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  • Donate to protect privacy around the world! | Privacy International
    to help fund the whole of Privacy International s work Would you like to Gift Aid your donation Yes No I confirm I have paid or will pay an amount of Income Tax and or Capital Gains Tax for each tax year 6 April to 5 April that is at least equal to the amount of tax that all the charities or Community Amateur Sports Clubs CASCs that I donate to will reclaim on my gifts for that tax year I understand that other taxes such as VAT and Council Tax do not count I understand the charity will reclaim 25p of tax on every 1 that I give Credit Card Information Card Type select Visa MasterCard Amex Discover Card Number Security Code Expiration Date month Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec year 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 Billing Name and Address Billing First Name Billing Middle Name Billing Last Name Street Address City Country select United Kingdom Afghanistan Åland Islands Albania Algeria American Samoa Andorra Angola Anguilla Antarctica Antigua and Barbuda Argentina Armenia Aruba Australia Austria Azerbaijan Bahamas Bahrain Bangladesh Barbados Belarus Belgium Belize Benin Bermuda Bhutan Bolivia Bonaire Saint Eustatius and Saba Bosnia and Herzegovina Botswana Bouvet Island Brazil British Indian Ocean Territory Brunei Darussalam Bulgaria Burkina Faso Burundi Cambodia Cameroon Canada Cape Verde Cayman Islands Central African Republic Chad Chile China Christmas Island Cocos Keeling Islands Colombia Comoros Congo Republic of the Congo The Democratic Republic of the Cook Islands Costa Rica Côte d Ivoire Croatia Cuba Curaçao Cyprus Czech Republic Denmark Djibouti Dominica Dominican Republic Ecuador Egypt El Salvador Equatorial Guinea Eritrea Estonia Ethiopia Falkland Islands Malvinas Faroe Islands Fiji Finland France French Guiana French Polynesia French Southern Territories Gabon Gambia Georgia Germany Ghana Gibraltar Greece Greenland Grenada Guadeloupe Guam Guatemala Guernsey Guinea Guinea Bissau Guyana Haiti Heard Island and McDonald Islands Holy See Vatican City State Honduras Hong Kong Hungary Iceland India Indonesia Iran Islamic Republic of Iraq Ireland Isle of Man Israel Italy Jamaica Japan Jersey Jordan Kazakhstan Kenya Kiribati Korea Democratic People s Republic of Korea Republic of Kosovo Kuwait Kyrgyzstan Lao People s Democratic Republic Latvia Lebanon Lesotho Liberia Libya Liechtenstein Lithuania Luxembourg Macao Macedonia Republic of Madagascar Malawi Malaysia Maldives Mali Malta Marshall Islands Martinique Mauritania Mauritius Mayotte Mexico Micronesia Federated States of Moldova Monaco Mongolia Montenegro Montserrat Morocco Mozambique Myanmar Namibia Nauru Nepal Netherlands New Caledonia New Zealand Nicaragua Niger Nigeria Niue Norfolk Island Northern Mariana Islands Norway Oman Pakistan Palau Palestinian Territory Occupied Panama Papua New Guinea Paraguay Peru Philippines Pitcairn Poland Portugal Puerto Rico Qatar Reunion Romania Russian Federation Rwanda Saint Helena Saint Kitts and Nevis Saint Lucia Saint Pierre and Miquelon Saint Vincent and the Grenadines Samoa San Marino Sao Tome and Principe Saudi Arabia Senegal Serbia Serbia and Montenegro Seychelles Sierra Leone Singapore Sint Maarten Dutch Part Slovakia Slovenia Solomon Islands Somalia South Africa South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands South Sudan Spain

    Original URL path: https://privacyinternational.org/?q=civicrm/contribute/transact&reset=1&id=1 (2016-04-27)
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  • Donate to protect privacy around the world! | Privacy International
    Bahrain Bangladesh Barbados Belarus Belgium Belize Benin Bermuda Bhutan Bolivia Bonaire Saint Eustatius and Saba Bosnia and Herzegovina Botswana Bouvet Island Brazil British Indian Ocean Territory Brunei Darussalam Bulgaria Burkina Faso Burundi Cambodia Cameroon Canada Cape Verde Cayman Islands Central African Republic Chad Chile China Christmas Island Cocos Keeling Islands Colombia Comoros Congo Republic of the Congo The Democratic Republic of the Cook Islands Costa Rica Côte d Ivoire Croatia Cuba Curaçao Cyprus Czech Republic Denmark Djibouti Dominica Dominican Republic Ecuador Egypt El Salvador Equatorial Guinea Eritrea Estonia Ethiopia Falkland Islands Malvinas Faroe Islands Fiji Finland France French Guiana French Polynesia French Southern Territories Gabon Gambia Georgia Germany Ghana Gibraltar Greece Greenland Grenada Guadeloupe Guam Guatemala Guernsey Guinea Guinea Bissau Guyana Haiti Heard Island and McDonald Islands Holy See Vatican City State Honduras Hong Kong Hungary Iceland India Indonesia Iran Islamic Republic of Iraq Ireland Isle of Man Israel Italy Jamaica Japan Jersey Jordan Kazakhstan Kenya Kiribati Korea Democratic People s Republic of Korea Republic of Kosovo Kuwait Kyrgyzstan Lao People s Democratic Republic Latvia Lebanon Lesotho Liberia Libya Liechtenstein Lithuania Luxembourg Macao Macedonia Republic of Madagascar Malawi Malaysia Maldives Mali Malta Marshall Islands Martinique Mauritania Mauritius Mayotte Mexico Micronesia Federated States of Moldova Monaco Mongolia Montenegro Montserrat Morocco Mozambique Myanmar Namibia Nauru Nepal Netherlands New Caledonia New Zealand Nicaragua Niger Nigeria Niue Norfolk Island Northern Mariana Islands Norway Oman Pakistan Palau Palestinian Territory Occupied Panama Papua New Guinea Paraguay Peru Philippines Pitcairn Poland Portugal Puerto Rico Qatar Reunion Romania Russian Federation Rwanda Saint Helena Saint Kitts and Nevis Saint Lucia Saint Pierre and Miquelon Saint Vincent and the Grenadines Samoa San Marino Sao Tome and Principe Saudi Arabia Senegal Serbia Serbia and Montenegro Seychelles Sierra Leone Singapore Sint Maarten Dutch Part Slovakia Slovenia Solomon Islands Somalia South Africa South

    Original URL path: https://privacyinternational.org/?q=civicrm/contribute/transact&reset=1&id=6 (2016-04-27)
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  • Printer-Friendly View | CiviCRM
    Enter your email address and click Subscribe You will receive a confirmation request via email shortly Your subscription will be activated after you respond to that email Email

    Original URL path: https://privacyinternational.org/civicrm/mailing/subscribe?gid=2&snippet=2 (2016-04-27)
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  • Mailing List Subscription | Privacy International
    Reports Submissions to the UN Legal Actions About Us Staff Trustees Financial Opportunities Contact Donate You are here Home Mailing List Subscription Enter your email address and check the box next to each mailing list you want to join Then click the Subscribe button You will receive a confirmation request via email for each selected list Activate your subscription to each list by responding to the corresponding confirmation email Email

    Original URL path: https://privacyinternational.org/civicrm/mailing/subscribe (2016-04-27)
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  • Maria del Pilar Saenz | Privacy International
    reads Explainers Reports State of Surveillance Briefings Investigations Research Reports Submissions to the UN Legal Actions About Us Staff Trustees Financial Opportunities Contact Donate You are here Home Maria del Pilar Saenz Maria del Pilar Saenz is a Project Coordinator at Privacy International Network partner Karisma Foundation She is a Physicist by profession and an activist by vocation She is an enthusiast of free software and free culture Privacy International

    Original URL path: https://privacyinternational.org/node/848 (2016-04-27)
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  • Colombia’s new spying scandal: Time for real change | Privacy International
    partners in Colombia a copy of Privacy International s report Shadow State Surveillance Law and Order in Colombia to form part of the evidence for the investigation into the latest spying scandal The report was submitted electronically and physically to the Inspector General s office on 26th February What the Inspector General will see DIPOL and the Integrated Recording System The aspects of the report relating to the Directorate of Police Intelligence DIPOL should make for sobering reading for the Inspector General The report reveals technologies purchased by DIPOL as far back as 2005 Our legal analysis suggests that DIPOL has no mandate to operate these technologies which are capable of intercepting the same types if not more Colombians private communications data than the lawful warrant based interception system operated by the Attorney General s office In 2005 DIPOL put out a call for tenders to provide equipment necessary to monitor 3G networks as part of an Integrated Recording System IRS in Spanish Sistema Integrado de Grabación Digital con destino a la Policía Nacional This system was conceived to surpass the interception of pre assigned targets and to automatically collect massive communications traffic across 16 trunk communication lines As DIPOL clarified to companies bidding to provide this solution the solution should include mass storage of traffic over all input E1 lines The existence and procurement of this equipment should pique scepticism over the Police s previous public statements concerning the nature of the communications surveillance infrastructure in Colombia The Government has consistently maintained that the surveillance system developed in the late 1990s and early 2000s known as Esperanza administered by the Attorney General s office was the only method through which interceptions could take place legally and technically In the past police officials from the Police Directorate of Criminal Investigation and Interpol DIJIN have said exactly that We are subordinated to the administrative control of the Fiscalía Attorney General s office Nothing is activated if not technically authorised by Esperanza If Esperanza was the only route through which surveillance could be operated technically and legally why did DIPOL respond to questions about the IRS system s connection to Esperanza that In no place are we talking about applying this development to the Esperanza system And when asked again about the new system s connections to the Attorney General s warrant based interception system No they the probes don t come from the Esperanza switch In addition to the Integrated Recording System there are suggestions that other types of surveillance technologies had been used to track and suppress the La FM investigation According to a journalist working on the La FM story his cursor had moved without him touching it while he was working with sensitive documents While this report in no way conclusively proves of the existence of hacking tools in Colombia reports from Citizen Lab and information revealed in a leak of documents relating to Italian company Hacking Team suggest that their product Remote Control System had been sold

    Original URL path: https://privacyinternational.org/node/800 (2016-04-27)
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  • Civil society organisations remain seriously concerned by Pakistan’s Prevention of Electronic Crimes Bill | Privacy International
    other rights the right to privacy The amended Bill continues to mandate that service providers retain data about Pakistanis telephone and email communications for a minimum of one year This requirement drastically expands the surveillance powers of the Pakistan government and goes against the growing consensus that the blanket retention of all subscribers data is an unlawful and disproportionate interference with the right to privacy The Bill also maintains provisions that allow for unchecked intelligence sharing with foreign governments The Bill would allow the Federal Government to unilaterally share intelligence gathered from investigations with foreign intelligence agencies without any independent oversight The statement highlights comments from the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights last year on the right to privacy in the digital age that intelligence sharing arrangements that lack clear limitations risk violating human rights law The Bill s provisions do not come close to achieving any limitation on this power Despite negotiations and revisions in the last six months through a hard won multi stakeholder consultation process the Bill fails to address the serious concerns raised by civil society The joint statement asks for the slate to be wiped clean and a new bill worked on bringing it into line with fundamental rights found in Pakistan s constitution and international human rights treaties Comment from Matthew Rice Advocacy Officer Privacy International The role of civil society groups in debates and discussions around bills is deeply important as a safeguard against bad laws that undermine fundamental rights Unfortunately throughout the process of drafting the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Bill civil society has first been locked out and then when consulted ignored It is clear that this Bill still has many problems in it which civil society has been united in identifying Yet the Information Technology Standing Committee has been

    Original URL path: https://privacyinternational.org/node/680 (2016-04-27)
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  • Prevention of Electronic Crimes Bill: Security without Oversight in Pakistan | Privacy International
    the intent of speeding up the process of getting the draft bill to the National Assembly Members of both the standing committee and rights organisations have condemned the lack of transparency and unwillingness to take on board vital input from civil society stakeholders Once more civil society has taken a stand against the Bill and its passage to the floor of the National Assembly Recently Digital Rights Foundation working with Privacy International and other organisations such as ARTICLE 19 Human Rights Watch and Association for Progressive Communications have called for the current version of the Prevention of Electronic Crime Bill to be scrapped and the process for drafting the Bill restarted Digital rights organisations support effective and progressive legislation that tackles cybercrime This is in stark contrast to comments made by Pakistani Minister of State for IT Telecommunications Anusha Rehman who asserted on May 20th that elements are making a hue and cry so that no laws against cyber crimes could be enacted in the country The 2015 PEC bill does not effectively or adequately tackle cybercrime What it does do is dangerously undermine the right to privacy of all Pakistani citizens at a time when new information about Pakistan s security services policies and practices have brought an added focus to the effect of surveillance on Pakistan society Personal security and privacy two concepts that Pakistan has officially endorsed by signing various international declarations are tenuous in practice in Pakistan Privacy International s report Securing Safe Places Online points out encryption is banned by the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority PTA as of 2010 due to being non standard means of communication and hidden In Privacy International s report Tipping The Scales Security Surveillance in Pakistan published in July 2015 it is discussed that digital service providers are required to ensure that their network systems are lawful interception compliant As the Hacking Team and NSA leaks indicate however Pakistan s intelligence and security agencies seem to have no trouble using extra legal means of carrying out surveillance on Pakistani citizens even if that includes infecting devices As the report stated the Pakistani government is a confirmed user of intrusion technologies which enable the remote hacking of targeted devices Due to the manner in which the PEC Bill has been amended abuse or broad interpretations of the Bill is more than possible The basis upon which intelligence would be necessary in the interest of integrity security or defence of Pakistan is murky especially with relation to public order decency or morality Material that satirises the state or calls for non violent protests for instance may be construed as being against public order or decency The definition of what qualifies appears to rely less on reasoned legal and social input and more on Potter Stewart s famous quote I know it when I see it Blasphemy and offensive material also make their presence in the PEC Bill Section 34 of the draft PEC Bill for example gives power to any officer authorised to

    Original URL path: https://privacyinternational.org/node/682 (2016-04-27)
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