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  • State of Surveillance: Tunisia | Privacy International
    on the work of implementation of the ATT 14 Still this agency is considered illegal and unconstitutional 15 since its creation is a violation of the right to fair trial because defendants can not challenge evidence compiled by the ATT Furthermore the agency began to exercise without any framework that defines the crimes they are mandated to investigate since no law defines crimes of information systems and communication as mentioned in the 4506 decree These crimes of information systems nonexistent until the ATT s creation have been defined and incorporated in a bill for the Suppression on Networks leaked to the media in 2014 16 In parallel a draft Organic Law No 09 on the fight against terrorism and the prohibition of money laundering 17 was tabled in the National Constituent Assembly It contains five articles dealing with surveillance The vote on the bill was blocked at a meeting before the drafting committee could finish its work and be replaced by the new parliament POLICIES Freedom of Information Freedom of information and the right of access to information have been for decades the focus of a battle between civil society and successive governments Tunisia acceded to certain international treaties that mention the right of access to information Among these conventions the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1968 and the UNESCO Guiding Principles for the Development and Promotion of Governmental Public Domain Information Tunisia has also signed and ratified the United Nations Convention Against Corruption UNFCCC in September 2008 On the local level although no legislation was totally explicit and on access to information there were various legal instruments such as Article 8 of the Constitution of 1959 and the Act of 2 August 1988 section 3 which treat the communication of public records as well as other circulars of the Ben Ali era for the creation and regulation of relationships with citizens offices or the creation of the Directorate General of Information whose mission was to intervene to assist journalists in their investigations in 2007 No legal framework guarantees human rights nor press freedom by the law Chapter 15 of the old Labor Code does not guarantee a reporter access to information as part of the exercise of his work In addition the former Tunisian Press Code punished as a crime any interference with the president and the dissemination of information likely to create a public order disturbance Decree Law No 41 18 on access to administrative documents of public bodies came into effect on 26 May 2011 and marked the launch of a new social and administrative culture It was followed by an amendment supplementing it on 11 June 2011 by Decree Law No 54 19 Article 3 of which clearly states that Any natural or legal person is entitled to access administrative documents as defined in Article 2 of this Decree as well as to proactive disclosure upon request of the person concerned subject to the exceptions provided for in this Decree This set of laws require public bodies and other jurisdictions to establish a way to communicate to citizens documents and material information in order to promote a culture of transparency and improve relations with the government At the government level several administrative data services have been launched on the portal Gov Data 20 Even the Ministry of Internal Affairs has converted much information into open data 23 available online On 5 May 2012 the government sent a circular 21 insistently demanding that all public structures apply the decree laws on access to information Regarding media affairs the repressive press codes that had hampered investigative work and access to information have been repealed and replaced by Decree Law No 115 of 2011 22 Article 10 of the decree reaffirms this right of access stating The journalist just as any citizen has a right of access to information new data and statistics he has the right to obtain communication with their different sources depending on the conditions terms and procedures laid down by Decree Law No 2011 41 In September 2013 the Minister for Good Governance announced the revision of the decrees of open gov as they contain some vague provisions allowing a wide field to arbitrary interpretation but some items are formulated in a broad manner thus hindering their application Also among the shortcomings the lack of control of the access application process to information made by the citizen and the answer to which the latter may have recourse if his request was not met As soon announced the government launched a public consultation 23 to define with Tunisian adjustments to the Decree 41 After this public dialogue a draft organic law 24 on the right of access to Information was tabled at the meeting it should be studied by the new assembly elected representatives of the people In parallel the work of the National Constituent Assembly culminated in the adoption of a new constitution in January 2014 which gives access to information a constitutional status Article 32 25 states that The right of access to information is guaranteed The State is working to ensure the right to access to communication networks This article is a world first since no other constitution explicitly has such a right in its text However the regulatory framework around the access to information law is conditional on the law of protection of personal data particularly Article 16 of Decree Law 41 2011 and also the limitations of protection of private information related to property rights and if the requested documents affect a court decision or are confidential Furthermore Article 17 of Decree 41 2011 sets out the exceptions to access to information under the framework of justice and limit the publication of information or documents that could be detrimental Identification and registration of subscribers During the Ben Ali era laws required direct or indirect identification of telecommunications and internet users Since the Internet was not accessible to all in the 2000s the state required to Internet cafes called publinets to keep an updated record of certain data about their customers This practice is not widely respected today as publinets are less frequently used with the advent of broadly accessible and cheaper internet and mobile internet Each customer must present documentary evidence of his or her identity in order to purchase and activate a SIM card SIM operators must record customer data regarding their identities name surname date of birth address and national identity numbers CIN Operators are also obliged to share the specifications of the obtained licenses in order to update this database Moreover in March 2014 in a bilateral meeting between the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Information and Communication Technologies the ministries decided to revise the procedures for allocating SIM cards and strengthen requirements governing submission of supporting documents 26 In July 2014 the telecommunications regulator sent an order requiring Orange Tunisia to respect the rules governing the sale of SIM cards and the conclusion of subscription contracts 27 In June 2014 the government launched a tender to recruit a research firm to deliver the development of a unique identifier for every citizen 28 This project was created during the government of 2012 2013 29 and was approved by a Council of Ministers in October 2014 30 Unlawful monitoring boxes Under Ben Ali citizens lived in a constant state of doubt on the security and confidentiality of their communications as Ben Wagner explains in its report on the export of surveillance technology including in Tunisia Many were placed under physical and electronic surveillance especially the political opponents of the government Some were imprisoned and others became exiled and sought refuge in European countries Since the revolution for a brief period of time there was little persecution that appeared deliberately directed against a specific population group Yet since 2012 with successive terrorist attacks in Tunisia and in parallel the disturbing presence of Tunisian elements fighting in Syria the state is engaged in a battle against these groups and has increased surveillance accordingly The national investigative unit on terrorist crimes within specialized services of the Directorate General of National Security is the police unit specialized in this field It is dedicated to monitoring the internet related crimes and sometimes carries out preventive operations arrests often based on telephone and electronic communications as stated in the recent press releases of the Ministry of Interior 31 Still much surveillance remains illegal since no legal framework clearly defines online crimes as have been seen on the internet libertarians questioned by Nawaat during some arrests 32 ACTORS Regulatory bodies The regulation of the information technology sector and communication in Tunisia began in the early 2000s with the enactment of the first telecommunications code in 2001 This code gave rise to the creation of a main regulatory authority in charge telecommunications the national body of telecommunications INT 33 under the supervision of Ministry of Information and Communication Technologies 34 The State has created the national agency of frequencies ANF 35 to regulate broadcast media It is in charge of managing the frequency spectrum also under the Ministry of Information and Communication Technologies whose primary mission was to establish a regulatory framework that organizes the sector The code establishes the national Office of the Telecast ONT 36 responsible for the creation operation maintenance and expansion of distribution networks As for the Tunisian Internet Agency ATI 37 created in 1996 was long regarded as a regulator of the internet The agency acts as an Internet Service Provider and it is also an internet exchange point and registry responsible for the technical management of national domain names The ATI was created to work on developing the internet in Tunisia but will be diverted over a decade of this by requiring it to be host of the internet censorship and surveillance without necessarily being formally mandated The National Agency for Computer Security ANSI 38 was created in 2004 Its role is the overall control of IT systems and networks within the various agencies and ensures the implementation of the general strategy security of IT systems while conducting a periodic audit of the systems ANSI hosts TunCERT 39 an emergency response team responsible for monitoring and supervision with regard to cyber attacks and offering advice and information relating to the national security of the virtual space Another actor in the sector and which is also under the supervision of PCM is the National Certification Agency NDCA 40 it is responsible for secure e transactions and the Decree No 2001 2727 of 20 November 2001 to make the approval of encryption systems In addition the Center for Telecommunications Studies and Research CERT 41 different from the TunCERT department under ANSI provides technical expertise and study and is the sole authority to approve and technically control the import terminals of public telecommunications networks and radio equipment Besides the above mentioned structures that frame directly or indirectly the ICT space and have all worked together and in total opacity the Higher Communication Council CSC provides oversight of the ICT space It was created in 1989 by Decree No 238 42 but only recognized in 2008 through Law No 30 After amending the Telecommunications Code in 2008 INT was supported in its role as principal regulator specifically in relation to the Internet The reinforced body thus became responsible for the regulation of Internet resources such as registering domain names which was formerly the mission of the ATI which will nevertheless continue to exert the technical management side of this role It is important to note that the regulation of the Internet in Tunisia has never been transparent so it is almost impossible to conclude definitively which actors are responsible for which mandates even after the series of amendments made to the telecommunications code in 2013 The National Body for the Protection of Personal Data INPDP 43 was created in 2004 through Law No 63 which establishes the personal data protection regime in the country In 2007 Decree No 3003 defined its organization and functioning Shortly after the 2011 revolution priority was given to the reform of the spectrum regulator of the communications technology sector The functions of the agencies were redefined in order to ensure transparency INT kept his role of ICT regulator As for the broadcasting and the recommendations of the INRIC 44 responsible for the media sector reform the High Independent Authority of Audiovisual Communication HAICA 45 was established in 2012 Its mission is to regulate the media sector It was replaced under a constitutional body under Article 127 of the new Constitution 46 Communications Service Providers In 1997 Tunisia signed an agreement with the WTO 47 on the liberalization of telecommunications and the convention sector It provided a schedule of work to be accomplished between 1999 and 2003 which required the allocation of a particular second mobile license a license to a data transmission operator a license for a fixed operator and the opening of the capital of the incumbent Under the WTO roadmap and following the enactment of the Telecommunications Code in 2001 the authorities announced the end of the state monopoly in the telecommunications sector held until then by the operator Tunisie Telecom Market liberalization has allowed Ooredoo former Tunisiana to obtain a mobile telecommunications operator license 48 operational in 2002 Subsequently a second license for the establishment and operation of a public network for data transmission VSAT satellite was granted in 2004 to another private operator DIVONA Telecom A third license was won by Divona Orange for the provision of fixed telecommunications services combined mobile services with 2G 3G and in 2009 49 this operator will keep a monopoly on 3G for one year The operator Tunisie Telecom was partially privatized in July 2006 35 of its capital granted to Emirati consortium TECOM DIG in against of 3 05 billion dinars The operator Ooredoo when he was Tunisiana had as main shareholders Wataniya Telecom and Orascom Telecom But in 2012 after the seizure of the assets of the Ben Ali family the Tunisian government has sold 15 of the forfeited shares the operator Qtel and kept the remaining 10 Qtel thus became the largest shareholder with 90 Ooredoo same time the operator gets fixed and 3G license 50 The state seized 51 of the Orange Telecom shares previously held by the son of Ben Ali but as of early 2014 the legal battle is not over yet 51 These problems with the law have allowed the state to be represented in the capital of two operators in addition to the 65 stake it owns at Tunisie Telecom where it is represented by the Ministry of ICT However the market remains quite opaque about the practices of the various operators and ISPs in the use of data collected from their customers In March 2014 the National Consumer Institute INC has appealed to the three operators to safeguard the personal data of their customers 52 and to institute better governance practices Recent public statements regarding the arrest of groups considered terrorists by the Special Crisis unit of the current government often indicated that these operations were carried out based communication listener or monitoring Facebook pages However there is no concrete evidence to date of requests addressed directly to operators confirming their cooperation with justice as has been reported 53 Security and law enforcement agencies After the revolution of January 2011 the transitional government announced in March that the Security Directorate of the State DES who officiated as the political police of Ben Ali had been abolished 54 This directorate under the Ministry of Interior but actually applied the directives from the palace of the presidency took care of tracks and installation of microphones as well as physical surveillance in Tunisia and abroad IT collaborated with the Directorate General of Military Security MSB under the Ministry of Defence the General Directorate of specialized services DGHS and other foreign intelligence services 55 And because of the development of security risks the government organized a conference debate on the theme Intelligence services in democratic rule of law legitimation organization and control 56 the minister for good governance and combating anti corruption invoked the urgency of implementing a strategic restructuring plan of the Tunisian security services on the basis of the German experience The government decided in late November 2014 to set up a new intelligence agency security and defense under the Ministry of Defence But the Decree No 4208 2014 57 creating the agency provides no more details on its operation or its financing except that this project is supported and closely followed by the United States 58 The defense minister has just told the media that this structure will replace the general administration of military security incorporating levels of the collection and analysis of information and a third level responsible for determining the strategy to be adopted 59 In the same week the Tunisian Ministry of the Interior announced at a joint press conference with the British Embassy in Tunis the creation of a new strategic planning unit responsible for the management and prevention of hazards and terrorist attacks Funding for the supervision of its agents and the provision of specialized equipment would be by donation from the British 60 A few days before the end of 2014 without much detail the head of government inaugurated two new poles one safe for the fight against terrorism and organized crime and the second judicial specialized in terrorist cases 61 both depend respectively the Ministry of the Interior and the court of first instance of Tunis until the new Assembly of People s Representatives vote the new anti terrorism law In terms of international cooperation however necessary to strengthen the fight against terrorism Tunisia remains silent despite rumors about the installation foreign bases in Tunisia 62 EXAMPLES OF SURVEILLANCE Under the government of President Ben Ali regime multiple examples of surveillance of citizens were reported Bloggers and activists were arrested and detained and requested to disclose the passwords to their

    Original URL path: https://privacyinternational.org/node/743 (2016-04-27)
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  • State of Surveillance: Uganda | Privacy International
    MTN Uganda is estimated at around 6 months worth of call metadata Law enforcement access to stored data Under Section 8 the Regulation of Interception of Communications Act 2010 12 telecommunications and internet service providers are required to ensure that their services are technologically capable of allowing lawful interception and in such a way so that the target of the interception remains unaware of it Identification and registration of subscribers Registration of SIM cards has been mandatory in Uganda since March 2012 following a campaign of the Uganda Communications Commission which cited the Regulation of Interception of Communications Act 2010 as justification for the exercise 13 The UCC stated that SIM registration information would be kept confidentially by telecommunications operators in a secure data base UCC justified the initiative as necessary to h elp law enforcement agencies to identify the mobile phone SIM card owners t rack criminals who use phones for illegal activities c urb other negative incidents such as loss of phone through theft nuisance hate text messages fraud threats and inciting violence and h elp service providers network operators know their customers better 14 The cut off date for the exercise was March 2013 Nevertheless as of 2015 it is still possible to buy a functional unregistered SIM card in Uganda In 2015 the Ministry of Security reportedly ordered the UCC to verify information provided by telephone users in the SIM card registration exercise by matching data collected during the National Identity card registration exercise with that gathered in the SIM card registration exercise 15 ACTORS Regulatory bodies Uganda s telecommunications industry is governed by the Uganda Communications Commission UCC The Commission s mandate is to develop a modern communications sub sector and Infrastucture in Uganda in conformity with the operationalization of the Telecommunications Policy 16 The National Information Technology Authority is an autonomous statutory body established under the NITA U Act 2009 to coordinate and regulate Information Technology services in Uganda It is supervised by the the Ministry of Information and Communication Technology MoICT 17 Communications Service Providers Uganda s main mobile network providers are a mixed group of Ugandan African and international providers These include MTN Uganda a subsidiary of South African company MTN Airtel Uganda a subsidiary of Indian company Bharti Airtel Uganda Telecom partially government owned Africell Uganda formerly Orange Africell is an African company founded in The Gambia Smile Telecom an African provider incorporated in Mauritius Sure Telecom a subsidiary of Time turns Holding Ltd Cyprus 18 K2 Telecom a private Ugandan company Smart Telecom owned by the Industrial Promotion Services IPS Kenya which is part of the Aga Khan Fund for Economic Development AKFED 19 Vodafone Uganda a subsidiary of the British Vodafone group Security and law enforcement agencies The power to gather intelligence and conduct surveillance are concentrated around three institutions the Uganda People s Defence Force UPDF the Uganda Police Force UPF and the Office of the President State House The President exercises control over sensitive intelligence operations while day to day spying for intelligence gathering appears less centralised Senior leaders and technical experts within intelligence circles are often reshuffled and reassigned among these agencies on Presidential direction The 1987 Security Organisations Act 20 established the Internal Security Organisation ISO and External Security Organisation ESO These two agencies are directed by Director Generals appointed by and accountable to the President and exist to collect intelligence and provide advice on Uganda s security directly to the President The 2003 Police Act 21 gives the President the power to appoint the Police Inspector General and his deputy as well as the majority of the members of the Police authority which oversees police functions and veto power over any potential dismissals of senior ranking officials As Commander in Chief of the defence forces the President may appoint the Chief of Defence Forces and virtually all high ranking officials and enjoys discretionary powers over the activities of the High Command The National Security Council established in 2000 22 responds directly to the President and comprises cabinet ministers ISO ESO army and police officials most of which are appointed by the President and up to five additional members also appointed by the President and approved by Parliament The Joint Intelligence Committee composed of security experts appointed by the President and chaired by the Minister of Internal Affairs reportedly meets once a week to share intelligence on national security threats 23 An Information and Communication Technologies ICT Technical Committee within the Joint Intelligence Committee advises on technology purchases and is responsible for many decisions related to defence and intelligence procurement These powers are discussed in more detail in Privacy International s report For God and my President State Surveillance in Uganda 24 EXAMPLES OF SURVEILLANCE State authorities have proactively cultivated the popular perception that surveillance is systematic centralised and technically sophisticated This is not the case not yet at least According to a Privacy International investigation in 2015 25 the attributes that have made Uganda s human intelligence network strong and allowed it to infiltrate opposition and other circles considered threatening to the government are poorly suited to conducting communications surveillance on a large and automated scale Poor levels of technical training low pay and a culture of bribe taking has alienated the few educated and technically competent engineers that would be required to operate a nationwide surveillance system beyond monitoring a relatively small number of high value targets according to industry and government sources The government has also reportedly placed agents within the telecommunications switching centres but their skills vary and assignments are relatively simple for example the generation of call and contact lists the location of callers using cell tower data and audio recordings of specific lines based on human intelligence In late 2011 officials of the Chieftaincy of Military Intelligence CMI and Uganda Police Force UPF acting on presidential orders used an intrusion malware short for malicious software to infect the communications devices of key opposition leaders media and establishment insiders The

    Original URL path: https://privacyinternational.org/node/737 (2016-04-27)
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  • THE PRESIDENT'S MEN? Inside the Technical Research Department, the secret player in Egypt's intelligence infrastructure | Privacy International
    Contact Donate You are here Home THE PRESIDENT S MEN Inside the Technical Research Department the secret player in Egypt s intelligence infrastructure Date Wednesday February 24 2016 Privacy International s new investigation THE PRESIDENT S MEN Inside the Technical Research Department sheds light on the Technical Research Department a secret unit of the Egyptian intelligence infrastructure that has purchased surveillance equipment from German Finnish manufacturer of monitoring centres for

    Original URL path: https://privacyinternational.org/node/757 (2016-04-27)
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  • For God and My President: State Surveillance in Uganda | Privacy International
    here Home For God and My President State Surveillance in Uganda Date Thursday October 15 2015 Related Privacy 101s Communications surveillance Data Protection Mass Surveillance Related Tech Explainers Internet Monitoring Intrusion Location Monitoring Monitoring Centre Phone Monitoring Video surveillance Privacy International s new report For God and My President State Surveillance in Uganda exposes the secret surveillance operation and the government s attempts to buy further powerful surveillance tools including

    Original URL path: https://privacyinternational.org/node/659 (2016-04-27)
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  • Demand/Supply: Exposing the Surveillance Industry in Colombia | Privacy International
    Financial Opportunities Contact Donate You are here Home Demand Supply Exposing the Surveillance Industry in Colombia Date Wednesday September 2 2015 Related Privacy 101s Communications surveillance Data Protection Export Controls Mass Surveillance Related Projects Big Brother Incorporated Related Tech Explainers Internet Monitoring Analysis Audio surveillance Equipment Intrusion Location Monitoring Phone Monitoring Video surveillance Over a dozen international companies are supplying powerful communications surveillance technology in Colombia Privacy International examines the

    Original URL path: https://privacyinternational.org/node/638 (2016-04-27)
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  • Shadow State: Surveillance, Law and Order in Colombia | Privacy International
    are here Home Shadow State Surveillance Law and Order in Colombia Date Monday August 31 2015 Related Privacy 101s Communications surveillance Mass Surveillance Related Projects Global ARM Related Tech Explainers Audio surveillance Equipment Intrusion Location Monitoring Monitoring Centre Phone Monitoring For nearly two decades the Colombian government has been expanding its capacity to spy on the private communications of its citizens Privacy International s investigation reveals the state of Colombia

    Original URL path: https://privacyinternational.org/node/635 (2016-04-27)
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  • Tipping the scales: Security and Surveillance in Pakistan | Privacy International
    to the UN Legal Actions About Us Staff Trustees Financial Opportunities Contact Donate You are here Home Tipping the scales Security and Surveillance in Pakistan Authors Matthew Rice Date Tuesday July 21 2015 The Pakistani government has significantly expanded its communication interception activities This Privacy International report covers the intelligence services plan to capture all IP traffic in Pakistan and other initiatives pointing to gaps in the laws governing surveillance

    Original URL path: https://privacyinternational.org/node/624 (2016-04-27)
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  • Private Interests: Monitoring Central Asia | Privacy International
    Home Private Interests Monitoring Central Asia Related Privacy 101s Communications surveillance Export Controls Mass Surveillance Metadata What is Privacy Related Projects Big Brother Incorporated Related Tech Explainers Internet Monitoring Analysis Intrusion Location Monitoring Monitoring Centre Private Interests Monitoring Central Asia is a 96 page report detailing its findings from an extensive investigation into electronic surveillance technologies in Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan The report brings together the findings of PI s team of investigative researchers consultants and technical legal and policy experts and is the outcome of consultations with confidential sources regional experts individuals who have been targeted by state surveillance and surveillance and telecommunications companies It involved an extensive open source and literature analysis a technical review of nearly 100 sensitive documents detailing government contracts and technical specifications and in country trips to the region and elsewhere The purpose of this report is to foster an effective policy and legislative response to the developing global surveillance industry by highlighting specific types of actors and technologies As perceived and actual security threats continue to be met by governments with increased censorship and surveillance and as the industry continues to offer states cheaper and more sophisticated and efficient options for

    Original URL path: https://privacyinternational.org/node/293 (2016-04-27)
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