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  • Foreword - American Academy of Arts & Sciences
    as a valuable commodity capable of being reused as nuclear fuel after appropriate processing The few extant examples of successful siting of civilian nuclear waste repositories such as by the Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company in Sweden clearly point to the critical importance of clarity and transparency in the processes leading to site selection and construction as well as to the central role of willing local participation in these processes These characteristics are key to repository siting that is perceived as fair and that speaks directly to the safety and security fears that inevitably surround any discussion of nuclear technology There is however another key element common to all extant successful siting exercises a prior agreement between all concerned parties about the nature of the repository Is the site intended for retrievable disposition or for permanent storage In the cases of many of the countries that are newcomers to nuclear power a further constraint is the feasibility of repositories both the technical suitability of in country sites for example is the local geology sufficiently well characterized and sufficiently stable to allow for safe disposal and the financial burden of building and maintaining the type of repository the nation desires Newcomers may resolve these problems by partnering with likeminded countries pursuing nuclear power such partnerships can potentially ease the search for suitable geological repositories by enlarging the search area and ease the cost burdens by distributing the fixed costs over a larger user base But critical to these partnerships is a shared vision of the nature of the repository is the spent fuel retrievable or not This requirement has proven problematic in practice In our discussions with stakeholders in a number of newcomer states it has become evident that there is no universal agreement on this point But without agreement it is difficult to imagine a pathway toward multilateral nuclear repository storage With this conundrum in mind and acknowledging the increasing urgency of dealing with used fuel storage especially in certain legacy nations where little progress has been made in dealing with the nuclear waste currently accumulating at reactor sites Stephen Goldberg James Malone and I developed a concept for internationally supervised consolidated interim storage 1 The fundamental idea was to get past the obstacle of making a choice about the nature of the repository by moving used fuel from the cooling pools located in the vicinity of the reactors to a consolidated dry cask storage facility as soon as practicable This facility would be operated under international supervision would be located in a willing partner state according to the multilateral interim storage agreement and ownership of the used fuel would remain with the states that produced it Thus the used fuel could be stored safely and securely for tens of decades and could be in principal retrievable Moreover there would not be a need for the partner states to agree on the economic value of the used fuel and by actively seeking partners that include both newcomers and

    Original URL path: https://www.amacad.org/content/publications/pubContent.aspx?d=21695 (2016-02-13)
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  • Back-End of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Governance and Liability - American Academy of Arts & Sciences
    and transportation infrastructure and allows for the postponement of decisions regarding reprocessing Both the customer state s public and the international public will see this facility as an internationally certified safe and secure path for nuclear waste This concept allows technological developments to blossom without forcing anyone s hand about making potentially irreversible decisions in the here and now Although the IAEA cannot mandate it the multilateral arrangement itself can require that certain parameters be met by a state in order to participate as customers in the storage facility agreement Such parameters should be identical to the requirements for the host state mentioned above First and foremost the customer needs to be in good standing with the NPT and its international safeguards agreement 16 In addition all international guidelines for nuclear safety and security need to be followed by the state namely the IAEA safety standards for radioactive waste management 17 If not already a member the customer should also consider joining the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management 18 Another major requirement for customer states needs to be an assurance to the host state that there is a final disposal plan in place for the used fuel upon its return to the customer Even if the fuel is recycled a plan must still be in place for the resulting radioactive waste This interim storage facility must not serve as a de facto disposal facility or a mechanism for states to delay dealing with the used fuel problem Customer states can ensure that there is a permanent disposal plan in place by embracing the necessary laws regulations and procedures for selecting siting and constructing a radioactive waste repository Although this does not guarantee that a repository will be open by the time the used fuel is returned to the customer it does put in place an obligation to do so thus pressure from the host state and international community will keep the customer accountable The differing needs and issues of customer states should also be considered on a regional basis For example Asian legacy fuel holders such as Japan and South Korea have a very different perspective than European legacy holders 19 and the ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations newcomer states have a very different view of the nuclear order than newcomer states in the Middle East and Africa MENA 20 While the framework of the multilateral arrangement should be beneficial to all customers the terms used to attract customer states can be tailored to states particular interests ASEAN newcomer states are each looking to build a relatively small number of reactors and are thus interested in consolidating used fuel storage in the region On the other hand MENA states may be more interested in multilateral storage to reduce proliferation risk Legacy Holders Legacy holders are states with existing nuclear energy programs that already have an inventory of used fuel in interim pool and dry storage With the exception of the few states that have sited permanent disposal repositories such as Norway and Sweden or that already reprocess their fuel France the majority of nuclear power states have a build up of used fuel Most of this fuel is stored on site at nuclear power plants either in pools or in dry storage if the pools are nearing capacity Many states are waiting for the large nuclear power states such as the United States to go through the process of disposing of used fuel before they venture down this complex path Some states may also be allowing time for a more proliferation resistant recycling technology to be developed There are also states that have yet to make a firm decision or policy on the issue of used fuel For these reasons a multilateral interim storage facility is attractive to states that are having difficulty disposing of used fuel or waiting for better options As the first customers of the multilateral interim storage facility legacy states which need the storage facility more urgently than newcomer states will provide the funding to build the facility The organization of the operating entity will need to appeal to legacy states in order to attract them as the first customers Further the legacy states existing relations with the host state must not be a deterrent Legacy states are concerned about the integrity safety and security of the used fuel being stored in another state The host needs to ensure that the used fuel is stored in a manner so that it can later be returned to the customer Legacy states also have existing export control laws that need to be considered when transferring nuclear material and technical information about the material Some states require a bilateral nuclear agreement the negotiation of which may depend on the good standing of the host state within the nonproliferation regime All major nuclear power states are members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and model their export control laws accordingly Most important the host state needs to assure its customers that their used fuel will not be used for a nuclear weapons program Newcomer States States currently constructing planning or exploring their first nuclear power plants are newcomers to the nuclear industry Although not in immediate need of storage solutions these states are nonetheless interested in assured back end services for their future used fuel Many of these states have limited expertise in nuclear technology and will only construct a small number of nuclear reactors Multilateral back end services are attractive in that the newcomer state will not need to further develop interim storage Used fuel storage has become a major nuclear issue in many legacy states but assured back end services would alleviate these concerns for newcomer states Therefore newcomer states are most concerned about the guarantee of back end services if they do not develop back end technology themselves For example what happens when a state develops a nuclear energy program with the plan to store used fuel at a multilateral storage facility but when it comes time to store the fuel the facility is full or shut down This would present a major problem to a state that does not have the nuclear R D program or technology to develop the back end of the fuel cycle How can the host state and operating entity ensure that back end services will be there when newcomer states start unloading used fuel The contract must therefore have provisions that allow for agreed to storage capacities that are legally enforceable under international trade laws so that the performance obligation belongs to the host state Newcomer states will also have the same safety and security concerns for their used fuel as legacy states Moreover they will likely need assistance with transporting the fuel to the facility Ownership during the transportation phase is discussed more in later sections Finally newcomers will need to have a plan in place for the used fuel once it is returned after the duration of the storage agreement International Community The international community is a major stakeholder in this concept and includes all states and organizations that are involved in the nonproliferation regime and nuclear industry The international community is interested in multilateral storage facilities in order to mitigate the safety concerns and the risk of proliferation from the back end of the fuel cycle By providing back end services it is less likely that a state will pursue current reprocessing technology to reuse the material in the fuel 21 At the same time multinational back end services encourage the growth of nuclear power especially for newcomer states that are concerned about used fuel disposal The growth of nuclear energy is favorable for nuclear supplier states As the leading international organization for nuclear technology and the nonproliferation regime and also as a supporter of international fuel cycle services both front end and back end the IAEA has taken particular interest in this venture As mentioned previously the international treaty on the safety of spent fuel and radioactive waste management produced by the IAEA in 1997 requires that any national or multinational facility meet the highest national and international standards The convention affirms the importance of bilateral and multilateral mechanisms to enhance the safety of radioactive waste and spent fuel management and also in assisting less developed nations with the obligations of the convention 22 Although multilateral and regional facilities have been mentioned in past meetings of the convention 23 the summary of the most recent meeting in 2012 states that the long term management of spent fuel and high level radioactive waste remains a challenging and difficult topic with considerable areas for improvement and that it must be taken into account from the very beginning of any nuclear activities such as in expanding nuclear power programmes 24 The IAEA should take some part in the formation and management of the interim storage facility and governing entity The IAEA will also be responsible for supervising the implementation of safeguards for the used fuel at the facility The material at the storage facility and that used in the R D program will be eligible for international safeguards measures and inspections according to the safeguards agreements of both the host state and the customers Although the fuel will remain under the ownership of the customer its location in the host state will complicate international safeguards obligations Other international organizations that may be stakeholders in back end fuel cycle services include regional nuclear and nonnuclear organizations such as the Brazilian Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials ABACC the European Atomic Energy Community EURATOM and the Arab Atomic Energy Agency AAEA Other international organizations may also be consulted the World Institute for Nuclear Security WINS for security considerations the Nuclear Suppliers Group NSG for export control guidelines and the World Association of Nuclear Operators WANO for safety best practices Structure of the Facilitating Entity Once the host state is identified the actual entity that will manage the facility should be formed The structure of this entity may be state owned and run a federal corporation a commercial corporation or an international consortium Each type of organization presents different advantages and disadvantages in governing and operating the facility In order for a multilateral fuel storage facility to be a success the facilitating entity must be able to do the following effectively Attract and negotiate with customer states Assist in forming the necessary bilateral and or multilateral agreements between the host state and customer states Have the technical expertise to manage the transportation transfer and storage of used fuel Be independently regulated by national or international authorities Have open communication and a working relationship with the host state Have the ability to operate protective security forces Accept international safeguards on nuclear material Make decisions quickly in response to safety or security issues Remain transparent credible and accountable Maintain operational stability even in times of national regional or global instability and Accept input from members customers and the international community The degree of implementing authority that this entity has is crucial to the success of the facility especially when safety or security concerns arise An organization that is too bureaucratic or has too many stakeholders with authority cannot make and implement decisions in a timely or effective manner An international consortium could be designed to ensure that all members have input and influence while still being structured to enable quick and effective decision making The facilitating entity can have a board of directors in which representatives of the regional and international community are present In addition the IAEA and or regional nuclear authority need to have a seat at the table in order to ensure that the highest standard of safety and security guidelines are followed The entity needs to be transparent credible and have political authority While a state owned and run facility is a possibility past experience has shown that existing government organizations are not necessarily the most effective at managing used fuel storage This was yet another lesson learned from the BRC which recommends that a new organization be formed separate from the DOE to implement the waste management program Further this should be a federal organization with the sole purpose of waste management to provide the stability focus and credibility and possess a substantial degree of implementing authority and assured access to funds Finally the organization needs rigorous financial technical and regulatory oversight by the appropriate government agencies 25 When considering the structure of the facilitating entity and associated customer contracts existing international fuel cycle arrangements can be consulted for best practices For example France reprocesses fuel from other countries and then sends the material MOX 26 and radioactive waste back to the customer Russia provides fuel leasing services to other countries wherein Russia remains the owner of the fuel These arrangements are further discussed in the supplementary secion Case Studies of International Fuel Conditioning and Fuel Leasing Arrangements In the case of an international storage facility oversight may be provided by an existing international organization such as the IAEA or by a newly formed international or regional organization The host state s existing independent nuclear regulator should provide safety and security regulation and oversight The differences between laws governing federal and commercial corporations vary from state to state and should be taken into account when forming this entity The ownership of the entity will impact its ability to implement and make decisions and also its ability to attract customer states There must be confidence in the facilitating entity for customer states to trust the host with used fuel storage for a significant period of time The long timeline for this facility one storage agreement can last for up to about one hundred years also introduces the issue of regional stability especially considering how often borders have changed in the past century For example Slovenia s current capital Ljubljana has politically been part of seven different countries in just the last century Revolutions and coups d état are now occurring in states around the world Civil wars and regional tensions in the future can have a significant impact on the safety and security of a storage facility This may increase the importance of an independent governing entity and oversight by an international authority A multilateral arrangement can protect the facility against political situations in a customer or host state thus the facility oversight should not belong to a single state While the host state may be the sole or main owner of the facility oversight and additional stakeholders should include other nations companies and international organizations Procedures implemented by a multinational or international entity need to be formally established in case the facility location is compromised by changing borders war natural disaster or other causes Stages of Governance during the Storage Facility Operation Transportation to and from the Storage Site The storage of used fuel in a multilateral facility begins with the transfer of that fuel from the customer to the facility in the host state Agreements need to outline which party will be responsible for the transportation of the fuel at which phases including loading the fuel into transportation casks from pool or dry storage This endeavor is complicated and involves technology that a newcomer state or a state with a small nuclear program may not possess Therefore the host entity should assist with or completely handle transportation of the used fuel to the storage site The multilateral storage facility is only economical if all of the costs of the infrastructure for transportation are spread among the participants Transportation regulations for radioactive material in the customer state host state and any states within the travel path must be taken into account Although nuclear material has been transported internationally for many decades there may still be significant hold up and delays in processing radioactive material at border crossings The IAEA publishes many international safety regulations for the transportation of nuclear material 27 If not done already the integrity of all transportation routes needs to be inspected according to national regulations Some countries and locales also maintain a nuclear free zone which depending on the specific legislation may or may not apply to the transportation of high level radioactive materials Piracy in international waters must also be considered a risk for the transportation of used fuel If not already in place the host state will need to establish sound infrastructure for accepting and transporting used fuel at ports and through borders on roadways and railroads These same considerations must be taken into account when transporting the used fuel offsite either to a disposal or recycling facility or back to the customer Governance at the Storage Facility The question of who owns the used fuel when it is stored at the multilateral facility is important In this storage concept proposal the customer maintains ownership of the fuel and the host state returns the fuel at the end of the storage agreement However the host entity manages the fuel in the facility and therefore is liable for the safety and security of the material which is discussed later in this chapter The main concern here is how much input the customers and the international community have in the management of the used fuel onsite The character and extent of customer involvement will be outlined by the nature of the host entity and the contracts to which the participants agree Ownership and Liability at the End of the Storage Agreement Since this proposal involves a multilateral interim storage not disposal or repository facility used fuel storage agreements will be for a finite time period after which the used fuel is sent back to the customer state who must have the means to deal with it domestically A major fear is that states will use the multilateral storage facility as a cop out and will not take steps to ensure that they can dispose of or recycle the used fuel once

    Original URL path: https://www.amacad.org/content/publications/pubContent.aspx?d=21697 (2016-02-13)
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  • The Consent-Based Approach for Site Selection - American Academy of Arts & Sciences
    In 2013 at the request of the community feasibility studies were conducted for eight of the twenty one interested communities Moving forward from the present communities with confirmed suitable sites will decide whether they are willing to accept the project and the NWMO will enter into a formal agreement with the preferred host Furthermore regulatory authorities will review the safety of the project through a public process After the successful construction and operation of a demonstration facility construction and operation of the repository will begin in continuing partnership with the host community 33 The following guiding principles of the project also exemplify that this is a consent based and transparent site selection process Safety security and protection of people and the environment are first and foremost The host community must be informed and willing to accept the project Communities will only be considered for this project if they willingly enter the process Communities that decide to participate have the right to end their involvement at any point up to and until a final agreement is signed The host community has a right to benefit from the project The questions and concerns of surrounding communities and those on the transportation route must be addressed The NWMO will involve all potentially affected provincial governments The siting process will respect Aboriginal rights and treaties and will take into account unresolved claims between Aboriginal peoples and the Crown 34 Used Fuel Management in Sweden and Finland Used fuel management strategies in Sweden and Finland can also provide some lessons learned for the consent based approach in siting a used fuel repository The Swedish nuclear utility SKB began its final disposal process by sending letters to municipalities across the nation asking them to voluntarily apply to host a repository Two communities agreed to participate in

    Original URL path: https://www.amacad.org/content/publications/pubContent.aspx?d=21698 (2016-02-13)
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  • Used-Fuel R&D Program - American Academy of Arts & Sciences
    Scholars Program Hellman Fellowship in Science and Technology Policy Policy Fellowship in the Humanities Education and the Arts Policy Fellowship in Global Security and International Affairs The Exploratory Fund Member Login User Name Password Forgot your password Home The Back End of the Nuclea Used Fuel R D Program The Back End of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle Establishing a Viable Roadmap for a Multilateral Interim Storage Facility Used Fuel R D Program The opportunity to host a back end R D program is part of the benefits package to attract states to become hosts of the multilateral storage facility The purpose of the R D program will be to research storage integrity and recycling techniques that have less of a proliferation risk than current practices Funding for this program will be derived from customer storage fees and customers may allow for the use of their fuel for R D activities These research activities may include but are not limited to the design and development of enhanced Used fuel storage containers and their integrity over time Containers for the final disposal of used fuel and radioactive waste Transportation of used fuel storage containers Safeguards techniques for used fuel in dry storage

    Original URL path: https://www.amacad.org/content/publications/pubContent.aspx?d=21699 (2016-02-13)
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  • Case Studies of International Fuel-Conditioning and Fuel-Leasing Arrangements - American Academy of Arts & Sciences
    build indigenous fuel cycle capabilities and because the suppliers can benefit economically Some arrangements allow customers to completely avoid the issue of dealing with used fuel in country which is especially attractive to states with small nuclear power programs The downside of these arrangements is energy security customers must usually depend on only one supplier International Used Fuel Recycling in France International back end fuel cycle services already exist in the form of used fuel reprocessing A prime example is the service provided by France to reprocess used fuel from other countries and return it as MOX mixed uranium oxide plutonium oxide fuel and vitrified waste France has reprocessed fuel from The Netherlands Belgium Switzerland Japan and Germany The structure of the agreements between France customer states and the IAEA can be used as an example for multilateral arrangements for interim used fuel storage When France enters into an agreement with another state to treat its used fuel a date by which the waste must be returned to the customer state is agreed upon The customer owns the material through the entire process This is not uncommon in the nuclear industry for example nuclear power plant utilities in the United States purchase uranium and then send it to various facilities owned by different companies for enrichment and fuel fabrication though the utilities maintain ownership of the material throughout the processes The international safeguards agreement between France and the IAEA also outlines the provisions for safeguarding nuclear material that belongs to nonnuclear weapons states while it resides in France This material is subject to safeguards measures and inspections and France must declare all material received from and sent to other states The location of this material while in France must also be declared 37 When designing a safeguards approach for the

    Original URL path: https://www.amacad.org/content/publications/pubContent.aspx?d=21700 (2016-02-13)
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  • Back-End Governance and Liability Business Plan - American Academy of Arts & Sciences
    years could very well outlive the corporations that entered into the agreement Should an event occur that results in harm to individuals or the environment after a signatory corporation ceases to exist there must be a way to determine liability for the event Establishing an insurance pool is one method to provide the financial means to protect against a future event Conducting an analysis of possible event scenarios will help insurance experts assign probabilities to and make estimates of the liabilities associated with these events The appropriate funding level for the insurance pool can be determined based on the results of such analysis Resolution of the long term liability issue is likely to be a precondition for current owners of used fuel to agree to store fuel at the regional facility Establishing the insurance pool requires a relatively complete facility design and the facility design and operating procedures will provide the framework for insurance policies In addition the facility design and operating procedures will support advance contracting for the holders of legacy fuel who critically will be the first to sign contracts for transportation and storage The commercial storage contract for legacy fuel owners will require advance payments totaling 100 million to 300 million in aggregate The regional authority will use this income for completing the construction and licensing of the facility The advance payments from legacy fuel owners will also serve to provide confidence in the project for international financial institutions who may also invest in the facility The incentives package model for the host country must be in place before an agreement can be reached and the details of the package can be negotiated with each country that expresses interest in hosting a facility The incentives package can include infrastructure improvements such as rail and road facilities harbor improvements water purification systems upgraded electrical distribution and other needs for operation of the storage facility The infrastructure improvements are anticipated to cost approximately 230 million This amount can be amortized over the first ten years of operation Based on the cost of the infrastructure improvements the storage fee should be set at 0 0006 per kilowatt hour of electricity generated by the fuel However the incentives should not be limited to the needs of the facility If necessary additional incentives can be offered to induce a country to host the facility These incentives may include a personnel training center that provides a broad range of training subjects many of which can be applied to other enterprises in the host country A materials research facility could be established to support the used fuel storage facility a potential disposal facility and other businesses Conducting research on a disposal facility would not commit the host country to also hosting the disposal site though it would not rule it out either Partnerships with universities recognized for their excellence in research would also serve the facility and host country as a whole The incentives could also address needs that are particular to a certain country For example a water desalination facility could appeal to coastal countries The possibilities are quite broad and should be the subject of detailed research with the stated goal of providing facilities that will benefit the host country in a variety of ways over the long term Because construction of these benefits facilities will require significant cash which will ultimately come from income related to operation of the interim storage facility the incentives must be carefully considered Preparing an incentives package that also highlights the safety and soundness of the business and nonproliferation guidelines will bring comfort to potential lenders A compelling presentation illustrating the cash flow model will help convince the financial community that the project will be self sustaining over the long run and will increase the likelihood that investors will front the money for the host country s infrastructure improvements The business entity should strive to pay back any loans as quickly as possible This will inspire further confidence in the financial community and perhaps assist in future financing negotiations Business Plan Phase Three Phase three of the plan primarily concerns implementation Infrastructure and relationships from prior phases must be in place before the implementation phase can begin Not least among these is the regulatory agency for the host country which must be up and running and have already approved construction of the facility The composition of the regulatory body should also be a subject of discussion There may be a temptation to employ a regional regulatory body however this concept is not workable The host country must have an independent regulatory authority The construction for the used fuel storage facility will provide storage for 10 000 MTU metric tons of uranium According to the World Nuclear Association s 2013 market report about 11 000 MTU are discharged annually from the world s nuclear power reactors 1 There are economies of scale related to the size of the facility and advantages related to being able to store approximately two hundred and fifty reloads Currently licensed technology is capable of storing thirty seven pressurized water reactor or eighty seven boiling water reactor used fuel assemblies 2 The thirty seven pressurized water reactor fuel assemblies have a uranium mass of about 17 MTU the eighty seven boiling water reactor fuel assemblies have a uranium mass of about 15 MTU The IAEA has reported that the Republic of Korea in 2006 held a used fuel inventory of 7 286 MTU This inventory has since grown and South Korea may now be considered a legacy fuel holder candidate In the same period Japan held 13 000 MTU of used fuel 3 Due to the disaster at Fukushima Daiichi Japan may have an additional incentive to store legacy fuel at an alternative regional facility There are practical limits to the amount of used fuel that can be held at a regional storage facility The shipping capacity is a significant limiting factor The ability to unload the used fuel canisters from the ship

    Original URL path: https://www.amacad.org/content/publications/pubContent.aspx?d=21701 (2016-02-13)
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  • Summary of Costs Related to Establishing and Operating a Regional Spent-Fuel Storage Facility - American Academy of Arts & Sciences
    and the Public Good Publications Overview Dædalus Journal of the Academy Bulletin Magazine of the Academy Books Research Papers Monographs and Project Publications Meetings Overview Induction 2015 Upcoming Meetings and Events Friday Forum 2015 2016 Schedule Past Meetings and Events Fellowships Overview Visiting Scholars Program Hellman Fellowship in Science and Technology Policy Policy Fellowship in the Humanities Education and the Arts Policy Fellowship in Global Security and International Affairs The Exploratory Fund Member Login User Name Password Forgot your password Home The Back End of the Nuclea Summary of Costs Related to The Back End of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle Establishing a Viable Roadmap for a Multilateral Interim Storage Facility Summary of Costs Related to Establishing and Operating a Regional Spent Fuel Storage Facility Initial Expenses Infrastructure Improvements Harbor including Docks 20 000 000 Cranes 20 000 000 Rail Head Facility 20 000 000 Road Improvements 20 000 000 Rails and Roadbed 150 000 000 Infrastructure Total 230 000 000 Storage Facility Expenses Transport Overpacks 80 000 000 Facility Design 1 000 000 Building Construction 10 000 000 Transfer System 5 000 000 Equipment 5 000 000 Initial Storage Pad 10 000 000 Storage Facility Expense Total 111 000 000

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  • Annual Estimated Expense and Revenue Summary - American Academy of Arts & Sciences
    and International Affairs The Exploratory Fund Member Login User Name Password Forgot your password Home The Back End of the Nuclea Annual Estimated Expense an The Back End of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle Establishing a Viable Roadmap for a Multilateral Interim Storage Facility Annual Estimated Expense and Revenue Summary Year Expense Revenue Net Capital Operations Maintenance O M Acceptance Storage 0 94 000 6 670 130 560 0 29 890 1 63 000 63 664 130 560 0 3 896 2 23 000 63 664 130 560 0 43 896 3 23 000 63 664 130 560 0 43 896 4 33 000 63 664 130 560 0 33 896 5 23 000 63 664 130 560 1 000 44 896 6 23 000 63 664 130 560 2 000 45 896 7 23 000 63 664 130 560 3 000 46 896 8 23 000 63 664 130 560 4 000 47 896 9 33 000 63 664 130 560 5 000 38 896 10 63 664 130 560 6 000 72 896 11 63 664 130 560 7 000 73 896 12 63 664 130 560 8 000 74 896 13 63 664 130 560 9 000 75 896 14 63 664 130 560 10 000 76 896 15 20 000 130 560 11 000 121 560 16 20 000 130 560 12 000 122 560 17 20 000 130 560 13 000 123 560 18 20 000 130 560 14 000 124 560 19 20 000 130 560 15 000 125 560 20 20 000 130 560 16 000 126 560 Notes on Expense and Revenue Summary Initial capital expense includes one pad equipment transfer system building construction facility design ten transport overpacks and 10 percent of the infrastructure cost Year 1 capital expense includes ten transport

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