archive-org.com » ORG » P » PRIVACYINTERNATIONAL.ORG

Total: 465

Choose link from "Titles, links and description words view":

Or switch to "Titles and links view".
  • Analysis | Page 10 | Privacy International
    surveillance system to monitor destructive ideas on social networks Watching the polls How spying imperils elections What does GCHQ know about our devices that we don t Explaining the law behind Privacy International s challenge to GCHQ s hacking After HMRC ruling what will Government do about potentially illegal exports of surveillance technology Intelligence agencies and workers rights political surveillance at its worst NETMundial a long way to go to

    Original URL path: https://privacyinternational.org/blog?page=9 (2016-04-27)
    Open archived version from archive


  • Victory! UK surveillance tribunal finds GCHQ-NSA intelligence sharing unlawful | Privacy International
    the NSA s mass surveillance programme UPSTREAM that exploits the US geographical position as the internet and telecommunications switching center for the world and involves the interception of fibre optic cables running through the country Other programmes part of UPSTREAM to which GCHQ has had access include CO TRAVELLER which collects five billion locational records a day and DISHFIRE which harvests 194 million text messages daily The top five programmes within UPSTREAM created 160 billion interception records in one month alone GCHQ s access to NSA material therefore makes up the large bulk of all surveillance material handled by the security services some ex GCHQ staffers estimated that 95 per cent of all SIGINT signals intelligence material handled at GCHQ is American Indeed in his witness statement to the Investigatory Powers Tribunal in May 2014 Charles Farr attested that The immense value of GCHQ s relationships with the NSA for the UK in part reflects the fact that the US intelligence agencies are far larger and much better resourced than the Intelligence Services In simple terms the US can provide the UK with intelligence that the UK with its far more limited resources could not realistically obtain by itself Historical illegality But this has been going on for far longer than PRISM has been in existence For more than 60 years GCHQ has been recieving raw intercept from NSA Indeed the original 1946 Five Eyes agreement the UKUSA agreement stipulates that all raw traffic shall continue to be exchanged except in cases where one or the other party agrees to forgo its copy The details of the modern day UKUSA arrangement remain secret despite legal attempts to obtain them including FOI requests in all Five Eyes countries and an ongoing legal challenge from Privacy International in the European Court of

    Original URL path: https://privacyinternational.org/node/485 (2016-04-27)
    Open archived version from archive

  • Computers vs humans: Why there's no difference between who, or what, looks at your data | Privacy International
    reasonable articulable suspicion standard Judge Walton observed that the RAS had been so frequently and systematically violated that it can fairly be said that this critical element of the overall regime has never functioned effectively Weak and ineffective as the RAS may be we haven t seen any attempt at applying similar protection in the UK or elsewhere In the UK Section 8 4 of RIPA exempts the GCHQ from describing the persons interception subjects and the premises for surveillance in a warrant when the communications are external A l eak ed NSA presentation shows clearly just how flawed modern mass surveillance is In an attempt to develop identifier leads the presentation lays bare the stages of processing developing leads or suspect lists through data interception passes through four phases of analysis and processing Once collected there is no limit to how much the data can be analysed with the only new protections and justifications being carried out at the very last stage before it is viewed by human eyes Both collection and enrichment analyses are carried out with no justifications at all Justifying mass surveillance has become as easy as getting signed off on broad statutory authority for the collection and asking analysts to select a threat scenario from a ready made drop down menu every time they want to dive into the data pool An inaccurate process The private communications of everyone caught in this net are subjected to experimentation in an attempt to determine how suspicious they are Emails and phone calls with friends and family internet searches on medical conditions and web browsing showing political views will all be examined and graded So how intrusive is the final stage before human eyes look at the individual communications How much processing is done to the communications of people who are not suspected for any criminal activity The figures say it all For analysts just setting out identifiers will yield between 50 and 10 000 leads through the initial three stages of surveillance One training document shows that at that stage only 5 per cent of the communications are of definite interest to the agency 20 per cent are definitely irrelevant and the rest is of uncertain relevance In the NSAs presenters own words the analyst is often left with too many identifiers of possible interest Today asymmetrical privacy protections based on origin mean it is common for intelligence agencies to differentiate in standards of safeguards between the communications of citizens and foreigners However after generating the lead lists and intercepting the communications the computer systems are actually incapable of distinguishing the origins In result agencies like the GCHQ and NSA mandated only to collect foreign intelligence happily trawl broad swathes of domestic communications as well The origin or foreignness is only determined at the third stage of the surveillance of the process Prior to that point the data is readily analysed albeit not manually and enriched in preparation for the surveillance officer A s much as 49

    Original URL path: https://privacyinternational.org/node/486 (2016-04-27)
    Open archived version from archive

  • Will new government in Indonesia bring about surveillance reforms? | Privacy International
    technology has been increasing These facts make the proposed changes while overdue all the more important The privacy Prolegnas The Indonesian government s legislative programme known as prolegnas sets the legislative priorities for the new government led by the President Widodo Widodo elected in 2014 was presented as a change to the past lineage of leaders drawn from the political or military elite In December 2014 a proposed list of bills to be considered priorities was released which included a number of bills relating to communications surveillance and privacy Specifically these included the Draft Bill on Interception procedure the Draft Bill on Mutual Legal Assistance the Draft Bill on Protection of Personal Data and Information and the Draft Presidential Regulation on a National Interception Center While these bills are yet to be drafted and their provisions analysed the inclusion of them in the prolegnas would represent an important step towards much needed reform Before the bills are drafted however the prolegnas must be agreed upon Right now that is facing problems The priorities of the prolegnas appear to be the subject of extensive political debate between two rival coalitions in the legislative body the ruling Great Indonesia Coalition led by the President and the opposition Red and White Coalition It is critical that even during these debates that proposals to overhaul surveillance in Indonesia are addressed in a real and substantive way given Indonesia s past experiences with surveillance Past experiences with problems of surveillance technology may have negatively affected Indonesians appreciation of technology In 2011 internal military documents exposed the Indonesian miitary s surveillance of peaceful activists politicians and clergy in the province of Papua without any form of judicial warrant Indonesia has also been tied to the purchase of advanced surveillance technology from Gamma Group that allows for

    Original URL path: https://privacyinternational.org/node/475 (2016-04-27)
    Open archived version from archive

  • It's time for our governments to stop eavesdropping and start listening | Privacy International
    if that s what they are interested in what numbers aren t they paying attention to 594 659 the number of signatories to Stop Watching Us a US campaign against mass surveillance 53 the amount of US researchers in cryptography and information security who called on the US government to resist the deployment of mass surveillance programs in advance of sound technical and social controls 417 the number of human rights organisations who support the International Principles on the Application of Human Rights to Communications Surveillance 10 the world s major internet companies that demanded a reform to government surveillance 10 276 the number of signatories to Don t Spy On Us a campaign against UK surveillance overreach 300 the amount of academics who have spoken out against mass surveillance These numbers have not piqued the interest of our intelligence agencies or the governments they serve Nor has this number Eight Consistent condemnation That s the number of regional and international expert bodies and mechanisms that have pronounced NSA and GCHQ mass surveillance a gross violation of human rights The onslaught began in December 2013 with the report by the President s Review Board specially constituted by President Obama to scrutinise the Snowden revelations The Board condemned the NSA s mass surveillance programmes stating that the government should not be permitted to collect and store all mass undigested non public personal information about individuals to enable future queries and data mining for foreign intelligence purposes The Review Board s report was echoed in the UN General Assembly s resolution in December 2013 which expressed it s deep concern at the negative impact that surveillance and or interception of communications as well as the collection of personal data in particular when carried out on a mass scale has on the exercise of human rights This was quickly followed by the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board s report in January 2014 on the bulk collection of telephone met data programme also known as Section 215 programme The PCLOB found that not only does US bulk collection of metadata fail to comply with the Patriot Act it also violates the Electronic Communications Privacy Act and raises concerns under both the First and Fourth Amendments The European Parliament s LIBE Committee Inquiry into the NSA surveillance programmes delivered its report in February 2014 which found that the fight against terrorism can never be a justification for untargeted secret or even illegal mass surveillance programmes takes the view that such programmes are incompatible with the principles of necessity and proportionality in a democratic society In July 2014 the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in a report entitled The right to privacy in the digital age pronounced in the strongest terms The very existence of a mass surveillance programme thus creates an interference with privacy Her findings were reinforced in October 2014 by the UN Special Rapporteur on counter terrorism and human rights eminent barrister Ben Emerson QC who condemned mass electronic surveillance by

    Original URL path: https://privacyinternational.org/node/94 (2016-04-27)
    Open archived version from archive

  • In wake of prosecutor's shooting, Argentinian human rights group releases report on troubled intelligence agencies | Privacy International
    he was meant to testify before Congress regarding a complaint involving several political officials In this context the Asociación por los Derechos Civiles ADC has published its report El des control democrático de los organismos de inteligencia en Argentina The un democratic control of the intelligence bodies in Argentina This report provides a detailed account of how the intelligence bodies function in Argentina and the serious irregularities in terms of its norms and operations this system presents The internal removal in the Intelligence Secretariat and the incidents regarding the AMIA case where from the onset the Secretariat was involved in concealing rather than to clarify the at terrorist attack presents a unique opportunity for democracy in Argentina to take action regarding the intelligence system The intelligence is an autonomous body of states officials and parastatal which acts in the shadows manages millions of pesos in reserved funds which are used to pay off judges and journalists and to spy on politicians businessmen public officials and citizens in general Since 1983 it is a system that has been presented as being completely autonomous but is actually an essential part of the Argentinian presidency It serves the wishes of the President but at the same time is able to maintain its own agenda which constitutes a real threat for democracy in Argentina and the rights of citizens The report published outlines the legal and political reasons behind the problem which can be summarised as follows Argentinian democracy adopted a structure of intelligence without controls and converted itself in one of the most powerful pillars of the Presidency In addition it developed unprofessional services dedicated to domestic spying and the management of reserve fund for which it is accountable to no one Finally Congress despite affirming on several occasions the necessity to make

    Original URL path: https://privacyinternational.org/node/95 (2016-04-27)
    Open archived version from archive

  • Looking to MLATs: A step towards transparency for intelligence sharing agreements | Privacy International
    emails and IP addresses are shared between these five countries regularly Information sharing between the United States and United Kingdom is so strong that SIGINT customers in both capitals seldom know which country generated either the access of the product itself The Five Eyes agreement has been enlarged and appended as needed and is often amended on a bilateral basis Unfortunately the current legal underpinning of the Five Eyes agreement remains shrouded in mystery and is therefore immune from public scrutiny A lack of transparency means that policy is given supreme precedence over the rule of law MLATs are a radically different yet workable way to structure such agreements MLATs What they are and how they work MLATs are law enforcement tools that allow States to request another country to locate wanted individuals issue warrants share evidence obtain testimony freeze bank accounts or repatriate seized assets MLATs are frequently applied to the sharing of online information And like intelligence sharing agreements an overarching template for cooperation is filled in with a detailed set of below the waterline rules and regulations Unlike informal intelligence sharing agreements however MLATs are subject to international treaty law Bilateral MLATs already exist between the United States the United Kingdom Canada and Australia These treaties were created between the U S and these Five Eyes partners in the 1980s and 1990s MLATs often contain references to respecting the domestic laws of the receiving party and some even attempt at protecting privacy rights For example Access writes that the multilateral Inter American MLAT indicates that the law of the receiving state should indicate the protections for third parties who have a stake in the requested items Intelligence sharing can be easily modelled on MLATs In fact the structure of the U S U K MLAT is remarkably similar to the 1946 intelligence sharing agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom known as the UKUSA agreement which is now public The current U S U K MLAT calls on each party to assist one another in providing documents records and evidence locating or indentifying persons executing requests for searches and seizures identifying tracing freezing seizing and forfeiting the proceeds and instrumentalities of crime and assistance in related proceedings and other such assistance as may be agreed In much the same way the 1946 UKUSA Agreement outlines the products to be shared collection of traffic acquisition of communications documents and equipment traffic analysis cryptanalysis decryption and translation and information regarding communications organizations practices procedures and equipment Both the UKUSA Agreement and the U S U K MLAT allow either party to withhold information if it is in the national interest to do so As past intelligence sharing agreements are substantially in accord with MLATs there is little reason for them to remain behind closed doors Benefits to modelling intelligence sharing agreements between the Five Eyes on MLATs With some effort intelligence sharing agreements could be re fashioned as formal treaties like MLATs Treaties provide predictability and rule

    Original URL path: https://privacyinternational.org/node/96 (2016-04-27)
    Open archived version from archive

  • On democracy day, its time for intelligence agencies to tell the truth | Privacy International
    had known all too well the dark deeds that take place in dark corners far from public scrutiny In particular the people of East Germany had experienced first hand the perils of security agencies operating behind closed doors the subsequent publication of Stasi files has been a harsh reminder of the corrupting nature of unconstrained and unaccountable power Britain has long regarded itself as a bastion of democratic ideology As the birthplace of the Westminster system and women s suffrage and home of rigorous public debate and political engagement Britain has prided itself as a leader and exporter of democracy It has held itself out as a worldwide leader in providing access to public data and has headed up the open government movement designed to make governments around the world more open accountable and responsive to citizens Yet when it comes taking responsible for the failings and overreach of its security services Britain suffers from an appalling lack of accountability and an almost complete unwillingness to be open and transparent in any way In the face of overwhelming evidence including documentary evidence that has been publicly verified by the United States government over the past 18 months the UK government has consistently refused to confirm any of the programmes of mass surveillance that GCHQ are operating This stonewall faced when it comes to discussing communications surveillance is not a function of a democratic society The culture of Neither confirm nor deny of political cheerleaders that present themselves as oversight committees and of a body politic that appears to have no interest in asking real questions of substance to these intelligence agencies have left the UK in a state of democratic disrepair in the oversight of our intelligence agencies This stretches across the UK security services Repeated questioning of the Metropolitan

    Original URL path: https://privacyinternational.org/node/97 (2016-04-27)
    Open archived version from archive



  •