archive-org.com » ORG » G » GEPR.ORG

Total: 971

Choose link from "Titles, links and description words view":

Or switch to "Titles and links view".
  • Three Proposals to Avoid a Solar Bubble. : Global Energy Policy Research
    the market in China This should be interpreted as rapidly declining international competitiveness Therefore the Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry stresses the downstream field of system integration SI as the means of survival for Japanese companies SI involves designing systems procurement of modules and inverters or the generation of power Companies such as Sharp have begun to expand from upstream to downstream operations However because PV is more expensive than traditional power sources no matter how far Japanese companies expand their SI operations domestically it will only result in an increased financial burden on citizens through the FIT Consequently though it is important for Japanese companies to earn profits overseas going forward their entry into the market was too late and their international competitiveness is low at this point in time When one looks at the top 15 ranking of the latest global rankings of PV SI businesses according to IMS Research not a single one is a Japanese company First Solar ranked third in the world in cell production in 2010 is ranked seventh in SI SunEdison ranked fifth in SI operations has already announced plans for a mega solar project in Japan When viewed from an international perspective the SI business model in which profits are earned by procuring inexpensive components and providing maintenance management services or power generation is a field to which Japanese companies are not good at in the first place It will be no simple matter for Japanese companies to focus on overseas expansion and produce profits 4 The high purchase price will lead to a bubble and ultimately fail The large scale introduction of PV caused by the FIT gave manufacturers in China and Taiwan an opportunity to enter the market The reduction in prices of PV panels that this caused was a desirable effect However the creation of a market via policy went too far and brought about a PV bubble According to Chapter 4 of the IEA s Policy Considerations for Deploying Renewables 2011 among other sources the causes of the PV bubble were 1 short lead time 2 limited price monitoring by government agencies and 3 excessively high purchase prices For PV the amount of time necessary from planning to beginning operations is much shorter than other forms of renewable energy at approximately two months for rooftop units and approximately one year for ground based units such as mega solar In European countries policymakers were unaware of an appropriate price and set the purchase price too high and as a result in exchange for a large capacity the financial burden on end users was increased The solutions to this problem that have since been put into action were to restrict capacity frequently reduce the purchase price and abandon the FIT For example in Germany which boasts the highest PV capacity in the world it was decided that the purchase price would be reduced at monthly intervals Germany s cumulative capacity rose from 6 000 MW in 2008 to just under 25 000 MW in 2011 with around 7 500 MW installed in the year of 2011 alone The amount of funds that Germany invested in this expansion is truly staggering The total amount paid for all forms of renewable energy under the FIT was 13 6 billion EUR roughly 1 36 trillion JYP in just the year of 2011 with the monthly cost burden per household reaching 10 3 EUR roughly 1 000 JPY or more than 10 of the total amount of the average electricity bill Furthermore with future rapid expansion of PV it is expected to exceed 18 billion EUR annually in 2013 More than half of the cost burden was spent on PV but the amount of power generated was only 3 of the total power generation Hence Spiegel Magazine s criticism that Solar energy has the potential to become the most expensive mistake in the history of German environmental policy Therefore in April 2012 the purchase price was modified significantly There are three points involved in this 1 reducing the price by 20 32 from April onward 2 reducing the purchase price by 1 per month beginning in May and 3 and adjusting the size of the reduction should the annual new capacity target 2 500 3 500 MW be exceeded from November onward Similarly Spain the Czech Republic France and Italy have also experienced PV bubbles Figure 2 with sweeping systemic changes following one after the other Spain is the most extreme example having decided in 2012 to cease all new installations after having enacted restrictions on new capacity and a large reduction in the purchase price in the wake of a bubble As of 2007 Spain had an installed capacity of 700 MW but this rose sharply to approximately 3 500 MW in 2008 as a result of the high purchase price Thereafter as a result of limiting new capacity 1 500 MW and reducing the purchase price by 30 in 2009 capacity in that year fell by 100 MW Afterward in February 2012 the Spanish Parliament decided to discontinue the FIT for new installations This was due to the fact that the financial burden resulting from the FIT had increased roughly 500 billion JPY annually and as the government was not permitted to shift the cost to electricity bills while in the midst of an economic crisis this resulted in a massive budget shortfall making it difficult to maintain the system Other European countries have made similar modifications to their systems The Czech Republic has abandoned the FIT while France has changed to purchase price reductions at three month intervals for amounts less than 100 kW and a bidding system for amounts greater than 100 kW Italy installed 9 000 MW of new capacity in the year of 2011 and intends to reduce the purchase price by 32 36 and limit new capacity to 2 000 3 000 MW per year Figure 2 Annual changes in the PV capacity of European countries

    Original URL path: http://www.gepr.org/en/contents/20120514-01/ (2016-02-14)
    Open archived version from archive

  • My feelings as a disaster victim who had supported nuclear power — It is necessary to continue to think about the reality of the disaster and its true causes : Global Energy Policy Research
    to these issues even in areas where the evacuation zone has been lifted the return of residents is not proceeding as expected One must understand that this is the reality of the nuclear disaster Haphazard government administration and disaster prevention measures by the power companies There were major issues with the response to the accident at the power plant but there were equally large problems locally It became clear that the disaster prevention system up until then had been so much pie in the sky and the training was like practicing swimming on dry land First because the off site center failed being unable to perform its function it is hardly worth consideration This is supposed to be a facility into which a vast amount of funding was invested in order to respond to accidents presupposing that a disaster would occur However in actuality it served no purpose whatsoever Local government officials were enraged by the lack of communication from the national government but one would expect that they would acknowledge their own lack of preparedness The media who reported indifferently on disaster prevention drills based on overly optimistic scenarios had not the least inkling of awareness of the issues Roads in coastal areas were destroyed by the tsunami but we must be aware just how fortunate it was that in spite of the massive earthquake the main roads into the mountains were almost entirely unobstructed We must recognize that if there were a power outage it would be impossible to maintain supplies of gasoline and if they were to flee into the mountains even the means to communicate would be lost Although the populations are small in comparison with cities there were no buses to be found in any of the municipalities aside from the two towns of Okuma and Futaba for which the national government prepared buses and during the evacuation the large number of private cars caused a massive traffic jam The shocking compensation system When one lives the life of a refugee as long as this a disaster victim s interest focuses on compensation However the compensation system used by TEPCO has met with an extremely negative reception To give an example for illnesses that caused or were worsened by evacuation TEPCO decided that any cases first diagnosed after December 1 2011 would not be eligible for compensation When asked why December 1 was specified I was surprised by TEPCO s answer that All of the evacuation shelters in stadiums and so forth were closed at the end of October and we gave ourselves a margin of one month The majority of those who evacuated are still in temporary housing and despite the occurrence of suicides due to the stress they created this cold and thoughtless rule From the start TEPCO limited claims and it has not disclosed standards for payment of any kind When a claim is made it is assessed based on a maximum amount that they arbitrarily decided themselves Their attitude of If

    Original URL path: http://www.gepr.org/en/contents/20120709-01/ (2016-02-14)
    Open archived version from archive

  • Was the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant Accident “Made in Japan”? : Global Energy Policy Research
    fact lobbying in the U S is much more intense where the power companies tend to pepper the NRC with lawsuits In hindsight TEPCO s failure to implement tsunami countermeasures and lack of foresight regarding a total loss of power clearly constituted gross negligence and the government certainly became a victim of regulatory capture If their causes were attributed to the peculiarity of the Japanese people however other nuclear power plants around the world would be deemed safe Cultural theory misses the mark as a landing point for the lessons learned from this accident We have a globally common issue here and have no choice but To reflect the latest scientific knowledge in regulations as stated in the report The larger issue is where capture or captive appears in Section 5 2 3 Debate over Treatment of the Latest Knowledge Here the report characterizes NISA as being captive to FEPCO s lobbying activities over the adoption of ICRP recommendations in the regulations Electric utilities were urging for the relaxation of radiation protection regulations prior to the accident Consequently they attempted to steer respectively research on the health effects of radiation toward conclusions of fewer health hazards and views on radiation protection by experts inside and outside Japan toward conclusions supporting relaxation of protection and controls Translation of Japanese report A Japanese radiation researcher reading this would be incensed No researcher to my knowledge has presented scientifically flawed views as a consequence of steering by government Globally scientists who concur that the ICRP recommendations are excessive regulations are in the majority at least within the radiation biology field This fact is clear even from the academic papers collected internationally by GEPR The report provides the premise that the current radiation standards are more relaxed than what it should be but the Commission has not scientifically verified this Actually the government issued an evacuation notice for communities as low as 1 mSv year by excessively strict application of the ICRP recommendations As a result over 150 000 people affected by the accident remain unable to return to their homes 17 months later The biggest suffering from the Fukushima nuclear accident took the form of excessive evacuation which has become a secondary disaster Reports issued by the United Nations and Russian Government about the Chernobyl accident have explained that the secondary disasters have been greater than the health hazards from radiation The Japanese Government s report understandably cannot criticize the current standards but the Fukushima NAIIC of the National Diet of Japan which has been guaranteed autonomy has leaned on the convention that radioactivity is infinitely dangerous and denounced the associated parties with the colloquial Nuclear Village adage This type of writing is almost at the same level as the mass media When it comes to the environment or health Shichihei Yamamoto criticized the common Japanese fault of a tendency to promote excessive regulations that met with the social climate rather than to examine the matter scientifically In this context the non scientific

    Original URL path: http://www.gepr.org/en/contents/20120709-02/ (2016-02-14)
    Open archived version from archive

  • This Week’s Update — Considering Successions of Nuclear Technique (23rd July, 2012) : Global Energy Policy Research
    2 Mr Moriyasu Tokiwai former technical expert at CRIEPI Central Research Institute of Electrical Power Industry contributed a column High Safety Nuclear Power Plant Fast Neutron Reactor Reevaluation and Successions This Week s Link 1 Worldwide health effects of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident Summary Energy Environmental Science Stanford University researchers contributed the report But there are some questions They estimate risks about the death by using LNT hypothesis and that is not appropriate Video Is Fukushima Dangerous Distorted images of Japan Morley Robertson Nobuo Ikeda What s happen What was the cause in Fukushima Morley Robertson writer and DJ talk about distorted images of Japan after Fukushima nuclear plant accident with Nobuo Ikeda 21st Century Energy Challenges At the ARPA E 2012 summit Bill Gates and U S Energy Secretary Steven Chu discussed the largest energy challenges of the 21st century in the U S and around the world A Web TV Program Is radiation really so harmful Considering risks of nuclear power generation Japanese only Agora Institute who operates GEPR broadcasted a Web TV program Is radiation really so harmful Considering risks of nuclear power generation on internet video streaming channel Niconico Live on January 19th in Japanese only Nobuo Ikeda President of Agora Incorporated and three experts on radiation risk analysis and energy policy discussed about the situations after Fukushima nuclear accident Their opinions were consistent that potentiality of health damage caused by the Fukushima accident is very small GEPR will provide a summary about this program soon Podcast Agora Inc who operates GEPR releases a podcast program which was originally aired on Jan 19th 2012on internet video streaming channel Nico nico Live Is radiation really so harmful Considering risks of nuclear power generation Japanese only The panel Nobuo Ikeda Akihiro Sawa Jun Takada and Hiroyuki Matsuda

    Original URL path: http://www.gepr.org/en/contents/20120723-04/ (2016-02-14)
    Open archived version from archive

  • The Fukushima Accident and the NAIIC Report : Global Energy Policy Research
    for any single dose and at 100 mSv per month for multiple or continuing exposures Any lesser dose or dose rate should have no negative health effect at all not even a little bit for in a stabilised system little bits are corrected and do not stack up Figure 2 Monthly doses depicted as areas Red a radiotherapy dose to a tumour fatal to all cells 40 000 mSv per month Light red a radiotherapy dose tolerated by peripheral healthy tissue 20 000 mSv per month Green a suggested conservative safe dose 100 mSv per month AHARS At the point of the arrow current ICRP safe dose 0 1 mSv per month ALARA How different are these thresholds of measurable risk from the environmental radiation safety regulations applied at Fukushima Figure 2 depicts monthly doses as areas The red rectangle is a radiotherapy cell killing dose given to a tumour The light red rectangle is a radiotherapy dose to peripheral tissue from which members of the public usually recover and return home thankful for the treatment more in the Appendix The green rectangle is the safe monthly dose rate discussed here As High As Relatively Safe AHARS The area of the small dot is the public safe limit recommended by the International Committee on Radiological Protection ICRP Report 103 2007 recommendations aimed to be As Low As Reasonably Achievable ALARA that is 1 mSv per year This ALARA figure is 1000 times smaller than any danger level AHARS a discrepancy that can give rise to major misunderstanding For example on 5 April 2011 the Tokyo Electric Power Company TEPCO announced that 11 500 tonnes of water contaminated by 100 times the radioactivity regulation level would be discharged into the sea but that this presented no health hazard Understandably the Japanese people and others did not believe these apparently contradictory statements resulting in further loss of trust But the inconsistency was not the fault of TEPCO not the fault of anybody at all in Japan but the fault of international ALARA based advice The NAIIC Report has mistakenly taken an insular Japanese view of an international problem The consequences of ill considered safety standards At the time of the Cold War fear of radiation was an important and effective international political weapon Many people in democracies expressed their concern by marching demonstrating and voting for a radiation free life That is the motivation behind ALARA which makes no reference to any actual danger level the use of ALARA as a safety philosophy is the fault of everyone in the world then and now who pressed for a radiation free existence At a national level in Japan as elsewhere official regulations are effectively obliged to follow the ALARA based safety recommendations of ICRP So what were the consequences at Fukushima The impact of the actual radiation and the released radioactivity for workers and public have been zero as expected on the above criteria In the next 50 years there is unlikely to be more than one single case of radiation induced cancer buried among all the other natural cases There were superficial beta burns but no significant hospital casualties In the first few days when information was scarce evacuation was appropriate while questions of re criticality were checked out but within a couple of weeks it was suggested that residents should be encouraged to return home without risk It would have been good for them if they had done so Restrictions on the contamination of food by radioactive caesium were set at 500 Bq kg in July 2011 At this level the personal consumption of 1 tonne of contaminated food in four months gives a less hazardous dose than a single CT scan This food restriction had a catastrophic impact on the rural economy and on the confidence of mothers for their children the same was found in Scandinavia after Chernobyl where a similar restriction was relaxed to 6000 Bq kg after six months However in Japan driven by anxious parents the restriction has been tightened to 100 Bq kg April 2012 thereby escalating public concerns and further eroding trust Appeasing fear is not effective and the consequences are well known It causes not only a collapse of confidence in the structure of society but also a public health disaster due to stress resulting in suicides alcoholism hopelessness depression and bed wetting The IAEA 2006 report on the health consequences at Chernobyl describes a similar effect there but it has been largely ignored in Japan The effect of closing nuclear power stations in response to public fear in Japan and prospectively in Germany too is having serious effects on both the world economy and the world climate through the use of substitute fossil fuels all without reason or understanding Confidence and trust in society The Fukushima accident has been designated Level 7 on the INES scale which has increased alarm without substance or benefit Although talking up danger may control popular sentiment and be attractive to politicians on occasion it causes social stress and suppresses economic confidence For human society to work effectively there needs to be mutual trust Science is not sufficient on its own and a working appreciation of the world around us requires a two way dialogue leading to trust especially on less familiar science The point was emphasised in the Report of UK House of Commons Science and Technology Committee 9 July 2012 Explanatory education and discussion are required to build confidence in nuclear radiation as in other aspects of life on Earth At the time of the Cold War nuclear science was seen as intimidating and people avoided it But a useful appreciation of radiation is not especially difficult to grasp although some scientists anxious to preserve their patch prefer to emphasise that it is complex and sophisticated and build their careers sheltered behind screens of expertise In the 17th 18th and early 19th Centuries authoritative knowledge was broad but unfortunately today society encourages narrow expertise that unnecessarily reduces the overall visibility of an interdisciplinary subject like nuclear The required trust may be achieved not by imposing top down authority and compliance with regulations but by establishing devolved responsibility Some relevant examples show how trust that is built on de centralised involvement can work quickly and effectively for the general good even if the technical aspect of the risk involved is not fully understood by all those concerned The efficacy of the personal reactions of the Japanese people triggered by the earthquake on 11 March has already been remarked and admired Responsibility devolved to individuals was essential to their speed of action Nature has found a similar answer in the provision of protection to living cells attacked by radiation and other agents that often damage the molecules of life Cells have evolved a long list of design features and active repair mechanisms Chemical messages are sent between cells to enable them to fire fight together and mechanisms are stimulated and resources readied in case of further assaults hormesis But the brain is not informed one can imagine anthropomorphically how cells might agree that they do quite well on their own without micro management by head office Indeed as the experiences at Chernobyl and Fukushima have shown the brain does not know what to do in its attempts to help except excite panic with other brains Why bother the cells might say with justification our local radiation protection provision is far superior to anything ever put in place by conscious human action And that is true for all but the highest doses and dose rates That is why no one died from radiation at Fukushima On this view radiophobia may be seen as an affliction of the worried well Figure 3 A poster advertising the availability and benefit of scans using internal and external sources of radiation The quite harmless radiation dose 10 mSv from a single scan exceeds the dose received by eating 5 tonnes of food described as contaminated 100 Bq kg caesium 137 by the Japanese regulations introduced in April 2012 Figure 4 A plastic carrier bag giving simple accessible advice about personal responsibility for safety from ionising radiation ultraviolet in sunshine The advice engages with enjoyment of life and common sense not official safety regulations Use of radiation in medicine discussed between patient and doctor one to one is a positive context in which to learn of the benefits and risks to life The dose from a single scan either with external radiation CT or CAT scan or with an internal source SPECT or PET scan is about 10 mSv That means that provided scans are not repeated more than twice a week they should be harmless but nobody should need so many anyway Figure 3 shows a Japanese poster explaining such scans in simple terms It is not difficult to appreciate that the radiation both internal and external is just like the radiation from Fukushima Just two scans a year gives a dose 20 mSv as large as the level that made so many frightened near the evacuation zone If everyone went home nobody would get a dangerous dose If the connection with harmless medical doses was explained not by TEPCO or government officials but by doctors teachers and others in the community who are trusted the current radiation levels would be accepted Figure 4 shows a plastic shopping bag provided by a high street pharmacy in the UK The picture of children enjoying the sunshine carries sensible advice about avoiding sunburn Sunshine the imperfectly filtered radiation sent by the Sun a nuclear reactor includes ultraviolet This radiation can kill skin cells and cause skin cancer years later much like other forms of ionising radiation The difference is that most people have learnt to treat it with respect but still enjoy their summer holidays In particular by reducing the rate of exposure and waiting for adaption after a few days risk is reduced as with nuclear radiation The children learn about it and reminders are written on the bag which is not a product of international or even national top down regulation Other people take their vacations at spas offering radioactive waters and they too return home refreshed and none the worse for exposure to radiation These examples show that public attitudes to radiation are more accepting than the media and the more vocal activists would have everyone believe Highways are a well known source of accidents but with the benefit of instruction we have learnt to handle the dangers Of course when we drive in the car there is a place only a few metres away in the path of oncoming traffic where we do not go it would be fatal if we did That does not mean that others may not travel with us Responsibility is devolved to the conscious control of the driver Unfortunately there is no contribution at all towards safety from biological evolution like there is for ionising radiation We were not always so relaxed about road traffic In the early days serious accidents were relatively common and regulations very restrictive Nevertheless in 1896 coincidentally the year in which radioactivity was discovered the Red Flag Act was repealed in the UK and the major economic benefits of road transport were embraced We should take a similar adult view in the case of nuclear technology today for the same reason The economy needs it and it is far safer than road transport too There is no limit to the size of a possible natural disaster and it seems strange that in Japan it is thought reasonable that blame should be given for the consequences of an earthquake and tsunami as extraordinary as that of 11 March 2011 While other buildings and plant such as a major oil refinery were completely destroyed seemingly without public comment the nuclear reactors almost survived an assault far greater than that which they were designed to withstand The workers at the plant showed quite exceptional courage and dedication to duty under extremely adverse circumstances for which they deserve worldwide thanks and praise By coincidence the first anniversary of Fukushima in 2012 fell close to the centenary of the loss of the Titanic In that case the disaster resulted in 1517 deaths brought on by the hubris of those in charge of the ship and much of the British nation at that time By comparison at Fukushima there has been no death and the Japanese workers and management seem blameless There are always matters for improvement and the Japanese nation are famously self critical but the IIAC Report seems too eager to point fingers of blame in Japan and less ready to appreciate the true source of the problem which is a missing link a point of blindness in international thinking The need for new international radiation safety standards Under popular pressure for nuclear safety at the time of the Cold War national governments took political refuge behind the ICRP who publish recommendations for radiation levels that should be regarded as acceptable This means that all governments not just the Japanese must adhere to these guidelines more or less thereby providing an international top down safety structure As we have seen these guidelines designed to appease fears are misinterpreted as safety levels by legislators and members of the public In misguided attempts to reassure the ICRP has tightened its recommendations from 150 mSv per year in 1951 to 1 mSv per year for the public today In the light of what is now known this tolerance could be relaxed to about 1000 mSv per year without risk as explained in the Appendix Meanwhile over the past 60 years in all countries the industry required to watch over these draconian safety conditions has grown though doing no more than what society asked Its practitioners have homes families and careers and they have reason to guard their expertise but not surprisingly it is to them that governments often turn for advice Provision of this industry and the restrictive effect of regulations are a major gratuitous charge on the cost of nuclear technology Many have reacted to the Fukushima accident by pressing for tighter restrictions not understanding that this would exacerbate the problem as well as increase costs without benefit Others have worried that the release of radioactivity could easily have been much greater Such an escalation would have had a negligible direct radiation effect on health but the public panic due to inept regulations could have been even more serious The relaxation of these regulations and the public education to go with it would provide the greatest improvement in public safety not just in Japan but worldwide Tight safety regulations not radiation have caused the stress and economic damage at Fukushima Pressure to relax the safety guidance at an international level is urgently needed Appendix What is a safe dose and what is a safe dose rate Showing that the biological response to radiation is stabilised in the way illustrated in Figure 1 requires both an understanding of how the biology works and some firm results for real people experiencing real radiation Only when these two match can we be sure that we understand data alone or ideas alone are not enough Although there is always more to learn the current state of knowledge based on understanding and data is good enough to establish quite robust guidance for the purpose of safety Confidence is more important than precise numbers safety is more concerned with getting the powers of ten correct than worrying about factors like two or three As well as confirming the picture we also need to estimate repair times and thresholds from biological experiments medical data and radiation accidents Radiation and Reason and Public Trust in Nuclear Energy Radiation doses may be either acute for which there is no time for repair to reduce the cumulative effect of the dose or protracted for which stabilisation can reduce any health impact It was established long ago that health may be affected by radiation in one of two basic ways Cell death leading to Acute Radiation Syndrome ARS at a dose so high that resources are not available to replace cells that die this may cause death with high probability on a time scale of a cell cycle for important cells a few weeks at most Damage to DNA that is not repaired or suppressed by the immune system can lead to cancerous growth Typically this appears later in life when the immune system is less effective Radiation is only a minor additional cause of cancer and its contribution can only be distinguished statistically For example it was responsible for an increase of 5 cancer deaths among the survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki who died between 1950 and 2000 The other 95 of cancer deaths were not related to radiation Public concern for any nuclear or radiation risk has meant that no stone has been left unturned that might expose further evidence of cancer Often these studies have marginal statistical significance that would be dismissed in other scientific contexts That means that it makes sense to concentrate on a small number of sources of evidence where the radiation levels are the highest and the result is quite clear without using statistics More discussion can be found in The Fukushima Tragedy The data are needed to find answers for these four cases 1 cell death from an acute dose 2 cell death from a protracted dose 3 cancer from an acute dose 4 cancer from a protracted dose Cell death from an acute dose The 237 initial firefighters at Chernobyl received doses up to 7000 mSv in a short period Within a few weeks 28 were dead from ARS Their mortality followed a stabilisation curve like Figure 1 with a threshold of around 4000 mSv Most had less than 2000 mSv and none of those died Data for irradiated laboratory rats are similar Cell death from a protracted

    Original URL path: http://www.gepr.org/en/contents/20120723-05/ (2016-02-14)
    Open archived version from archive

  • This Week’s Update — World Energy Affairs (17th July, 2012) : Global Energy Policy Research
    of Japan From NHK news Ministry of the Environment of Japan began a service to display potential location for renewable energy on a Japanese map by using Google Earth 2 A better mix Shale gas will improve global security of energy supplies Economist This article showed reserves of the shale gas Reserves are abundant in the United States and China countries with high energy consumptions Therefore it points out that it is benefitial for both energy security and global warming policy Video Is Fukushima Dangerous Distorted images of Japan Morley Robertson Nobuo Ikeda What s happen What was the cause in Fukushima Morley Robertson writer and DJ talk about distorted images of Japan after Fukushima nuclear plant accident with Nobuo Ikeda 21st Century Energy Challenges At the ARPA E 2012 summit Bill Gates and U S Energy Secretary Steven Chu discussed the largest energy challenges of the 21st century in the U S and around the world A Web TV Program Is radiation really so harmful Considering risks of nuclear power generation Japanese only Agora Institute who operates GEPR broadcasted a Web TV program Is radiation really so harmful Considering risks of nuclear power generation on internet video streaming channel Niconico Live on January 19th in Japanese only Nobuo Ikeda President of Agora Incorporated and three experts on radiation risk analysis and energy policy discussed about the situations after Fukushima nuclear accident Their opinions were consistent that potentiality of health damage caused by the Fukushima accident is very small GEPR will provide a summary about this program soon Podcast Agora Inc who operates GEPR releases a podcast program which was originally aired on Jan 19th 2012on internet video streaming channel Nico nico Live Is radiation really so harmful Considering risks of nuclear power generation Japanese only The panel Nobuo Ikeda

    Original URL path: http://www.gepr.org/en/contents/20120717-04/ (2016-02-14)
    Open archived version from archive

  • This Week’s Update — How should We Build Consensus on Energy? (9th, July 2012) : Global Energy Policy Research
    coming soon National Diet of Japan Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission NAIIC opened their official report It showed that the accident was Made in Japan Dr Ikeda pointed out problem in this 3 Japan s energy situation has changed fundamentally after the accident in Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power One of the changes is in a stable supply of electricity The electricity could be used freely with just turning a switch However from now on there is a possibility that electric power shortage could be constant by stopping nuclear power plants Yumiko Iwafune Associate Professor Institute of Industrial Science the University of Tokyo contributed a column From 2011 Emergency Power Savings to 2012 Sustainable Power Savings In addition to her study in energy consumption she is active in enlightenment activities of power saving etc to the general pubic Iwafune pointed out that electricity savings in Japan in 2011 was achieved by the burdens on the economy and the people She gives an opinion that we should consider electricity savings in a way that effect meeting efforts reflecting 2011 experience This Week s News 1 Beware post crisis Made in Japan labels Financial Times This article introduced NAIIC s report and questioned that the crisis lie in shortcoming of Japanese culture Video Is Fukushima Dangerous Distorted images of Japan Morley Robertson Nobuo Ikeda What s happen What was the cause in Fukushima Morley Robertson writer and DJ talk about distorted images of Japan after Fukushima nuclear plant accident with Nobuo Ikeda 21st Century Energy Challenges At the ARPA E 2012 summit Bill Gates and U S Energy Secretary Steven Chu discussed the largest energy challenges of the 21st century in the U S and around the world A Web TV Program Is radiation really so harmful Considering risks of nuclear power

    Original URL path: http://www.gepr.org/en/contents/20120709-05/ (2016-02-14)
    Open archived version from archive

  • From 2011 Emergency Power Savings to 2012 Sustainable Power Savings : Global Energy Policy Research
    should have been more effort to create spare capacity in supply Nonetheless I expect that the peak demand for this summer will be met Kansai Electric Power will need to rely heavily on good luck i e It will be a cool summer If their peak demand does not fall onto other company s peak demand it may be possible for them to secure necessary amounts from other company s extra capacities Providing nothing goes wrong at their fossil fuel power plants Ultimately however the Kansai Electric Power s predicament can be overcome with supply from other company s spare capacities and help from the power saving actions If we were to include unreasonable power saving measures that would drop the GDP figure then they should most certainly be able to manage this summer On the other hand Tokyo Electric Power did not depend on nuclear power generation from the beginning and it looks as if they are building up for an ability to create a healthy spare capacity for this summer However managing the peak demand does not mean we have solved Japan s fundamental energy problems The real issue for today s Japan is the cost of fuel in the long run and the true solution to this problem will be for us to deal with power savings that lead to energy conservation i e the meaningful reduction in power consumption Right now we are substituting nuclear power generation with fossil fuel power generation and I hope the public is well aware of the fact that the fuel cost for fossil fuel is steadily increasing With this current situation even if the electricity companies cut labor costs significantly and close all unnecessary subsidiary companies the rate hike will be unavoidable as long as people consume electricity Under these circumstances managing peak demand would be meaningless without consideration to energy conservation For that matter we will not need to resume inefficient private power generation nor will we need an unreasonable fuel shift other than Kansai Electric Power without the resumption of Ōi Nuclear Power Plant We must start saving power that leads to conservation of energy I am not suggesting the energy conservation that would bear hardship but we must deliver power saving measures that are high in efficiency and sustainability This should go without saying but the efficiency must be balanced with effort Please refer to the website Power Savings in an Emergency Only in Japanese for power saving tips around you There are a lot of forward thinking tips such as no ironing for husband s shirts For the service sector we may need a bold investment though there should still be a lot of things that can be done especially for small to medium size companies to explore energy conservation and power saving methods that are highly cost efficient Critical issues for energy systems The peak demand problem is a serious problem and we made a big fuss about it last year However when we consider

    Original URL path: http://www.gepr.org/en/contents/20120423-01/ (2016-02-14)
    Open archived version from archive



  •