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  • Introduction - American Academy of Arts & Sciences
    technical is political As Clark s framing makes clear even in the early days of the Internet designers understood that design choices had political influence particularly at the level of recognizing potential tensions between large computer providers such as IBM and the telecommunications carriers Three decades later and after two decades of consistent work in law philosophy and social science the secret is out the technical is the political Different design choices are subject to conflict among governments corporate stakeholders and Internet users all of whom pursue power and their at times conflicting interests through these choices Both Clark and Benkler s essays provide a rich description of how design choices affect ethical and political values in concrete settings In their contribution Estrin and Juels very clearly explore the tensions between design choices that are conducive to big data the collection of information by large data processors seeking to learn about and thereby influence their users or customers and those design choices that would be conducive to small data The latter decisions could empower users to access their personal data and use it to manage their own lives as well as gain personal services that would not be possible otherwise but at the risk of personal data exposure and against the challenge of wresting control of small data away from companies pursuing big data capabilities Landau in turn outlines the tensions between creating an Internet system that prioritizes individual privacy and safety and a digital environment that may be secure but that nonetheless makes users vulnerable to the surveillance systems of service providers and governments Tufekci explores how the design characteristics of different social networks influence the type of communication feasible she describes how the different designs of Twitter and Facebook caused the two platforms to diverge in the degree to which their algorithms directed attention to recent political protests in Ferguson Missouri and how the shift to Facebook from open Internet blogs changed the nature of online publication in the Iranian and Egyptian public sphere She then further examines how algorithms can influence users political and economic preferences with substantial implications on both economy and democracy Smartphones and Things A second major theme that emerges from this collection of essays is that the nature of the endpoints of the network has changed radically since the early days of the Internet and this in turn has changed the design choices and their implications The early Internet connected general purpose computers that were fixed in location and often shared among users A node was not a person but a computer and a computer was a general purpose device not a specific appliance connected for control Today the majority of Internet users connect using smartphones which are both personal and mobile Kirstein s essay wrestles with the substantial challenges of building a network intended to serve over one trillion devices many of them special purpose machines aimed at sensing and control systems without substantial embedded intelligence The essays by Estrin and Juels

    Original URL path: https://www.amacad.org/content/publications/pubContent.aspx?d=22049 (2016-02-13)
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  • Acknowledgments - American Academy of Arts & Sciences
    Login User Name Password Forgot your password Home Nuclear Liability A Key Co Acknowledgments Nuclear Liability A Key Component of the Public Policy Decision to Deploy Nuclear Energy in Southeast Asia Acknowledgments There is growing interest worldwide in civilian nuclear power to meet increased energy demands But the spread of nuclear technology in the absence of rigorous independent regulatory regimes and international inspection programs can present serious security risks the proliferation of weapons capabilities and safety dangers that can lead to accidents The Academy s Global Nuclear Future GNF Initiative is working to prevent such dangerous outcomes by identifying and promoting measures that will limit the security safety and proliferation risks created by the apparent growing global appetite for nuclear energy The GNF Initiative has created an interdisciplinary and international network of experts that is working together to devise and implement nuclear policy for the twenty first century To help reduce the risks that could result from the global expansion of nuclear energy the GNF Initiative addresses a number of key policy areas including the international nonproliferation regime the entirety of the fuel cycle the physical protection of nuclear facilities and materials and the interaction of the nuclear industry with

    Original URL path: https://www.amacad.org/content/publications/pubContent.aspx?d=1502 (2016-02-13)
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  • Prologue - American Academy of Arts & Sciences
    nuclear suppliers nuclear operators and the host and neighboring states in sharing the cost of liability The continual debate regarding the sufficiency and availability of funds to meet potential compensation demands in case of an accident This uncertainty we believe constitutes a hurdle for public acceptance of nuclear energy especially in developing countries we believe that the insurance caps need to be raised significantly Altering the balance in this area of nuclear liability law jurisprudence by identifying the nuclear supplier as the responsible party in case of an accident If liability laws comparable to the Indian Civil Liability for Nuclear Damages Act are adopted in the future by additional countries particularly those in Southeast Asia this could be a game changer in assessing the economic viability of nuclear energy The principle of excluding supplier liability in favor of channeling all liability to the operator of a nuclear power plant has been the operative standard in existing statutes and conventions Reliance by a growing number of nuclear aspirants on foreign technology and expertise including safety oversight We believe that this will create new challenges regarding legal jurisdiction as to who is responsible for compensation and the extent of liability that could be imposed on these foreign entities and individuals Unavailability of a universal framework regarding the liability conventions across all states The principles laid down by the Paris and Vienna Conventions form the bedrock of current international nuclear liability law However there is a lack of harmonization between these two agreements Many states including legal officials from the United States have asserted that the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage creating a viable risk pool based on proportional assessments imposed on nuclear plant operators in states that have ratified the CSC could serve as an umbrella agreement According to the IAEA The OECD sponsored Paris Convention and Brussels Convention are popular in Western Europe while the IAEA sponsored Vienna Convention is popular in Eastern Europe and elsewhere around the world Some countries have signed a Joint Protocol to link those two treaties The Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage CSC was designed to become a global regime and is open to countries without nuclear power plants 1 This paper addresses the following key questions What impact have the unfortunate events at Fukushima had on the views of regional policy makers and stakeholders regarding changes to nuclear liability and nuclear compensatory standards What is the standard that policy makers and scholars planning the deployment of new nuclear energy should use as a guidepost as they consider nuclear liability legislation in their respective states Obvious questions that arise include whether the principles laid down by the Paris and Vienna Conventions should be used to establish regional or country specific standards and whether regional agreement on standards should be preferred over country specific standards The current U S policy is clear on these questions The United States prefers adoption by new countries of the CSC rather than implementation of region based standards

    Original URL path: https://www.amacad.org/content/publications/pubContent.aspx?d=1503 (2016-02-13)
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  • Introduction - American Academy of Arts & Sciences
    parliament passed the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damages Act 2010 CLNDA Under the CLNDA liability for a nuclear incident would principally lie with the operator which would be required to pay compensation However the act also introduces the novel concept novel at least in the area of nuclear liability law of supplier liability over and above the accepted principles of operator liability Whether prominent supplier countries such as the United States Japan France and Russia will accept this new principle remains to be seen However supplying India with nuclear material confers significant economic benefits on France and Russia and preliminary evidence suggests that both countries may accede in the case of deploying reactors in India In fact recent reports indicate that Russia has already arrived at a preliminary agreement with the Indian authorities and has accepted the Indian nuclear liability law While the exact modalities of the agreement are in the process of being worked out the structure adopted appears to be one in which the increased cost of the supplier purchasing insurance for the supplied component will lead to an escalation in the cost of the concerned component 6 If this agreement were to be finally signed it would be a watershed moment in the history of international nuclear liability law Whether countries that are now planning or are in the commission stage of nuclear power plants including those in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations ASEAN or other South Asian countries will consider the CLNDA to be a feasible model or whether India because of its unique standing in the world economy will stand alone in enforcing this principle remains to be seen If major supplier countries such as France and Russia agree to the supplier liability model that is modish in India then France and Russia and the other suppliers may have difficulty arguing that the same model should not be accepted elsewhere Some academic and environmental organizations are even arguing that Japan should consider adopting supplier liability especially in light of the fact that much of the compensation paid out for the Fukushima disaster was taxpayer funded 7 Very recently about 1 400 plaintiffs have filed a lawsuit against the three companies that supplied the reactors at the Fukushima nuclear power plant namely Toshiba General Electric and Hitachi This lawsuit filed at the Tokyo District Court challenges current regulations that provide immunity to suppliers from liability in nuclear accidents and that place the liability solely on the operator in this case the Tokyo Electric Power Company TEPCO The plaintiffs have argued that the three suppliers failed to implement safety improvements to the four decade old boiling water reactors at the nuclear power plant and they are seeking a token compensation of 100 yen approximately US 1 each The goal of the plaintiffs is not economic compensation but to raise awareness in relation to the issue of supplier immunity from nuclear liability 8 Another pressing issue which is being raised in the aftermath of the Fukushima accident

    Original URL path: https://www.amacad.org/content/publications/pubContent.aspx?d=1505 (2016-02-13)
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  • Brief Historical Context - American Academy of Arts & Sciences
    conventional industrial applications Exposure to such substantial risks was unacceptable and proved to be a hurdle in attracting meaningful investment to the sector At the same time American nuclear suppliers wanted to expand into Western Europe but were not willing to expose themselves to liability claims for nuclear incidents occurring outside the territory of the United States This factor along with the difficulty of calculating insurance premiums because of the low probability but high risk nature of nuclear incidents issues pertaining to determination of compensation proving damage and so on led to the enactment of the Price Anderson Nuclear Industries Indemnity Act which came into effect in 1957 12 Economic Channeling of Liability The Price Anderson Act embodies the concept of economic channeling of liability In accordance with the act nuclear operators agree to bear the burden of strict liability in return for a limitation of liability over time guaranteed insurance coverage with manageable premiums and capped damages 13 Under this concept of economic channeling while a supplier may in principle be liable the operator would cover the eventual economic burden by paying any compensation Therefore operators would be required to obtain the maximum amount of insurance against nuclear incidents that they can avail from the insurance industry Any liability over and above that covered under such insurance would be paid through the fund created under the Price Anderson Act the main contributories of which are members of the American nuclear industry This is in contrast with legal channeling under which victims cannot bring claims against any entity other than the operator even if such other entity were to be at fault because all liability has been shifted to the operator The legal principle insulating the supplier from all liability was developed based on this concept of economic channeling and provided suppliers with further protection from liability Legal Channeling of Liability The economic channeling principle was transformed to a legal principle by a report issued in 1959 by Harvard Law School and the Atomic Industrial Forum International Problems of Financial Protection against Nuclear Risk 14 The Harvard report took the view that once a supplier had delivered goods components to an operator the supplier no longer had control over those goods components and hence the liability for the goods components was completely transferred as well 15 At the time this principle was a significant departure from accepted principles of tort law No other industry had excluded suppliers from the chain of liability in this manner The Harvard report articulates a variety of reasons for this new approach to liability including the importance of keeping costs low avoidance of litigation and encouraging investment and innovation in the nuclear industry 16 The report also notes that potential plaintiffs might target the suppliers rather than operators because of the deeper pockets of suppliers 17 This observation has proved prescient India recently modified its own nuclear liability law to make suppliers liable to preserve the ability to sue suppliers in the event of proven

    Original URL path: https://www.amacad.org/content/publications/pubContent.aspx?d=1506 (2016-02-13)
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  • International Law and Nuclear Liability - American Academy of Arts & Sciences
    a significant increase from the previous limit of 5 million and broadens the definition of nuclear damage to include environmental damage To date the Vienna Convention which aimed at universal adherence has attracted the membership of only forty states Subsequent to the Chernobyl accident the European Union undertook a complete revision of the Paris and Brussels Supplementary Conventions The 2004 Protocol to Amend the Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy 26 of 29 July 1960 2004 Protocol is the most important of these revisions The 2004 Protocol extends the geographic scope of accidents raises the amount of compensation available to the victims and enlarges the definition of nuclear damage The new limits of liability were fixed for operators insured at 700 million for the installation state public funds at 500 million and for collective state contribution under the Brussels Convention at 300 million or a total of 1 5 billion The 2004 amendments removed the requirement for a state to restrict the maximum liability of a nuclear operator thus allowing states preferring an unlimited liability policy to join the convention However the 2004 Protocol has not yet entered into force because a majority of EU states including Germany France and the United Kingdom have not ratified it Thus the old liability limits enacted in 1960 i e 360 million continue to apply In addition to the Paris and Vienna Conventions in 1997 at the insistence of the United States the IAEA sponsored another international nuclear liability regime the Convention on Supplementary Compensation CSC The CSC was put in place primarily to align the U S Price Anderson Act with international law The CSC provides for two tiers of compensation In the first tier it fixes the amount of compensation at 300 million special drawing rights To the extent that the funds from the operators are insufficient to cover this amount the installation state has to make public funds available to capture the difference In the second tier if claims for compensation for nuclear damage exceed 300 million special drawing rights additional amounts would have to be offered through contributions by member states based on their installed nuclear capacity These additional amounts are to be provided through contributions by member states collectively on the basis of a formula that factors in the installed nuclear capacity of a state and a UN rate of assessment 27 The amount is therefore not fixed but depends on the number of nuclear power plants in member countries and will increase as the nuclear capacity of a state increases 28 It is estimated that if most states that use nuclear power adhered to the CSC the amount of the second tier would be more than 300 million special drawing rights 29 an amount in addition to the first tier compensation of 300 million special drawing rights Another special feature of the CSC is that 50 percent of the international funds are to be used to compensate damage suffered both inside and outside the installation state while the remaining 50 percent is to be used exclusively to compensate transboundary damage 30 Nevertheless the allocation of international funds may vary depending on the national compensation made available by the installation state Therefore if the installation state prescribes a national compensation lower than 300 million special drawing rights then the percentage of international funds exclusively available for compensating transboundary damage is to be increased accordingly 31 However if the installation state makes available a national compensation amount of 600 million special drawing rights or higher then the whole amount of supplementary compensation is to be used to compensate damage suffered both inside and outside the installation state 32 For transboundary damage to be compensated using international funds the CSC requires that such damage should have occurred within the geographical scope of the CSC that is within the territory of a contracting party 33 In other words the international funds are not available to non contracting parties However with respect to the national compensation amount the CSC leaves it to the discretion of the installation state to include or exclude damage suffered in another state that is not a party to the CSC This discretion is however subject to other obligations of a contracting state that may arise under other international conventions on nuclear liability The advantage that the CSC offers is that it is an instrument to which all states may adhere regardless of whether they are parties to an existing nuclear liability convention and regardless of whether they have nuclear installations on their territory The CSC can be adhered to even if contracting parties enter into regional arrangements or agreements for liability However an important requirement is that countries should enact national liability laws that are consistent with model law described in the annex to the CSC or amend laws that are inconsistent or the Vienna or Paris Convention The CSC can therefore work as a supplemental convention that is over and above an existing convention The CSC has not yet come into force because it requires the ratification of five parties with a minimum of 400 000 MW of installed nuclear capacity 34 Fourteen countries including India have signed the CSC but most have yet to ratify it However India has drafted a liability law that some argue is not in compliance with the CSC model law owing to the expanded concept of supplier liability that has been introduced in the law This is discussed in detail in Appendix C Therefore India s ratification of the CSC is in doubt Table 1 prepared by the World Nuclear Association shows the nuclear power states and the liability conventions to which they are party Table 1 Nuclear Power States and Liability Conventions to Which They are Party 35 Countries Conventions Countries Conventions Argentina VC RVC CSC Lithuania VC JP Armenia VC Mexico VC Belgium PC BSC RPC RBSC Netherlands PC BSC JP RPC RBSC Brazil VC Pakistan Bulgaria VC JP Romania VC JP RVC CSC Canada Russia VC China Slovak Republic VC JP Czech Republic VC JP Slovenia PC BSC JP RPC RBSC Finland PC BSC JP RPC RBSC South Africa France PC BSC RPC RBSC Spain PC BSC RPC RBSC Germany PC BSC JP RPC RBSC Sweden PC BSC JP RPC RBSC Hungary VC JP Switzerland PC RPC BSC RBSC India CSC Taiwan Iran Ukraine VC JP Japan United Arab Emirates RVC Kazakhstan RVC United Kingdom PC BSC RPC RBSC Korea United States CSC India has signed the CSC but has not yet ratified it Whether India s domestic liability law conforms to the requirements of the convention is not yet clear Key to abbreviations PC Paris Convention RPC 2004 Revised Paris Protocol not yet in force BSC Brussels Supplementary Convention RBSC 2004 Revised Brussels Supplementary Convention not yet in force VC Vienna Convention RVC Revised Vienna Convention 1997 JP 1988 Joint Protocol CSC Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage not yet in force Several key players such as India China and Japan are not yet party to any of the key conventions Among the ASEAN countries the Philippines and Indonesia have signed the Vienna Convention and the 1997 Protocol 36 It therefore is clear that a large portion of the world s nuclear reactors continue to remain outside the framework of any of these conventions A comparative table highlighting key features of the three conventions has been included as Appendix A While many of the principles in the three conventions are similar there are differences in some of the provisions including those in relation to the amount of liability the time period within which a claim can be made the geographical scope of application of these conventions the definition of nuclear damage and the approach to how compensation must be dispersed among other issues These differences in themselves highlight the need for a uniform framework Some believe that the lack of progress in attaining harmonization and consensus is owing to the different approaches subscribed to by two of the most important players the United States and France Whereas France supports the Paris Convention and the Joint Protocols the United States is pushing for the CSC framework However in a joint French U S statement from August 28 2013 France indicated its support of the CSC framework and its desire to bring the CSC into force 37 Japan has recently indicated that it is proposing to introduce legislation to ratify the CSC This ratification would be a major step toward bringing the international convention into force 38 The CSC framework would require more nuclear power countries like China India France and Japan and possibly more European nuclear energy countries that are party to one of the liability conventions The reason for this is because the installed capacity required for the CSC to come into effect requires the inclusion of major countries with high installed nuclear capacity Furthermore the participation of these countries is also imperative in making the CSC an effective framework as it would increase access to the amount of funds that may be available in the case of a nuclear accident The robustness of all the existing conventions was considered in great detail in 1999 at an International Symposium in Budapest organized by the OECD and the IAEA on the issue of reform of civil nuclear liability 39 It was noted that the traditional opinion was that the special regime for nuclear liability developed in the 1960s and it represented a fair compromise between the obligation to ensure the protection of the public and the economic and legal interests of the nuclear industry It also noted that this traditional view was now beginning to be questioned to a certain extent and that the issue of reform of nuclear liability was an evolving one 40 In the aftermath of Fukushima the questions challenging this traditional view are increasing and the issue of reform needs to be revisited keeping in mind new and evolving challenges facing the nuclear industry and the public good The Impact of Fukushima on the International Liability Framework The incident at Fukushima has underlined the lack of a reliable universal liability framework reflecting the inability of the international community to achieve a universal harmonized regime 41 Major Japanese industries such as agriculture fishing and tourism were heavily affected by the incident at Fukushima 42 However because the accident occurred on the eastern side of Japan bordering the Pacific Ocean the transboundary impact on other countries has been insubstantial Nevertheless the UN Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation suggests that the full impact may not be known for years 43 At this stage though liability and compensation issues have been limited within the jurisdiction of Japan 44 Japan has not acceded to any of the international nuclear liability conventions but has its own domestic legislation which again does not provide recourse to people affected outside the territory of Japan Had the accident occurred in the western region of Japan it might have caused considerable damage in South Korea The Fukushima nuclear accident emphasizes the need to undertake reforms that are acceptable to more countries With total costs estimated at well over 100 billion 45 the Fukushima accident is also a reminder of the low caps on liability in extant liability laws and the corresponding obligation of the government to pay compensation as well as the potential impact such an incident could have on neighboring countries Many experts now conclude that the need to revisit and revise regulations regarding financial responsibility for nuclear accidents has been clear and compelling for at least a quarter of a century since Chernobyl and has been made overwhelmingly obvious by Fukushima 46 And many now hope that the Fukushima accident will serve as a catalyst for real progress in the nuclear liability regime 47 The IAEA has responded to the accident by emphasizing the need to achieve a global nuclear liability regime In June 2011 the IAEA adopted a Draft Action Plan on Nuclear Safety On the matter of the nuclear liability regime the action plan states Member States to work towards establishing a global nuclear liability regime that addresses the concerns of all States that might be affected by a nuclear accident with a view to providing appropriate compensation for nuclear damage The IAEA International Expert Group on Nuclear Liability INLEX to recommend actions to facilitate achievement of such a global regime Member States to give due consideration to the possibility of joining the international nuclear liability instruments as a step toward achieving such a global regime 48 Responding to the action plan INLEX recommended actions to achieve such a global regime 49 Overall the recommendations advise states to participate in the existing international regimes in order to take advantage of the higher level of flexibility offered by these conventions Repeated requests to states to adhere to the international conventions have however not yielded concrete results Perhaps the approach needs to shift from looking for international consensus on issues of nuclear liability to focusing on how various regions decide to approach nuclear liability For example the EU has called for greater harmonization through involvement of the EU A communication from the European Commission to the European Council and the European Parliament Nuclear Illustrative Program NIP presented under Article 40 of the Euratom Treaty makes clear that because a majority of new EU states follow the Vienna Convention the Commission is seeking to harmonize nuclear liability rules within the Community and that in order to finalize and improve the proposals already made the discussion should focus on developing a harmonized liability scheme and mechanisms to ensure the availability of funds in the event of damage caused by a nuclear accident 50 Further in its July 12 2007 opinion to NIP the European Economic and Social Committee states that for greater acceptability of nuclear power the current system liability insurance of 700 million is inadequate 51 Arguments calling upon further EU involvement through a European Nuclear Liability Directive are also being advanced 52 Regional cooperative structures similar to those advocated by the EU may also prove useful for South Asian countries and countries within the ASEAN region The Impact of the International Conventions on Asia Transboundary Issues The IAEA estimates that Asia may well be the engine of the world s nuclear energy growth The energy requirements of Asian countries are already significant and continue to grow Despite the Fukushima incident the IAEA estimates that the majority of global expansion of nuclear power will be in Asia 53 Because of the potential transboundary impact of nuclear incidents countries within the region must have a clear mechanism for how to react in the event of a Fukushima or Chernobyl type incident Apart from Saudi Arabia the United Arab Emirates the Philippines and Indonesia none of the Asian or Asia Pacific countries that have a significant stake in nuclear energy or are committed to a nuclear energy program are parties to any of the international liability conventions that are in force This position seriously compromises the efficient operation of nuclear power plants in this region In the event of a cross border incident such as Chernobyl avoiding liability would not be difficult Unlike Bangladesh India Indonesia and Malaysia most Asian countries do not have a domestic nuclear liability law and the few such laws that do exist do not address transboundary issues However concerns have been voiced within the South Asia region about nuclear power plants that are sited close to international borders Considering the scale of nuclear power expansion and new plans such issues will only escalate in the future Sri Lanka in 2012 raised serious concerns about India s Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant KNPP Located on the Tamil Nadu coast the plant is 250 kilometers from the island nation which has continually raised safety concerns throughout the construction process Further Bangladesh s proposed nuclear power project which is 50 kilometers aerially from the Indian border may result in India raising concerns about the siting of this project Similarly future nuclear power plants within the ASEAN region could also pose serious concerns for all neighboring countries within the region irrespective of whether such countries are pursuing a nuclear energy program International momentum on framing a universal nuclear liability regime has been slow The reforms following Chernobyl have largely been ineffective For example the 1997 Vienna Protocol has only ten ratifications and the 2004 Paris Protocol has only two Norway and Switzerland Europe which bore the brunt of the Chernobyl disaster still does not have a harmonized liability regime and many countries in Europe continue to adhere only to the original Paris or Vienna Convention The slow progress on transboundary principles of international nuclear liability law should be kept in mind by countries in the ASEAN and South Asia region Early engagement on the issue of international nuclear liability is necessary so that effective regional frameworks can be put in place before more nuclear power plants become operational in these regions The difficulty of a truly international framework such as the CSC or the Vienna Convention is the sheer number of countries and interests involved Regions such as the EU South Asia and Southeast Asia might find that focusing on achieving regional agreements is a more effective way of building a robust liability regime 54 Challenges Faced by Countries in Which the Operator Will Be from a Different Country The situation of liability on a foreign operator is likely to be seen more and more as countries like the United Arab Emirates UAE and Vietnam new entrants to nuclear power come to rely extensively on foreign technology material and expertise None of the international conventions or domestic laws of countries address the possible challenges that such a scenario may raise This evolving issue can already be seen in the UAE On the recommendation of the IAEA the UAE established a Nuclear Energy Program Implementation Organization which in turn established the Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation

    Original URL path: https://www.amacad.org/content/publications/pubContent.aspx?d=1507 (2016-02-13)
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  • Domestic Approaches - American Academy of Arts & Sciences
    Meetings and Events Fellowships Overview Visiting Scholars Program Hellman Fellowship in Science and Technology Policy Policy Fellowship in the Humanities Education and the Arts Policy Fellowship in Global Security and International Affairs The Exploratory Fund Member Login User Name Password Forgot your password Home Nuclear Liability A Key Co Domestic Approaches Nuclear Liability A Key Component of the Public Policy Decision to Deploy Nuclear Energy in Southeast Asia Domestic Approaches Beyond the international and regional conventions several countries with commercial nuclear programs have their own legislative regimes for nuclear liability These countries can be grouped into three categories 1 those that are party to one or both of the international conventions and have their own legislation notably the United Kingdom Germany Sweden and Russia 2 those that are not party to any international convention that is in force but have their own legislation or related measures the United States Canada Japan South Korea India and China and 3 those that are not party to a convention and are without their own legislation The limits of liability vary considerably among jurisdictions with their own legislation For a summary of liability limits provided for by legislation in various countries see Appendix B Apart from India no country grants operators a right to recourse against a supplier unless such a right is contractually agreed to or the nuclear incident is the result of a supplier s act or omission intended to cause such damage India was not the first country to introduce the principle of supplier liability In 1998 Austria passed the Act on Civil Liability for Damages caused by Radioactivity The focus of this act is to protect Austrian citizens consequently it provides for unlimited strict liability Under this law a plaintiff can file a claim against a supplier but the claim

    Original URL path: https://www.amacad.org/content/publications/pubContent.aspx?d=1508 (2016-02-13)
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  • Supplier Community Approach - American Academy of Arts & Sciences
    The Exploratory Fund Member Login User Name Password Forgot your password Home Nuclear Liability A Key Co Supplier Community Approach Nuclear Liability A Key Component of the Public Policy Decision to Deploy Nuclear Energy in Southeast Asia Supplier Community Approach The Nuclear Power Plant Exporters Principles of Conduct is an industry code of conduct and the result of a three year initiative to develop norms of corporate self management in the exportation of nuclear power plants Articulated and consolidated by the world s leading nuclear power plant vendors including AREVA CANDU Mitsubishi GE Hitachi ROSATOM Westinghouse and KEPCO the principles also address civil liability The principles require that before entering into a contract to supply a nuclear power plant to any customer a vendor needs to make an independent judgment that the consumer state has a legal regime providing adequate and prompt compensation in the unlikely event of an accident Further the principles urge that the legal regime should have the following components Contains adequate liability limits and financial protection consistent with current international standards Is backed by customer state guarantees Ensures that claims for compensation by possible victims will be channeled to the operator of the nuclear power plant

    Original URL path: https://www.amacad.org/content/publications/pubContent.aspx?d=1509 (2016-02-13)
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