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  • Summary: FATF's June 2015 Best Practices Paper
    BPP explains adding that not all NPOs should be subject to the same measures According to the Interpretive Note to Recommendation 8 a successful approach is flexible multi faceted and four pronged including outreach proportionate risk based supervision and monitoring effective investigation and information gathering and effective mechanisms for international cooperation Countries should ensure that any response is proportionate to the TF risk posed The BPP reminds countries that measures already established to mitigate risks from other illicit financial activity may sufficiently address the current TF risk to the sector while additional or different measures may need to be considered when existing measures are found inappropriate to mitigate the risk or as the TF risk to the sector evolves and changes over time Here the BPP again reminds countries that measures implemented need to be proportionate to the risks identified avoiding those that disproportionately burden NPOs with little or no TF risk because not all NPOs face high terrorist financing risks and many NPOs face little or no such risk the sector has an extremely large number of very diverse entities and a one size fits all approach is not effective in combatting terrorist abuse of NPOs and is more likely to disrupt or discourage legitimate charitable activities Examples of measures that may not be appropriate for NPOs facing little or no risk include detailed registration procedures additional reporting requirements requirement of appointing a designated staff person responsible for CT compliance and an external audit of the organization Outreach to the Sector The BPP reminds countries that they are required by Recommendation 8 to conduct outreach to the NPO sector on TF issues All stakeholders including governmental and non governmental actors law enforcement and NPO regulators can be involved in developing outreach and education about the specific risks facing the NPO sector and provide good examples of mitigation measures Ideally the outreach would be a two way ongoing dialogue between governments and NPOs Advantages of this approach include obtaining useful information about specific needs concerns vulnerabilities risks and challenges that can form the basis of more effective policies issues flagged can help countries prevent or disrupt high risk activities before they escalate more effective implementation of mitigation measures will give NPOs a better understanding of their risks and learning how to conduct more effective outreach and engage in more constructive dialogue with the sector Supervision or Monitoring of NPOs The Interpretive Note also requires countries to take steps to promote effective supervision or monitoring of the NPO sector The BPP warns countries against applying the same measures to all NPOs Instead countries may implement measures that are commensurate with the risk identified through a domestic review of the NPO sector and an understanding of the TF risks facing the sector Specifically countries should apply the measures set out in sub paragraphs 5 b i to 5 b vii of the Interpretive Note to Recommendation 8 to address the NPOs that both fall within FATF s definition of an NPO and face the greatest risk of TF abuse Measures that could be applied in these situations include requirements for an organization to be licensed or registered although countries are not required to impose specific licensing or registration requirements for CT financing purposes maintain information on their activities and those who own control or direct their activities issue annual financial statements have controls in place to ensure that funds are fully accounted for and spent in a manner consistent with the NPO s stated activities follow a know you beneficiaries and associate NPOs rule keep records and be subject to monitoring by the appropriate authorities There are several advantages to properly implementing these supervision and monitoring requirements the BPP notes including avoidance of over regulation on the sector the ability to change regulatory investigative or outreach response as NPOs change over time helping mitigate risks by leveraging off transparency good governance and or self regulatory initiatives already implemented by NPOs better allocation of limited supervisory resources by taking steps that are commensurate and adopting different approaches to supervision and monitoring based on a range of factors There is no single correct approach to ensuring effective oversight of the sector the BPP adds Effective Investigation and Information Gathering Countries should ensure effective cooperation coordination and information sharing to the extent possible between all relevant agencies and organizations They should have investigative expertise and the capability to examine those NPOs that are suspected of being exploited by or actively supporting terrorist organizations In addition all NPOs falling within the FATF definition and deemed to be at a higher risk of TF abuse should have available some financial and programmatic information in the event that an investigation into possible terrorist abuse becomes necessary Mechanisms for information sharing are important when a country suspects that a particular NPO is being abused by terrorists they should promptly share any relevant information with appropriate authorities so that preventive or investigative action can be taken While information provided by NPOs to government agencies is important in promoting transparency the use of national security or intelligence based information gathering is important in those specific cases where organizations rely on deception to mislead donors and other NPOs for terrorist financing purposes Information from criminal investigations can provide authorities with a better understanding and context of the TF risk environment surrounding NPOs In some cases administrative measures and targeted financial sanctions may be necessary to protect the NPO sector from abuse The paper explains that a collaborative inter agency approach to detection of abuse and risk can ensure that investigative actions by one agency don t conflict with or jeopardize actions by another group Effective Capacity to Respond to International Requests for Information about an NPO of Concern The BPP concludes this section by noting that countries should be ready for international requests for information regarding a suspect NPO by identifying appropriate points of contact and procedures to respond to these requests Actions NPOs Can Take To Protect Against TF Abuse This

    Original URL path: http://www.charityandsecurity.org/print/1318 (2016-02-16)
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  • Report: The Impact of FATF Recommendation 8 on Civil Society in Europe and Asia
    ICNL and other groups have documented the introduction of repressive laws in more than 50 countries Many of these new laws are enacted as counterterrorism measures which provide a justification for less democratic and repressive governments to introduce restrictive laws and regulatory environments for CSOs the report states These laws advance the hypothesis that non profit organisations are particularly vulnerable to abuse or exploitation by terrorist groups which leads states to enact strict laws to combat this threat The obvious danger in encouraging less democratic and repressive states to adopt new civil society laws and non profit regulations in the name of counter terrorism is that it encourages such regimes to adopt wide ranging laws that restrict the legitimate activities or political space of CSOs when transposing the requirements the report notes The report found that the mutual evaluations of R8 in the countries studied have had a significant impact Fifteen of the 17 countries examined for the report adopted legislative amendments to their NPO regulatory frameworks or proposed new legislation following or in anticipation of their evaluations The report concluded among other things that Recommendation 8 is a vehicle for NPO regulation evaluators are influence by lack of regulation rather than risk assessment and there is a restrictive impact on the political space of NPOs Of particular concern is the finding that where states did undertake a risk assessment and concluded that their NPO sectors face a minimal risk the evaluators still called upon those countries to introduce new NPO regulations In addition while R8 is supposed to be limited to a small subset of a country s nonprofit sector i e excluding small and informal organizations advocacy groups and many others in practice these states did not their regulation or supervision to this subset This overbroad regulatory approach

    Original URL path: http://www.charityandsecurity.org/print/1338 (2016-02-16)
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  • Send by email | Charity & Security Network
    case sensitive Switch to audio verification Home page Issues Humanitarian Access Material Support Financial Action Task Force FATF Financial Access Peacebuilding Countering Violent Extremism Click Here For More Issues Solutions Principles to Guide Solutions Models to Draw On Proposed Solutions News The latest headlines Resources Litigation Analysis Background Legislation Studies Reports Experts Blog About Us Staff Contact Search form Search Stay Up To Date Subscribe Publications The Latest News C

    Original URL path: http://www.charityandsecurity.org/printmail/1338 (2016-02-16)
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  • Report: Repressive Regimes Use Anti-Terrorist Financing Measures to Suppress Civil Society
    countries that sets anti terrorist financing and anti money laundering standards used by 180 countries After examining the effects of FATF regulations in nearly 160 countries including the U S Transnational Institute and Statewatch found FATF rules are being used by governments as an instrument to further cut back on the space of civil society freedom to access and distribute financial resources for development conflict resolution and human rights work Paraguay for example was tagged by the FATF in the mid 2000s as being non compliant with FATF standards Its response was to pass the Anti Terrorist Law of 2010 which did not clearly define what constitutes terrorism and included acts such as dangerous interventions or obstacles on public roadways noise pollution and other actions which intimidate Paraguayan citizens With sentences up to 15 years for some offenses the law is widely seen as a mechanism to suppress protest and limit the capacity of nonprofits The report also links the FATF regime to the overly broad terrorist blacklisting and asset freezing regime used by the U S and UN an increase in government surveillance of nonprofits around the world and the prosecution of nonprofits for material support of terrorism The

    Original URL path: http://www.charityandsecurity.org/print/798 (2016-02-16)
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  • Send by email | Charity & Security Network
    sensitive Switch to audio verification Home page Issues Humanitarian Access Material Support Financial Action Task Force FATF Financial Access Peacebuilding Countering Violent Extremism Click Here For More Issues Solutions Principles to Guide Solutions Models to Draw On Proposed Solutions News The latest headlines Resources Litigation Analysis Background Legislation Studies Reports Experts Blog About Us Staff Contact Search form Search Stay Up To Date Subscribe Publications The Latest News C SN

    Original URL path: http://www.charityandsecurity.org/printmail/798 (2016-02-16)
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  • Study: FATF Doesn't Do Enough to Evaluate Effectiveness, Monitor Potential Harms
    ratings The report found that despite improvements in FATF s standards and methodology for evaluation a focus on program effectiveness and outcome effectiveness was still lacking In particular the study notes a lack of clear evidence that FATF s policy recommendations actually lead to its goals of reducing terrorist financing and little to no cost benefit analysis has been done to identify potential harms created by the recommendations The FATF system has proceeded as if it only produces public and private goods said the study but there needs to be more acknowledgement of the actual and potential financial costs of recommendations their potential abuse by authoritarian regimes as well as potential negative impacts on NGOs and parts of civil society The study goes on to offer three specific ways that FATF s recommendations can harm civil society Registration and reporting requirements for civil society groups will increase the intrusion of state monitoring and thereby control their affairs Administrative and financial costs created by regulatory compliance can threaten the survival of small associations In Islamic societies controls intended to restrict the financing of terrorism can deprive societies of locally delivered charitable activities that help the local society These impacts on civil

    Original URL path: http://www.charityandsecurity.org/print/1189 (2016-02-16)
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  • Send by email | Charity & Security Network
    sensitive Switch to audio verification Home page Issues Humanitarian Access Material Support Financial Action Task Force FATF Financial Access Peacebuilding Countering Violent Extremism Click Here For More Issues Solutions Principles to Guide Solutions Models to Draw On Proposed Solutions News The latest headlines Resources Litigation Analysis Background Legislation Studies Reports Experts Blog About Us Staff Contact Search form Search Stay Up To Date Subscribe Publications The Latest News C SN

    Original URL path: http://www.charityandsecurity.org/printmail/1189 (2016-02-16)
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  • Charity & Security Network, Human Security Collective Send Recommendations to Financial Action Task Force
    Working Group on FATF which CSN and the Human Security Collective co chairs in addition to meetings with FATF representatives a literature review and a survey of the nonprofit sector The specific recommendations made to FATF state 1 FATF should distinguish between potential risk and actual abuse Research shows that money or goods from nonprofit organizations make up a miniscule portion of overall terrorist financing Yet FATF argues they are particularly vulnerable FATF should utilize available research on the prevalence of abuse to ensure any measures are proportional to the actual threat 2 Typologies should be based on analysis of evidence that classifies clusters of similar cases FATF should use concrete data rather than isolated case studies when crafting their typologies By focusing on trends FATF can craft nuanced typologies that more accurately reflect on the ground realities 3 A variety of strategies are needed to address a variety of types of abuse A one size fits all approach to countering terrorist financing is ineffective and can negatively impact civil society groups Of the few nonprofits that have been found to be funneling money to terrorist groups a majority were front organizations that served no charitable purpose Fewer organizations had funds diverted to terrorists through fraud by a bad actor These and other distinctions should be kept in mind when formulating typologies 4 Typologies should recognize the diverse structures and functions of NPOs Many nonprofit organizations are not engaged in international funds transfers and do not work in conflict zones where terrorist groups are present These organizations effectively pose no risk and typologies should recognize this fact 5 FATF should avoid an overbroad definition of terrorist financing Activities covered by the fundamental freedoms of speech and association should never be included in typologies or FATF s recommendations The definition of

    Original URL path: http://www.charityandsecurity.org/print/1204 (2016-02-16)
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