adopt unprofitable practices or for whatever reasons abandon profitable ones But usually those fads are reversed for example when societies without a certain fad outcompete the neighboring society with that fad or when societies without the fad realize they re making a big mistake and reacquire it In short competition between human societies that are in contact with each other is what drives the invention of new technology and the continued availability of technology Only in an isolated society where there s no competition and no source of reintroduction can a fad result in the permanent loss of valuable technology The other lesson I would like to draw from history concerns the optimal fragmentation principle That is if you ve got a human group whether that group is the staff of a museum or a business or the German beer industry or Route 128 is that group best organized as a single large unit or divided into a number of small units or fragmented into lots of small units I propose to get some empirical information about this question by comparing the histories of China and Europe Why did China fall behind Europe technologically during the Renaissance Some believe that the Confucian tradition made the Chinese ultra conservative whereas the Judeo Christian tradition in Europe stimulated science and innovation Well just ask Galileo about the stimulating effects of the Judeo Christian tradition on science Also consider the state of technology in medieval Confucian China China led the world in innovation and technology in the early Renaissance with such inventions as canal lock gates cast iron compasses deep drilling gunpowder kites paper porcelain printing stern post rudders and wheelbarrows So the real question is why did Renaissance China lose its enormous technological lead to late starter Europe We can get insight by examining why China lost its lead in oceangoing ships By the year 1400 China had by far the most best and biggest oceangoing ships in the world Between 1405 and 1432 the Chinese sent out seven oceangoing fleets the so called treasure fleets comprising hundreds of ships with total crews of 20 000 men Each of those ships dwarfed the tiny ships of Columbus Those gigantic fleets sailed from China to Indonesia India Arabia and the east coast of Africa It looked as if the Chinese were on the verge of rounding the Cape of Good Hope coming up the west side of Africa and colonizing Europe But China s tremendous fleets came to an end through a typical episode of isolationism In China there had been a navy faction and an anti navy faction In 1432 the anti navy faction gained ascendancy when the new emperor decided that spending so much money on ships was wasteful The consequent abandonment of the fleets in China was final because when that emperor gave the order to dismantle the shipyards and stop sending out the ships that decision applied to all of China China was a virtual gigantic island likeTasmania Contrast that with what happened with oceangoing fleets in Europe Columbus an Italian wanted to sail a fleet across the Atlantic He unsuccessfully sought support from his native Italy and from France Portugal and Spain six times before he was finally given three small ships by the king and queen of Spain Columbus then sailed off discovered the New World and brought the news back to Europe Cort6s and Pizarro followed him and brought back huge quantities of wealth Within a short time as a result of Columbus having shown the way eleven European countries jumped into the colonial game and got into fierce competition with each other The essence of these events is that Europe was fragmented In China which was unified one emperor s decision abolished clocks throughout the empire China was on the verge of building powerful waterpowered machinery centuries before the Industrial Revolution in Britain but the emperor said Stop and that was the end of it Yes in Europe there were princes who said no to electric lighting or printing or guns but because Europe in the Renaissance was divided into roughly 2 000 principalities there was never one person with the authority to abolish a whole technology throughout Europe Inventors had lots of chances there was always competition between different states and when one state tried something that proved valuable the other states saw the opportunity and adopted it So the real question is Why was China chronically unified and why was Europe chronically disunified Why is Europe disunified to this day The answer is geography just picture a map of China and a map of Europe China s coastline is smooth Europe s coastline is indented and each big peninsula became an independent country independent ethnic group and independent experiment in building a society notably the Greek peninsula Italy the Iberian peninsula Denmark and Norway Sweden Europe had two big islands Britain and Ireland that became important independent societies while China had no island big enough to become an independent society until the modern emergence of Taiwan Unlike China Europe is transected by mountain ranges the Alps the Pyrenees the Carpathians that split It into different principalities Europe s big rivers flow radially the Rhine the Rhone the Danube the Elbe and don t unify Europe In China the two big rivers flow parallel to each other are separated by low lying land and were quickly connected by canals For those geographic reasons China was unified in 221 BC and has stayed unified most of the time since then but Europe has never been unified Augustus couldn t do it neither could Charlemagne Napoleon or Hitler To this day the European Union is having difficulties bringing any unity to Europe So the lesson I draw is that competition between entities that had free communication between them spurred on Europe In China one despot could and

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  • The Significance of Joint Missile Surveillance - American Academy of Arts & Sciences
    Overview Dædalus Journal of the Academy Bulletin Magazine of the Academy Books Research Papers Monographs and Project Publications Meetings Overview Induction 2015 Upcoming Meetings and Events Friday Forum 2015 2016 Schedule Past Meetings and Events Fellowships Overview Visiting Scholars Program Hellman Fellowship in Science and Technology Policy Policy Fellowship in the Humanities Education and the Arts Policy Fellowship in Global Security and International Affairs The Exploratory Fund Member Login User Name Password Forgot your password Submit a Question Date 12 5 2012 Name Email Needed only if you expect a reply Subject Message Home Publication Overview Research Papers Monographs and Project Publications The Significance of Joint Missile Surveillance Research Papers Monographs and Project Publications The Significance of Joint Missile Surveillance Author John Steinbruner Published by American Academy of Arts and Sciences Cambridge MA 02138 2001 Order from the Academy Or download the PDF Table of Contents Project on Joint Missile Surveillance The Significance of Joint Missile Surveillance John Steinbruner About the Author Find Dædalus Issues View and order copies of Dædalus from 2001 to the present Earlier issues can be found on the journal database JSTOR Find Bulletin Issues View issues of the Bulletin from Fall 2000 to the present

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  • an American s alleged criminal actions did fall within the Court s jurisdiction a state could refer a case to the ICC or the ICC Prosecutor could initiate an investigation with the approval of the Pre Trial Chamber 6 The state in which the crime allegedly was committed would have to accept ICC jurisdiction The ICC Prosecutor would then be required to notify the United States of its intent to commence an investigation The United States would have a month in which to inform the Prosecutor of any American investigation of the case The Prosecutor would be required to defer to any U S investigation and respect a U S decision not to proceed to prosecution unless a Pre Trial Chamber nonetheless authorized the investigation This is the procedural nub of American concerns the ability of the Pre Trial Chamber to overrule a U S claim to handle a case This is the only circumstance in which the stated fears of the United States might be realized For this to occur a majority of Judges would have to determine that the United States is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution Since America s literal ability to administer justice is unquestioned the ICC s judgment would hinge upon willingness The terms are further defined in the Statute unwillingness can be found only where the proceedings or decision not to prosecute were intended to shield the person from criminal responsibility where there has been an unjustified delay inconsistent with an intent to bring the suspect to justice or where the proceedings were not independent or impartial and were conducted in a manner inconsistent with an intent to bring the suspect to justice In other words the United States would either have to be so biased that it could not evaluate the question of international crime have no intention of investigating the claim or be investigating only to protect an individual The seriousness with which the modern U S military justice system treats international humanitarian law makes this a virtual impossibility in the case of a military investigation Moreover actions official or unofficial of a U S citizen that approached the gravity of an international crime would be addressed within the American judicial system One can disagree with the results of U S military justice proceedings with regard to the My Lai massacre but the ICC would not have had a role in the case It is difficult to envision ICC judges concluding that the United States was unwilling to pursue allegations of egregious international criminal violations by Americans Yet such a scenario in theory is possible This is why American officials express concern about a politicized Court Critics presume ICC officials could be intent on undermining U S foreign policy regardless of the Court s purpose or rules This is why the Administration sought a procedural guarantee that the United States could exempt Americans from ICC jurisdiction The problem is that the pursuit of such an exemption runs contrary to the Court s central purpose to hold all individuals accountable for massive international crimes There is a significant tension between the specific U S concern and the broader objectives of the Court The ICC and American National Security Interests In joining the Court states agree to be bound by a process with defined rules but no guarantees with regard to a specific case or interest States accept a degree of risk in order to advance a larger goal of ending impunity for the worst international criminals The central issue for the United States remains whether the risks inherent in joining the ICC are outweighed by the Court s potential benefits Other leading powers allies including Germany France and the U K shared many U S concerns about the Court Our allies have similar reasons to be concerned about the Court s ability to judge the actions of their nationals particularly with regard to the use of force These states like the United States consider themselves to have global responsibilities They deploy forces beyond their borders and participate in a broad range of peace operations and interventions They too have weaker enemies that often seek advantage through asymmetrical responses ranging from terrorism to political campaigns designed to undermine the legitimacy of the leading powers actions Yet during the Rome negotiations regarding the ICC these states became satisfied with the tradeoffs inherent in joining the Court including in the case of France the need to amend its Constitution They joined with the United States to insert additional safeguards and clarifications regarding the Court s workings and they then concluded that the Court s larger value outweighed any residual risks it might pose to their nationals or foreign policy The United States was not exceptional in its initial reservations it was exceptional in its ultimate conclusion that the Court wasn t worth joining United States policy toward the Court whether or not it decides to join entails tradeoffs involving a wide array of issues including constitutional protections sovereignty the use of force the pursuit of justice the rule of law and the quality of American leadership Constitutional Protections Because the international Court reflects a mix of common and civil law traditions it lacks the requirement of a trial by jury and other cherished U S Constitutional protections for the accused Some of the most emotional arguments offered against the ICC revolve around this compromise the ICC simply does not feel constitutional Yet even in an Administration skeptical of the ICC the Justice Department has ruled that there are no constitutional barriers to joining the ICC The constitutionality issue is best evaluated by means of comparison For actions that occur abroad and otherwise would fall within foreign national jurisdiction ICC proceedings should be compared with those of a foreign state not an American court Americans abroad are subject to the jurisdiction of foreign courts the Constitution does not travel with them Individuals already face the possibility of foreign prosecution for ICC covered crimes General Pinochet discovered this principle with some surprise And depending upon a nation s political motivation and legal system foreign judicial proceedings may be far less hospitable to American constitutional principles than an ICC will be Another point of comparison is extradition of American citizens for trial abroad This has been common practice for two hundred years established by treaties in which the United States has delegated the trial of Americans to foreign states The ICC can be viewed as another type of court to which the prosecution of Americans is delegated and again in many cases the ICC will feel far more similar to a U S court than a foreign court A third comparative basis for judging the ICC s constitutionality is the American military justice system American service members are subject to courts martial that employ fundamentally different procedures than those available in a civilian court Some of the most cherished American rights e g trial by jury do not extend to active duty members of the Armed Forces Having an ICC might actually benefit an American citizen The ICC could be for both legal and political reasons a welcome alternative to trial in a foreign country Serbia s Milosevic was most obliging when three Americans were seized in Kosovo but had the timing been different so too might have been his calculation of interest A rogue state that captured an American soldier or pilot might refuse to return him to the United States Having the ICC as an alternative venue might provide a face saving alternative to provoking a crisis and given complementarity also might be the most expeditious means to bring the American home Alternatively the United States might find it useful to suggest that foreign criminal suspects be tried in an ICC rather than engaging in protracted wrangling over the venue as was true of the dispute with Libya over where to try the Libyan suspects implicated in the Pan Am bombing over Lockerbie Thus the costs of supporting the ICC in terms of compromising constitutional protections are little different than the costs incurred in establishing a different system of justice for members of the military or reaching extradition agreements with foreign countries or travelling abroad as an American within the jurisdiction of a foreign judicial system The ICC poses no qualitatively new or different risks in this regard Sovereignty Many opponents are concerned that the ICC is part of an incipient system of world government a tool in the hands of hostile individuals and states that will seek to inhibit America s freedom of action particularly with regard to the use of force Preserving American sovereignty they argue requires opposing the Court The emotional appeal of the argument is strong but what is it really about It revolves around two different issues one the inherent corruptibility of institutions and two specific concerns about prerogatives regarding the use of force The ICC is an institution created by international treaty There are many such institutions and in the post WWII period the United States designed most of them In many the United States wielded disproportionate formal power the World Bank or even a veto the United Nations Security Council For a variety of reasons having to do with changes in international politics and norms emerging new institutions evade direct control of a single state But the ICC is not unique in this regard the World Trade Organization is the latest such entity The ICC s current mandate is not newly created its purpose is to enforce specific pieces of existing international law law that was developed and supported by the U S government Foreign states already can enforce these laws against Americans There is nothing untoward about the Court s creation or current mandate The history of ICC negotiations does show that the United States needs to develop a more proactive and timely approach to participating in multilateral diplomatic negotiations Greater U S clarity of objectives and coordination of effort might have avoided acrimony and resulted in compromise more acceptable to the United States It is worth noting that the ICC s Assembly of State Parties has the potential in effect to legislate new international law i e defining aggression adding new crimes This is troubling but all the more reason for the United States to participate in the Court and become more adept at so called conference diplomacy The ICC on its face has nothing to do with limiting the sovereignty or freedom of action of the world s leading power The United States does not intend to promote or condone the criminal activity under the Court s jurisdiction As Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy recently put it This is not some kind of rogue institution that will target some American GI Americans have nothing to fear It s only the likes of Bosnian Serb leader and accused war criminal Radovan Karadic who need worry 7 But Court opponents question how the ICC will act in practice They fear that once the legal mechanisms are established they could be hijacked for political purposes In fact the United States should expect that hostile states will attempt to use the Court to achieve political objectives just as they would seek to exploit other forums The Court s judges and prosecutors will expect politically motivated allegations their responsibility will be to evaluate the charges objectively Concerns about politically biased corrupt or incompetent officials are common to each new institution national or international At some level every political institution requires a leap of faith about human capacities Politicization of the Court would quickly end its relevance and the leading powers behind the Court are well aware of the need to ensure the highest integrity and impartiality of ICC officials More practically the ICC Statute seeks to address these fears by delineating the qualifications for judges and prosecutors the processes by which they are selected and the means by which they can be dismissed by the states that are parties to the Treaty The Use of Force American officials have indicated that the existence of the ICC because it claims jurisdiction over individuals even if their government is not a party to the treaty might dampen U S military participation in certain contingencies The Administration fears that an ICC could question the legality of actions by American troops or military and political leaders This additional risk they imply could preclude U S military action on behalf of non vital interests such as humanitarian or peace operations It is important to be clear about what the Court can and cannot do The potential threat from the ICC is a symbolic challenge to American decisions about the use of force The ICC will have no independent enforcement powers it cannot compel even the weakest states unless the UN Security Council in which the United States has a veto decides to do so Apprehending suspects will fall to states which already have the authority to apprehend suspects within their borders The ICC will have power that is derived from its moral and legal authority It is a different sort of power than that usually evoked by ICC critics and the power will will hinge upon the Court s credibility the consistency transparency and objectivity of its actions If the ICC were to be captured by hostile political forces and repeatedly inject itself into issues beyond its mandate it would be problematic for the United States in a variety of ways An American President might decide to undertake internal investigations of actions that already had been judged to be legal simply in order to ensure that the ICC would not consider the case 8 If the Court challenged a U S ruling on the grounds that the United States was unwilling to pursue justice the Court would pose a political challenge Challenging the capability or intent of the U S justice system would occur only if the Court were acting fundamentally contrary to its mandate Such a departure is highly unlikely for several reasons that go beyond the self interest that Judges and Prosecutors would have in maintaining the Court s integrity and legitimacy First the scope for interpretation of law was narrowed significantly during the ICC negotiations The United States feared that the legitimacy of its military actions could be undermined by an ICC raising questions about the American use of force particularly with regard to issues such as the proportional use of force the legitimacy of targets and civilian casualties 9 The United States did a remarkable job in the ICC negotiations of specifically defining the individual elements of these crimes that would have to exist for criminal liability to be established In addition the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia ICTY already has provided a precedent with regard to the most potentially contentious issues concerning the U S use of force In an example of just what the United States fears with regard to ICC jurisdiction over American action the ICTY had jurisdiction over Serbia and Kosovo at the time of the 1999 NATO bombing The ICTY Prosecutor in response to requests from private parties directed her staff to provide an internal assessment of NATO s actions While the Prosecutor specifically denied that the tribunal was launching a formal investigation the ICTY submitted a raft of questions to the Pentagon and other relevant actors stirring up internal controversy about the legitimacy of the tribunal s actions Yet the Prosecutor concluded that there was no deliberate targeting of civilians or unlawful military targets by NATO and that there was no basis for opening an investigation into any of those allegations or into other incidents related to the NATO bombing 10 This was not a peacekeeping or humanitarian operation it was a coercive bombing campaign in which hundreds of civilians allegedly died as a result of the coercive use of force 11 Yet even in this case an international tribunal reasoned with transparent logic that mistakes or unintended consequences do not constitute war crimes Finally if Court opponents are concerned that the ICC could become a tool for undermining U S foreign policy they should understand that U S opposition to the Court has a similar effect not just among enemies but among American friends and allies Justice International courts and tribunals can be a useful tool for advancing both specific American objectives regarding a particular conflict and overarching international legal and security goals Since Nuremberg the United States occasionally has supported international tribunals as a means of punishing those responsible for genocide and war crimes United States officials have noted the importance of holding individual perpetrators of gross abuses accountable for their crimes Prosecuting individuals rather than governments is important for several reasons First it sets precedents that must become part of the calculation of political and military leaders The threat of prosecution also may force individuals throughout the entire chain of command to take greater responsibility for their actions If over time victor s justice is replaced by the enforcement of international law criminal activity will become more costly and possibly less likely The ICC probably will prove unable to prosecute criminals that cling to power within states or take refuge in states willing to provide protection But even if the Court cannot reach criminals its indictments would affect them Indicted individuals would fear traveling abroad to shop seek medical treatment raise funds or otherwise enhance their personal and political standing More importantly the ICC s spotlight can isolate and discredit gross human rights violators potentially undermining their local support and limiting their ability to cause further harm These are modest benefits but they are real International tribunals can also make a contribution simply by compiling a definitive historical account of criminal actions Truth telling can mitigate forgetting and the creation of historical fiction International judicial proceedings also help transfer culpability from groups to individuals thereby helping to prevent recurring cycles of violence Skeptics may remain unconvinced

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